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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON THE EVALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS
BY
MERLIN MACK HANAUER
April 2011
Committee Chair: Dr. Paul J. Ferraro
Major Department: Economics
This dissertation comprises four chapters. The unifying theme is the evaluation
of environmental programs. Specifically, each chapter examines some facet of the
impacts of protected areas.
The first chapter examines the heterogeneous environmental and economic
impacts of protected areas in Costa Rica. Previous studies suggest that Costa
Rica’s protected area system induced both reduced deforestation and alleviated
poverty. We demonstrate that these environmental and social impacts were spatially
heterogeneous. Importantly, the characteristics associated with the most avoided
deforestation are the characteristics associated with the least poverty alleviation. In
other words, the same characteristics that have limited the conservation
effectiveness of protected areas may have improved the social welfare impacts of
these areas. These results suggest that ‘win-win’ efforts to protect ecosystems and
alleviate poverty may be possible when policymakers are satisfied with low levels of
each outcome, but tradeoffs exist when more of either outcome is desired.
The second chapter explores in more detail the heterogeneous impacts of
protected areas in Costa Rica and Thailand. In particular we investigate the
potential for protected areas to act as a mechanism for poverty traps and use
semiparametric models to identify the spatial congruence of environmental and
economic outcomes. We find no evidence that protected areas trap historically
poorer areas in poverty. In fact, we find that poorer areas at baseline appear to have
xiv
the greatest levels of poverty reduction as a result of protection. However, we do
find that the spatial characteristics associated with the most poverty alleviation are
not necessarily the characteristics associated with the most avoided deforestation.
We demonstrate how an understanding of these spatially heterogeneous responses to
protection can be used to generate suitability maps that identify locations in which
both environmental and poverty alleviation goals are most likely to be achieved.
In the third chapter we address the mechanisms through which protected areas
affect economic outcomes. Using recently developed quasi-experimental methods
and rich biophysical and demographic data, we quantify the causal post-treatment
mechanism impacts of tourism, infrastructure development and ecosystem services
on poverty, due to the establishment of protected areas in Costa Rica prior to 1980.
We find that nearly 50% of the poverty reduction estimated in a previous study can
be attributed to tourism. In addition, although the mechanism estimates for the
infrastructure and ecosystem services proxies are negligible, we argue that the
results provide evidence that enhanced ecosystem services from the establishment of
protected areas has likely helped to reduce poverty. The results provide additional
information to policy makers that wish to enhance the future establishment of
protected areas with complementary policy.
The final chapter studies the economic impacts of protected areas in Bolivia. We
find that municipalities with at least 10% of their area occupied by a protected area
between 1992 and 2000 exhibited differentially greater levels of poverty reduction
between 1992 and 2001 compared to similar municipalities unaffected by protected
areas. We find that the results are robust to a number of econometric specifications,
spillover analyses and a placebo study. Although the overarching results that
Bolivia’s protected areas were associated with poverty reduction are similar to
previous studies , the underlying results are subtly, but significantly, different. In
previous studies it was found that controlling for key observable covariates lead to
xv
fundamentally antithetical results compared to na¨ıve estimates. Conversely, these
results indicate that na¨ıve estimates lead to an over-estimation of the poverty
reducing impacts of protected areas. The results expose the heterogeneity of
protected area impacts across countries and, therefore, underscore the importance of
country-level impact evaluations in order to build the global knowledge base
regarding the socioeconomic impacts of protected areas.
xvi
Chapter I
Protecting Ecosystems and Alleviating Poverty with Parks and Reserves:
‘Win-Win’ or Tradeoffs?
Introduction
National parks and reserves are globally popular approaches to protecting
biodiversity and the supply of ecosystem services (MEA 2005). These protected
areas now cover approximately 12% of the world’s terrestrial surface, with few
nations lacking a protected area system (WDPA 2009). Despite the ubiquity of
protected area systems, the published scientific evidence related to their
environmental impacts is sparse and comprises predominantly case study analyses
(MEA 2005, Joppa and Pfaff 2010). The evidence base related to their impacts on
neighboring human communities is much weaker (Coad et al. 2008). A debate has
emerged over whether the environmental goals of protected areas conflict with
poverty alleviation goals, particularly in developing nations (Adams et al. 2004,
Wilkie et al. 2006, Coad et al. 2008). Opponents highlight the role that protected
areas can play in limiting agricultural development and exploitation of natural
resources. Proponents highlight the role that protected areas can play in supplying
ecosystem services, promoting tourism and improving infrastructure.
Empirical studies have found that protected areas, on average, are effective in
reducing deforestation, although not as much as proponents may have expected
(e.g., Cropper et al. (2001), Andam et al. (2008), Pfaff et al. (2009). Only a few well
1
2designed empirical studies have examined protected area impacts on socioeconomic
outcomes in surrounding populations. They have found either no effect (Duffy-Deno
1998, Lewis et al. 2002, 2003) or a positive average effect (Andam et al. 2010, Sims
2010). As with most empirical studies in environmental policy, prior research on
protected area impacts tends to focus on either environmental or social outcomes,
but not both, and estimate only mean treatment effects.
In order to better understand the way in which a protected area system affects
environmental and social outcomes, one must examine the two outcomes jointly and
elucidate how different subpopulations are impacted. The econometric and program
evaluation literature tends to focus primarily on the estimation of mean treatment
effects, paying little attention to the impacts of treatment on population subgroups
(Manski 2005, Crump et al. 2008). Yet, as noted by Manski (2005), average
treatment effects may not provide sufficient information to a social planner whose
goal is to maximize a specific social welfare function. For example, a medication
may have positive mean health impacts on the treated population as a whole, yet
men and women may respond differently. Suppose that the positive treatment
effects are driven by males’ strong responses whereas the medication has no, or
deleterious, impacts on women. A physician would be remiss in prescribing such a
medication without conditioning on subgroup characteristics.
Understanding subgroup impacts allows for the formulation of what Manski
(2005) terms conditional empirical success (CES) rules. CES rules select treatments
that maximize average impacts based on observable covariates (Manski 2005 pp.75).
In the context of environmental policy, decisionmakers must possess an
understanding of the heterogeneous impacts of ecosystem protection conditional on
biophysical and demographic characteristics. For example, a planner may generate
little avoided deforestation when establishing protected areas on high slope land if
this land would likely remain forested in the absence of protection because it is less
3suitable for agriculture. Similarly, in an attempt to minimize negative
socioeconomic impacts from land-use restrictions, a planner may not want to place
protected areas in regions that comprise high proportions of agricultural workers if
the opportunity costs of conservation in such regions greatly outweigh the local
benefits from protected areas.
Costa Rica is an ideal setting for studying CES rules related to protected areas.
Costa Rica is a biodiverse developing nation with rich and reliable spatially explicit
data on biophysical and demographic characteristics. It was an early adopter of
protected areas in the late 1960s and early 1970s and, by 2000, had protected about
25% of the nation. Despite these efforts to protect ecosystems, however, Costa Rica
experienced a substantial amount of deforestation over the last 50 years: of the
approximately 3 million hectares of forest in 1960, more than 1 million had been
deforested by 1997 (Andam et al. 2008). The Costa Rica government has
established a goal to be a model of sustainable development in Central America
(Rubin and Hyman 2000). Most importantly, the available empirical evidence
(Andam et al. 2008, 2010) suggests a ‘win-win’ scenario in which both avoided
deforestation and poverty alleviation were, on average, achieved in and around
Costa Rican protected areas. In order to examine this conjecture more deeply, we
examine the heterogeneity of the protected area impacts conditional on biophysical
and demographic characteristics. We find that the characteristics associated with
the most avoided deforestation are the characteristics associated with the least
poverty alleviation. While our analysis confirms that Costa Rica’s protected areas
system did lead to moderate levels of avoided deforestation and poverty alleviation,
even among high-poverty areas, it also points to tradeoffs if decisionmakers desire
higher levels of either outcome.
4Background
Two studies of the impacts of protected areas on avoided deforestation (Andam
et al. 2008) and poverty (Andam et al. 2010) comprise the point of departure for
our study. Both studies use quasi-experimental matching techniques to obtain
estimates of the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). Estimating the
ATT is akin to asking, “what would deforestation or socioeconomic outcomes have
been had these areas not been protected?” Using digital forest cover data, Andam
et al. (2008) estimate the amount of avoided deforestation between 1960 and 1997
that can be attributed to the designation of protected areas prior to 1980.1
Conventional methods of analysis in the conservation literature simply compare
deforestation outcomes on protected and unprotected parcels. Using these methods
yields estimates that imply protected areas were accountable for a 44% reduction in
deforestation. These estimates are inherently biased due to the nonrandom
designation of protection. Protected land parcels are observably different from
unprotected parcels based on covariates that have been found in other studies to
affect deforestation. To control for selection on observable characteristics, the
authors create a representative counterfactual group by matching unprotected land
parcels to protected parcels based on key observable covariates. The resulting
estimate of avoided deforestation is a more modest 11% reduction in deforestation
attributable to protection. Their study confirmed that protected areas did indeed
prevent deforestation, but because they tend to be placed on land that is undesirable
for agriculture, the deforestation they avoid is modest. The placement of protected
areas on land poorly suited for agriculture is a global phenomenon (MEA 2005).
Andam et al. (2010) use Costa Rica census tracts (segmentos) as the units of
analysis to estimate the impact of protected areas established prior to 1980 on
1They also estimate the impact of protected areas established after 1980, but the focus of our
analysis is on the areas established before 1980.
5poverty between 1973 and 2000. Similar to Andam et al. (2008), the authors use
matching techniques to form a counterfactual sample that is similar to the treated
census tracts based on observable covariates that are believed to affect both
designation of protected areas and socioeconomic outcomes. Their results indicate
that the mean poverty was 1.3 points lower in census tracts with more than 10% of
their area protected compared to similar matched census tracts with less than 1%
protected land. This reduction is equivalent to an effect size of 0.2 (impact divided
by standard deviation of the matched control group). Selection bias was substantial
because protected areas tend to be placed in high poverty areas with low potential
for economic growth. A simple comparison of census tracts with and without
protected areas would lead to biased estimates that imply protected areas
exacerbated poverty.
Data
Baseline Data Sets
We use data from Andam et al. (2008) and Andam et al. (2010) to estimate the
heterogeneous impacts of protection, conditional on biophysical and demographic
characteristics. The deforestation analyses use digital forest cover boundaries from
1960 and 1997, and georeferenced land characteristics that are believed to influence
both the designation of protected areas and deforestation (see Table 1 and Andam
et al. (2008) for details). To ensure comparability, the sample land parcels from
Andam et al. (2008) are used. Forest cover outcomes are calculated using
geographic information systems (GIS) and digital forest cover maps from 1960 and
1997. Twenty thousand three-hectare land parcels (minimum mappable unit) were
selected at random from the 1960 forest cover layer. This layer pre-dates protected
areas and thus serves as the baseline forest cover,which can be compared across time
to the 1997 forest cover. Forest cover is represented by a binary indicator: a land
6parcel is considered forested if it has greater than 80% canopy cover. The outcome
for each land parcel is denoted by a 0 if it had not been deforested by 1997 and a 1
if it had been deforested. To determine if a land parcel is considered protected for
the analyses, a layer containing all protected areas established prior to 1980 is
overlaid with the land parcels. Costa Rica’s protected areas system includes
International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) management categories Ia,
I, II, IV and VI, which represent the level of land-use restrictions: Ia being the most
strict. The proportions of these IUCN categories in our sample are: Ia&I = 0.038; II
= 0.43; IV = 0.038; VI = 0.496. Land parcels within the boundaries of a protected
area receive and indicator of treatment.2 Similar overlays are performed with other
data layers to create a set of covariates associated with each observation.
In the socioeconomic analyses, the unit of observation is the census tract. The
1973 census is used as the baseline year (see Appendix A) and demographic data are
geocoded to their respective census tracts to form a set of covariates for each
observation. In 1973 Costa Rica contained 4,694 census tracts with an average size
of 8.82km2 (range: 0.00466-836 km2). To determine if a census tract is considered
protected for the analyses, a layer containing all protected areas established prior to
1980 is overlaid with the census tracts. As in Andam et al. (2010), a census tract is
considered protected if at least 10% of its area is occupied by protected land (results
are robust to changes in this threshold definition).3 Conversely, any census tract
2Of the 20,000 land parcels in the random sample, 3,380 were protected prior to 1980. To avoid
potential bias in estimates we follow Andam et al. (2008) and drop any land plot that was protected
between 1980 and 1997 from the pool of potential counterfactual observation. 4,717 land parcels are
excluded prior to the analysis for various reasons, justification for which can be found here: http:
//www.pnas.org/content/suppl/2008/10/14/0800437105.DCSupplemental/0800437105SI.pdf
3We use the 10% threshold in accordance with Andam et al. (2010). A 10% threshold was chosen
because protecting 10% percent of the worlds’ ecosystems was the goal of the 4th World Congress
on National Parks and Protected Areas (Andam et al. 2010). Andam et al. (2010) show that their
results are robust to changes in this threshold value (alternatively defined as 20% and 50%).
7Table 1: Summary statistics and description of covariates used as controls to form counterfactual samples.
Standard
Variable Description Mean Median Deviation Range
Deforestation Covariates
High Productivity Land Land Use Capacity I, II or III 0.008 0 0.09 0-1
Land suitable for agricultural production.
May require special land and crop
management (classes II & III).
Medium-High Land Use Capacity IV 0.0289 0 0.167 0-1
Productivity Land Moderately suitable for agricultural
production; permanent of semi-permanent
crops
Medium-Low Land Use Capacity V, VI or VII 0.0802 0 0.272 0-1
Productivity Land Strong limiting factors on agricultural
production.
Distance to Forest Edge Distance (km) to the edge of the forest in 2.79 2.35 2.19 0.0001-11.2
1960
Distance to Road Distance (km) to nearest road in 1969. 16.99 14.28 11.62 0.04-53.31
Distance to Major City Linear distance (km) to nearest major 77.4 56.9 49.53 9-180.5
city: Limon, Puntarenas or San Jose.
Socioeconomic Covariates
Baseline Poverty Poverty index measured in 1973. 14.9 15.8 6.43 -6.4-28.9
Forest Cover Percentage of census tract 0.412 0.383 0.342
occupied by forest in 1960.
% High Productivity Percent of census tract occupied by Land 0.118 0 0.22 0-1
Land Use Capacity I, II or III land
%Medium-High Percent of census tract occupied by Land 0.295 0.04 0.377 0-1
Productivity Land Use Capacity IV land.
%Medium-Low Percent of census tract occupied by Land 0.347 0.156 0.387 0-1
Productivity Land Use Capacity VI, VII or VIII land.
Distance to Major City Average linear distance from each 300m2 57.3 49.7 41.28 0.0037-208
(km) land plot within a census tract to nearest
major city: Limon, Puntarenas or San Jose.
Roadless Volume The sum of the product of area and 308,000 66,400 699,100 0.28-7,590,000
distance to nearest road (1969) for every
square with side length 100m
within the census tract.
8that contains less that 1% protected land is considered unprotected and a binary
treatment indicator is assigned accordingly.4 A poverty index is derived for each
tract from census data following Cavatassi et al. (2004). Higher levels of poverty are
associated with greater poverty index values (negative poverty index values indicate
low levels of poverty). The censuses from which the poverty index is derived were
conducted in 1973 and 2000. In the analyses, the poverty index calculation for 2000
is the outcome of interest. To match tracts on baseline characteristics, we use the
matching covariates used in Andam et al. (2010), which include the 1973 poverty
index and other baseline covariates that affect both protected area location and
economic growth (see Table 1 and Appendix A for more details). As noted in
(Andam et al. 2010) there were some protected areas established prior to our
baseline year (1973). However, a majority of the protected areas in our sample
(approximately 85%) were established between 1973 and 1979. Further, when we
drop the protected areas that were established prior to 1973 from the analysis, the
qualitative results remain the same.
Subgroup Variables
Agriculture has played a central role in the history of deforestation and economic
growth in Costa Rica (de Camino Velozo et al. 2000). For protected areas to stem
deforestation, they must be placed in areas in which the forest was at risk of
conversion to other uses and they must be enforced. Thus we wish to estimate
treatment effects within subgroup covariates that capture the returns to agriculture,
the dependence of an area on agricultural activity, and the ease of enforcement. All
threshold values used to define subgroups are baseline, pre-protection values, and we
test the sensitivity of our results to the choice of these thresholds.
4Of the 4,691 census tracts, 249 are considered protected (treated) prior to 1980 and 4164 are
considered potential counterfactual observations. To avoid bias in the analysis, 278 tracts with
protection between one and ten percent are dropped from the analysis.
9Land use capacity is a measure of land’s suitability for cultivation that takes
into account such factors as soil, precipitation, climate and slope (see Table 1).
Land parcels designated as land use capacities 1, 2, 3 or 4 are denoted as land with
high returns to agriculture. In a related study, Pfaff et al. (2009) estimate how
avoided deforestation between 1986 and 1997 on protected Costa Rican land parcels
varies according to geographic characteristics that categorize the parcels as either
“high” or “low” pressure. They use slope as a subgroup variable under the
assumption that high-sloping land is less productive and more costly to cultivate (it
is also more costly to log). To permit comparisons between our study and their
study, as well as to provide another proxy for returns to agriculture in an area, we
designate land with a slope of more than 23% as high-slope areas (the median value
of the deforestation analysis sample).
The returns to agriculture are higher on land that is closer to cities with
markets. Yet cities also tend to be the seats of government enforcement of
deforestation laws and thus their proximity to a plot may have a countervailing
effect on ecosystem conversion. In other words, parcels far from cities may have low
returns to agriculture, but less enforcement of land-use laws. Cities also provide a
tourism gateway and thus may further mediate the economic impacts of protected
areas. As a measure of access to markets we use the distance to one of Costa Rica’s
three major cities. Land parcels more than 57 kilometers of San Jose, Puntarenas or
Limon are considered to be high-distance parcels (the median value of the
deforestation analysis sample).5 We also ran analyses with distance to road, which
is a covariate that captures the same economic relationships as distance to cities,
but we omit it from the final analyses because it provides qualitatively similar
results to distance to major city as a measure of access to markets. Among treated
5Pfaff et al. (2009) use distance to San Jose.
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parcels, distance to major city and distance to road have a (Pearson’s) correlation
coefficient of 0.704.
The aforementioned covariates are measures of the characteristics of the land
parcel. To characterize the economic conditions in the surrounding area, we use the
percentage of adults employed in the agricultural sector in the census tract.
Robalino (2007) presents a theoretical model that predicts negative economic
impacts from protected area will be stronger in areas with greater proportions of
agricultural workers. We define areas with high-baseline agricultural workers as
census tracts with more than 13% of the workers employed in agriculture (the
median value of the poverty analysis sample).
As a final variable to form subgroups for analysis, we chose a variable based on
policy-relevance rather than theory. As noted in the Introduction, the relationship
between protected areas and poverty is important in international environmental
policy debates (Adams et al. 2004, Wilkie et al. 2006, Coad et al. 2008). Thus
differences in outcomes for low-poverty and high-poverty regions are of interest to
decisionmakers. We define an area as high-poverty if it has a baseline poverty index
of greater than 18 (the median value of the poverty analysis sample).
Methods
Estimator
Andam et al. (2008) and Andam et al. (2010) use matching techniques as
identification strategies to estimate the average treatment effect on the treated
(ATT).6 Naturally, once an area is protected one is unable to observe what would
6ATT is the appropriate estimand in these studies because the interest lies in the sample of areas
that were protected as compared to areas that could have been protected (unprotected areas that
are similar to protected areas based on key covariates). Alternatively, the average treatment effect
(ATE) additionally imputes values for all control units (finds the best match from the treatment
group). Given that there are many observational units that would never feasibly be selected for
protection, using ATE as the estimand makes little sense.
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have happened in this area had it not been protected (termed the fundamental
problem of causal inference by Holland 1986). Matching therefore constructs an ex
post counterfactual group of unprotected units that is observably similar to the
group of protected units in terms of key covariates believed to affect both outcome
and selection into treatment. The underlying goal is to achieve balance across the
key covariates similar to that achieved by a randomized experiment. To achieve this
balance, Andam et al. (2008) and Andam et al. (2010) use bias-adjusted nearest
neighbor Mahalanobis matching.
Our study uses a quasi-experimental design to conduct subgroup analyses. We
form an ex post control group, based on observable covariates, on which we conduct
subgroup analyses with the ATT as the estimand of interest. Subgroup analyses are
relatively rare in the program evaluation literature (Crump et al. 2008), but can
provide valuable insight even when average treatment effects are not significantly
different from zero (Crump et al. 2008, Imbens and Wooldridge 2009). Perhaps the
most common method of subgroup analysis is the use of interaction terms in a
regression framework. However, even if this type of approach were preceded by
matching (Ho et al. 2007) or trimming (Imbens 2004, Imbens and Wooldridge 2009),
the subgroup treatment effect estimate is more similar to the Average Treatment
Effect (ATE) than the ATT. Crump et al. (2008) suggest estimating separate
regression functions (parametric or nonparametric) for treatment and control
groups, and testing for differences in the coefficients on the subgroup variable.
While this approach is more transparent, it too is an estimand that is more in-line
with ATE than ATT.
We propose an estimator that uses regression-adjusted imputation methods (see
Imbens (2004), Abadie et al. (2004), Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) and a general
form matching-based variance estimator (Abadie and Imbens 2006, Imbens and
Wooldridge 2009) to estimate subgroup effects in terms of ATT. The advantage of
12
this approach is that it allows for the estimation of confidence intervals to compare
point estimates across subgroup pairs, while still allowing transparent comparison of
subgroup effects to the overall ATT.
Like nearly all estimators for treatment effect we use the form τ̂ =
∑
N
λi · Yi
where Yi is the outcome for unit i and λi is a known weight such that
∑
i:Ti=1
λi = 1,∑
i:Ti=0
λi = −1, where Ti is the treatment indicator for unit i.7 Letting s indicate the
subgroup of interest, the subgroup ATT estimator is
τ̂ s =
∑
N
λsi · Y si . (1)
where
Y si =
 Y
s
i if Ti = 1
Ŷ si = Y
s
i:T=0 + µ̂0 (Xi:T=1)− µ̂0 (Xi:T=0) if Ti = 0
(2)
and µ̂0(·) represents the predicted values obtained from combining the coefficients
from a control group regression, of outcome on covariates, with the respective
treated and control covariates.8 Because we are interested in the ATT, our
estimator is
τ̂ s =
∑
Ni:T=1
λsi · Y si +
∑
Ni:T=0
λsi · Ŷ si . (3)
Variance
Variances for these subgroup ATT estimates are calculated using a general method
proposed by Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) which is related to the method
proposed by (Abadie and Imbens 2006). The method permits heteroskedasticity
7The simplest example of weights would come from one-to-one matching without replacement.
In this case λi:T=1 = −λi:T=0 = 1/NT=1. In general the weight is based upon the estimation
strategy (i.e., propensity score weighting, kernal matching etc.). For our purposes λi:T=1 = 1/NT=1,
λi:T=0 = #C/NT=0, where #C is the number of times an observation is used in the control group.
8The imputations are calculated by plugging the covariates Xi:T=1 and Xi:T=0 into the vector
of coefficients from the regression Yi:T=0 = Xi:T=0β0 + ε to obtain µ̂0 (Xi:T=1) and µ̂0 (Xi:T=0),
repectively.
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across treatment arms (protected, unprotected) and covariates. Matches are chosen,
based on covariates, within treatment arms and the difference in outcome between
these matches forms the basis for the variance estimation
σ̂2i (Xi) = (Yi − Yl)2 /2. (4)
Where Yl is the outcome of the nearest within treatment arm neighbor. This
conditional variance estimate is then used to estimate the variance for the sample
V̂ (τ̂) =
∑
N
λ2i · σ̂2i (Xi) . (5)
These variance estimates can then be used to form confidence intervals by which
the point estimates of the differences between treated and control subgroups can be
evaluated.9
Inference
There are two components of our estimator τ̂ s, delineated by high baseline levels of
the covariates mentioned in the Data Section, τ̂H , and low baseline levels, τ̂L.
Protected and unprotected units are assigned to high and low subsets based on an
established threshold =. Assignment to subgroup s ∈ [L,H] is conducted according
to the following rule
si =
H if xi > =
L otherwise.
(6)
Each subgroup pair is composed of units xs=Hi with corresponding estimator τ̂
H
and units xs=Li with corresponding estimator τ̂
L. The estimator τ̂H is therefore
calculated by comparing the outcomes of protected and unprotected units for which
9All ATT point estimates and associated variances were programmed in R v.2.9.1. The code is
available from the authors upon request.
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xs=Hi . Similarly, the estimator τ̂
L is calculated by comparing protected and
unprotected units for which xs=Li . These estimators address how protected units
with high baseline levels of a covariate, for instance, would have fared had they not
been treated by comparing them to similar unprotected units with high baseline
levels of the same covariate.
Greater interest lies in the comparison, within subgroup pairs, of the two
components of the subgroup estimator than in the respective point estimates. We
want to compare the ATT estimates of high-baseline units to the ATT of
low-baseline units for each set of subgroup pairs. Specifically we want to know if
τ̂H 6= τ̂L, which is an indication of heterogeneous subgroup response to treatment.
Let Cs
(
τ̂ s, V̂
)
=
[
τ̂ s − c ·
√
V̂ (τ̂ s), τ̂ s + c ·
√
V̂ (τ̂ s)
]
be the 95% confidence
interval for subgroup s, where c is the appropriate critical value associated with the
normal distribution. Let C = CH ∩ CL be the intersection of the high and
low-baseline covariate components of Cs. If C = ∅ then there is a statistically
significant difference between the point estimates of τ̂H and τ̂L within subgroup
pairs. In other words, the absence of an intersection between the confidence
intervals of two subgroup ATT point estimates provides evidence that the point
estimates differ statistically. For instance, suppose that for some baseline covariate
the subgroup pair deforestation outcomes have the relationship τ̂H > τ̂L and C = ∅.
This supposition would indicate that those units with high baseline levels of the
covariate exhibited statistically greater amounts of deforestation than those units
with low baseline levels of the covariate. Conversely, if in the previous example
C 6= ∅ we cannot draw any statistically meaningful conclusions regarding
heterogeneous treatment effects, in spite of the observed point estimates τ̂H > τ̂L.
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Implementation
We begin by creating two counterfactual control groups for the deforestation and
socioeconomic subgroup analyses. To ensure comparability, we follow the methods
of Andam et al. (2008) and Andam et al. (2010) closely. There are two primary
concerns in the formation of the counterfactual groups. The first is comparability
across studies. We ensure comparability by drawing counterfactual groups that are
similar to those used in previous studies.10
Our second concern is the precision of our estimates. Because subgroup analyses
require the segmentation of the sample (or population), subgroup treatment effect
estimates will generally have less precision than the overall sample (or population)
treatment effect estimates. In the deforestation sample, precision is not a concern.
There are 2,806 protected land parcels in the sample and an equal number of
unprotected parcels. However, because the unit of analysis in the socioeconomic
analyses is the census tract, there are far fewer protected units (249) in the sample.
Precision decreases when the sample is broken into subsets according to the
observable characteristics of interest. To improve precision, we form the
socioeconomic counterfactual group by combining propensity score and trimming
methods (Imbens 2004, Imbens and Wooldridge 2009). We calculate propensity
scores for the entire population of census tracts based on the covariates in Table 1.
The population is then trimmed according to Crump et al. (2009) and Imbens and
Wooldridge (2009) in order to remove extreme propensity score values which
indicate that the units are not good comparison units for the treated sample.11
After trimming, the remaining sample consists of 231 protected census tracts and
10In the deforestation analysis our counterfactual group is slightly different for two reasons. First,
we use an updated protected areas spatial layer which differs from the layer used by Andam et al.
(2008). Second, we use only a single nearest neighbor match (Andam et al. (2008) uses the two
nearest neighbors) because there are negligible gains to precision, whereas bias is minimized using
only one match (Imbens and Wooldridge 2009).
11This trimming method is based on the distribution of propensity scores. The trimmed set
T¸=T¸α = {x ∈ X|α ≤ p (x) ≤ 1− α} where p (x) is the estimated propensity score and α is the
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973 unprotected census tracts. By using this alternative method of forming our
counterfactual group we face the concern that the estimates of ATT will differ
significantly from the estimates obtained by Andam et al. (2010). It can be seen,
however, that by using the same bias-adjustment techniques as those used by
Andam et al. (2010), the estimated ATT of -1.39 is similar to that of original study.
This gives us confidence that the subgroup estimates from this sample are indeed
comparable to the average treatment effects from (Andam et al. 2010).
To address potential heterogeneous deforestation and socioeconomic response by
subgroup, we first break the deforestation and socioeconomic samples into subgroup
pairs according to equation (6) using the threshold for each of the pretreatment
(baseline) covariates listed in the Subgroup Variable Section. Estimates of subgroup
ATT are made for each subgroup within each of the subgroup pairs according to the
methods outlined in the Estimator Section. This is done for both the deforestation
and socioeconomic samples using the same threshold values to define subgroups.
Using the same values allows us to compare how similar subgroups respond to
protection in terms of deforestation and socioeconomic outcomes.
Results
Table 2 presents the results. For each subgroup, it presents the average outcome for
protected units, the imputed counterfactual values for these units and the ATTs.
Figure 1 graphically presents results from a statistical comparison of subgroup point
estimates. Each major column represents a subgroup pair and contains two ATT
sub-columns. The height of each bar represents the point estimate of ATT for the
specified subgroup. The associated whisker represents the 95% confidence interval
for each of point estimate. Figure 1 shows for which characteristics we find evidence
solution to: 1α·(α−1) = 2 ·
[
1
p(Xi)−(1−p(Xi))
∣∣∣α < p (Xi) < 1− α]. The estimate for our set is α =
0.027.
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Figure 1: Estimated heterogeneous impacts of protection on avoided deforestation and
poverty.
of heterogeneous subgroup effects. If the whiskers of the two ATT estimates within
a subgroup pair do not overlap, a statistical difference in subgroup effects exists.
Land Use Capacity
As an indicator of agricultural suitability we find that protected land parcels with
high land use capacities display significantly higher levels of avoided deforestation
(32.4%) than those with low capacities (9%). This result is consistent with the
assumption that agricultural pressure increases the likelihood of deforestation.
Table 2 indicates that even though deforestation was higher on protected land
parcels with high land use capacity (21% were deforested as compared to 10% of low
capacity protected parcels), the expected deforestation in the absence of protection
was much higher (54% on high-capacity land as compared to 20% on low-capacity
land). However, the results suggest that protection on high-capacity land may have
exacerbated poverty (positive rather than negative ATT). In contrast, the poverty
reduction impacts on low-capacity lands are quite large.
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Slope
The results also indicate a significant difference in deforestation ATT for high-slope
and low-slope land parcels. Avoided deforestation from protection on high-slope
forest parcels is estimated to be 1.4%, which is significantly lower than the
estimated avoided deforestation of 15.9% on low-slope parcels (these results are
qualitatively similar to the estimates of Pfaff et al. (2009)). However, as was the
case using land use capacity to define subgroups, the impacts of protection on
poverty are reversed: poverty alleviation associated with protection is greater on
census tracts with high average slopes than those with low average slopes.
The results in I and I thus indicate that while the returns to protection in terms
of avoided deforestation are higher on land with relatively higher potential returns
to agriculture, protection assigned to such land leads to comparatively poorer
socioeconomic outcomes.
Distance to Major City
We find that protected land parcels that are located further from one of Costa Rica’s
three major cities experience significantly higher levels of avoided deforestation
(15.3%) than parcels that are closer (5%). These results are counterintuitive when
distance to a major city is only viewed as a proxy for market access that increases
the returns to agriculture. However, distance to a major city also serves as a
measure of land-use law enforcement. There is less enforcement of existing land-use
laws the further a land parcel is located from a city. This explanation is consistent
with the estimated avoided deforestation values in Table 2: deforestation is higher
on both treated and control parcels farther from major cities. The conditional
19Table 2: Estimated average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) by subgroup pair.
Deforestation Socioeconomic
High Baseline Levels Low Baseline Levels High Baseline Levels Low Baseline Levels
Subgroup Pair Threshold YT=1 ŶT=0 τ
s=H YT=1 ŶT=0 τ
s=L YT=1 ŶT=0 τ
s=H YT=1 ŶT=0 τ
s=L
Land Use High 0.212 0.535 -0.324 0.108 0.202 -0.094 1.62 0.003 1.617 -2.22 -0.528 -1.693
Capacity [104] [104] (0.077) [2702] [2702] (0.017) [22] [301] (0.663) [209] [672] (0.359)
Slope 23% 0.098 0.112 -0.014 0.132 0.291 -0.159 -3.9 -2.3 -1.62 1.03 1.25 -0.228
[1624] [1133] (0.023) [1139] [1656] (0.019) [135] [284] (0.244) [96] [689] (0.301)
Distance To 57km 0.141 0.294 -0.153 0.081 0.131 -0.05 2.86 2.81 0.053 -3.82 -2.58 -1.247
Major City [1418] [1377] (0.016) [1388] [1429] (0.015) [67] [298] (0.511) [164] [675] (0.223)
%Agricultural 13% 0.107 0.24 -0.133 0.119 0.164 -0.045 -1.41 -1.41 0.008 -2.45 -0.643 -1.802
Workers [1660] [1676] (0.019) [1146] [1130] (.019) [131] [487] (0.267) [100] [486] (0.335)
Baseline 15 0.123 0.239 -0.116 0.082 0.162 -0.08 0.968 2.06 -1.088 -4.51 -3.83 -0.684
Poverty [2002] [2002] (0.018) [804] [804] (0.024) [112] [564] (0.301) [119] [409] (0.208)
Notes: Y denotes the outcome (deforestation, poverty index), T = 1 denotes protected units, T = 0 denotes matched unprotected units.
ŶT=0 s imputed according to equation (2).
τs is the subgroup ATT calculated, τ = YT=1 − ŶT=0.
[Number of Observations in Subgroup]
(Standard Errors)
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impacts on poverty, however, are the opposite: although protection yields greater
avoided deforestation when located farther from cities, it yields higher
socioeconomic impacts when located near cities.
Agricultural Workers
We find a statistical difference in the efficacy of protected areas on deforestation
outcomes according to the percentage of agricultural workers that reside in the
census tract from which the land parcel is sampled. Avoided deforestation estimates
are significantly higher on parcels that fall in census tracts with high percentages of
agricultural workers (13.3%) compared to those in census tracts with lower
percentages of agricultural workers (4.5%). Such a result is consistent with the
conjecture that a higher proportion of agricultural workers in the population serves
as a good measure of the amount of agricultural activity within the area, which is
correlated with higher returns to avoided deforestation.
We find that census tracts with high percentages of agricultural workers
exhibited significantly lower socioeconomic outcomes due to protection (0.008) than
did census tracts with low percentages of agricultural workers (-1.802). These results
provide evidence consistent with predictions that land restrictions associated with
protected areas have a differential effect on agricultural workers (Robalino 2007).
Poverty
Although we find the point estimates of avoided deforestation due to protection to
be higher on land parcels that fall within census tracts with high levels of baseline
poverty, the difference between high (11.6%) and low (8%) subgroups is statistically
insignificant. So too are the estimates of protections impact on socioeconomic
outcomes for these subgroups. The point estimates indicate that protection was
more beneficial in areas with high baseline poverty but the confidence intervals for
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these estimates clearly overlap. Statistical significance aside, the point estimates
depict a desirable situation from many planners’ perspectives. Although
high-poverty areas fared no better, statistically, with protection than low-poverty
areas, avoided deforestation and poverty alleviation in high-poverty areas were
significantly different from zero. Thus placing protected areas in high-poverty areas
can, on average, achieve environmental gains without exacerbating poverty. In fact,
the evidence suggests that, if anything, protected areas have alleviated poverty in
these areas.
Robustness to Subgroup Definitions
To define subgroups, we use median values of the relevant covariates (see the
Subgroup Variable Section). We test the sensitivity of our results to a +/-10%
change in these median threshold values. Our inferences are unchanged in all but
two instances. In the analysis of protection’s impact on poverty, the difference
between subgroups near and far from major cities is no longer statistically significant
at the 5% level for either a +10% or -10% change in the threshold value. The
difference between subgroups with high and low-sloped land is no longer significant
for a 10% increase in the threshold value. The ordinal relationships between the
point estimates for each subgroup, however, remain qualitatively the same. In the
slope subgroup analysis, the precision of the estimates changes when the threshold
is increased because there are relatively few census tracts with a majority of land
having very high slopes This problem does not arise when the threshold value is
decreased (in fact, the qualitative and statistical relationships are the same using a
threshold value that is 50% lower than the one used in our analyses).12
12The threshold value of 23% slope to separate the subgroups comes from the median slope of
units in the deforestation sample. If one were to instead use the median slope of the census tract
in the socioeconomic sample (16%), a relationship similar to that displayed by land use capacity
is observed. High-slope areas show relatively high poverty alleviation, whereas low-slope areas are
associated with poverty exacerbation.
22
We run three additional robustness analyses. In the first two we define the
threshold as the 40th and 60th percentile subgroup values. For the third analysis we
drop any observation with a covariate value that lies between the 40th and 60th
percentile and define the “low” group as any observation below the 40th percentile
and the “high” group as any observation above the 60th percentile. The results from
each of these analyses are qualitatively similar to the robustness analysis using a
+/-10% change in the median threshold values.
Unobserved Heterogeneity
Unobserved heterogeneity (hidden bias) is a concern in any non-experimental study.
Consistent estimation of the average treatment effect on the treated depends on the
untestable assumption that, after conditioning on baseline characteristics, the
outcome under the no-treatment state is independent of treatment exposure. In our
study, if the protected and matched unprotected units differ in some unobservable
way that affects deforestation, our estimates will be biased. For example, consider
how Andam et al. (2008) measure forest cover: a three-hectare plot is considered
forested if its canopy cover was greater than 80%. If forested plots selected for
protection systematically were to have more (less) canopy cover than the matched
controls, our avoided deforestation estimates would be biased upward (downward).
For example, say that mean baseline crown cover was 95% in protected plots and
85% in matched control plots. With similar levels of deforestation on protected and
unprotected plots, unprotected forest plots would be more likely to pass the 80%
threshold and be declared “deforested.” 13
To test the sensitivity of their results to hidden biases, Andam et al. (2008,
2010) use a sensitivity test recommended by Rosenbaum (2002). For example, in
the avoided deforestation study of (Andam et al. 2008), the authors examine the
13We thank an anonymous referee for noting this particular potential source of hidden bias.
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possibility that the protected plots may be unobservably less likely to be deforested
than their matched controls. They posit the existence of a strong confounding
factor that not only affects protection decisions, but also determines whether
deforestation is more likely in protected plots or the matched controls. They find
that the treatment effect estimate is highly robust to hidden bias: if an unobserved
plot attribute caused the odds ratio of protection to differ between protected and
unprotected plots by a factor of as much as 2.15, the 99% confidence interval of the
estimate would exclude zero.
Of course, a sensitivity test to hidden bias only quantifies and expresses the
uncertainty from hidden bias. It does not dispel that uncertainty.14 Our study,
however, focuses on the ordinal rankings of treatment effect estimates within
subgroup pairs rather than on the level of the point estimates themselves. In other
words, we are less interested in stating the avoided deforestation is X% in a
particular subgroup, and more interested in saying that avoided deforestation in
subgroup A is greater than in subgroup B. Unobserved heterogeneity would be a
concern in our analyses only if it were to differentially affect the subgroup pairs such
that it caused the ordering of subgroup estimates to switch. We cannot think of a
simple story of systematic unobserved heterogeneity that would act differentially
within subgroup pairs (e.g., on flat lands, decision makers systematically sought out
sparse-canopies among forests observably similar on the dimensions we match, and
on steep lands they systematically sought out thick-canopies). Thus, even if
14To directly assess the potential source of bias from not using continuous crown cover data, we
would need continuous baseline data, which we lack. However, we obtained such data for the period
1992 -1993 from the Global Land Cover Facility (Earth Science Data Interface). If we assume that
any canopy cover bias in decisions to protect forests before 1980 would continue into the early 1990s,
we can use these recent data to test whether canopy cover percentages were similar between protected
and unprotected plots at baseline. We measure canopy cover inside and outside of protected areas
established between 1991 and 1995. These data (measured at 1square km-level) range from 0-80%.
Because there is no variation above 80% (the threshold for our binary indicator), we use the next
quintile (60-80%). If forest canopy percentage affects selection into protection, we should observe
a difference in the mean canopy cover for protected and unprotected units. We do not observe
any meaningful difference: mean canopy cover percentage within protected areas is 69.75% and in
unprotected areas is 69.6%.
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unobserved heterogeneity were to bias the underlying average treatment effect on
the treated estimates of the original samples, it is unlikely to affect our estimated
ordering of subgroup pairs.
Discussion
Recent studies have found what appears to be evidence of so-called ‘win-win’
outcomes associated with protected areas in Costa Rica. Protection has been
moderately effective, on average, in preventing deforestation (Andam et al. 2008)
and in alleviating poverty (Andam et al. 2010). However, these impact estimates
ignore the potential for heterogeneous responses to protection for different
subgroups. Understanding heterogeneous treatment response is important from the
perspective of a social planner because conditional assignment of protected areas
can lead to greater average treatment response for the population (Manski 2005).
Using new quasi-experimental methods, we estimate the heterogeneous subgroup
impacts of protected areas established prior to 1980 on deforestation and
socioeconomic outcomes in Costa Rica. For nearly all the biophysical and
demographic subgroups we define, we find statistically significant, and
policy-relevant, evidence of heterogeneous responses to protected areas. Avoided
deforestation is highest when protection is assigned to lands that are highly suitable
for agriculture, are far from major cities and infrastructure, or where a high
percentage of adults are employed in agriculture: about three times higher than on
lands that exhibit the opposite characteristics. However, poverty alleviation is
highest when protection is assigned to areas with the opposite characteristics. In
other words, the characteristics associated with the most avoided deforestation are
the characteristics associated with the least poverty alleviation.
Caution should be observed when using our results to guide future conservation
planning in Costa Rica. We estimated the average treatment effects of protection on
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protected forests in each subgroup impacts. Thus extrapolation should only be
made to areas that are observably similar to the protected ecosystems in this study.
Given that the covariates associated with areas already protected are most likely
very similar to areas that will be chosen for protection in the future, basing
extrapolation on the counterfactual samples used in this study may not be
unreasonable. Future analyses, however, should estimate the average treatment
effect on the control (ATC) to provide insights into the way in which protection
anywhere in Costa Rica that is currently unprotected would affect deforestation and
poverty. As noted in Andam et al. (2010), future analyses should also focus on the
impacts of alternative management strategies, such as community management
(e.g., Somanathan et al. (2009), and on elucidating the mechanisms through which
protection has reduced poverty (e.g., tourism, infrastructure development,
ecosystem services). Our analysis provides a useful foundation for such analyses by
highlighting the spatially heterogeneous impacts of protection.
Although historical treatment responses do not necessarily predict future ones,
our results indicate that prudent conservation planning would pay special attention
to covariates related to agriculture. For example, decisionmakers may wish to look
at the composition of employment in the surrounding areas before assigning
protective legislation to an ecosystem. If protecting ecosystems in areas with a large
percentage of adults employed in agriculture cannot be avoided, additional
interventions, such as performance payments for environmental services to local
communities, may be warranted to contribute to poverty alleviation goals.
One of the goals set forth at the Fifth World Parks Congress in 2003 is that
protected areas should do no economic harm to surrounding human populations
(Adams et al. 2004). The results to date indicate that, on average, Costa Rica’s
protected area system achieved this goal. Equally important, the results support
claims that protecting ecosystems in high-poverty areas can, on average, achieve
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environmental gains and alleviate poverty. Yet the amount of avoided deforestation
generated by Costa Rica’s protected area system was modest. As in other nations,
Costa Rican protected areas tend to be assigned to ecosystems with low economic
returns from conversion.15 Our study shows that the same factors that have limited
the conservation effectiveness of protected areas may have improved the social
welfare impacts of these areas. This observation implies that ‘win-win’ efforts to
protect ecosystems and alleviate poverty may be possible when policymakers are
satisfied with low levels of each outcome, but tradeoffs exist when more of either
outcome is desired. Without innovations in conservation technology, having more of
one will imply having less of the other.
15The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005, pp. 130) reports that “many protected areas
were specifically chosen because they were not suitable for human use.”
Chapter II
Conditions Associated with Protected Area Success in Conservation and
Poverty Reduction
Introduction
Protected areas are the dominant approach to protecting biodiversity and the
supply of ecosystem services (MEA 2005). A fundamental concern surrounding the
establishment of protected areas, particularly in developing countries, is that
ecosystem conservation goals may conflict with poverty alleviation goals by reducing
incomes or perpetuating poverty traps (Adams et al. 2004, Coad et al. 2008, Wilkie
et al. 2006, WDPA 2009, Brockington et al. 2006). A poverty trap, as described in
the introduction to this special issue, is a self-reinforcing mechanism that causes an
area to remain poor. By restricting access to natural resources, protected areas
might create new poverty traps or reinforce old ones.16 Protected areas tend to be
established away from major cities and on agriculturally undesirable land (Joppa
and Pfaff 2009); characteristics also associated with high levels of poverty. We
might therefore be concerned that protected areas would reinforce poverty traps.
More optimistically, they might push local economies out of poverty traps by
providing tourism business opportunities, improved infrastructure, or enhanced
supplies of ecosystem services. For example, new evidence from Costa Rica and
16For example Robalino (2007) predicts that protected areas would place a greater burden on
non-landowning workers, who are often the poor.
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Thailand suggests that protected areas in these two countries have, on average,
reduced local poverty (Andam et al. 2010, Sims 2010).
To fully understand protected area impacts, one should consider environmental
and socioeconomic outcomes jointly and quantify the heterogeneity in impacts.
Unfortunately, there is little scientific evidence on the nature of this heterogeneity
or of the potential tradeoffs between environmental and socioeconomic outcomes
(Coad et al. 2008, Joppa and Pfaff 2010). Retrospective causal analysis of the
socioeconomic impacts of developing country protected areas is limited
(Brockington et al. 2006, Andam et al. 2010, Sims 2010, Ferraro and Hanauer 2011,
Bandyopadhyay and Tembo 2010). Only the work in Thailand and Costa Rica
(Andam et al. 2010, Sims 2010, Ferraro and Hanauer 2011) also collects information
on environmental outcomes. However, those previous studies do not include
sufficiently detailed analysis of heterogeneity in impacts to assess potential tradeoffs
between ecosystem protection and poverty alleviation (Manski 2005, Crump et al.
2008).
Using data from Costa Rica and Thailand, we examine the heterogeneity of
protected area impacts as a function of baseline poverty and covariates that are
likely to moderate how protection affects outcomes (Baron and Kenny 1986). We
select these two nations because they have significant biodiversity, large protected
area systems and reliable spatially explicit data. Unlike previous studies that
explore heterogeneous impacts of protected areas (Sims 2010, Ferraro and Hanauer
2011, Pfaff et al. 2009), we examine impacts on both avoided deforestation and
poverty reduction and use a nonparametric method of locally weighted scatterplot
smoothing (LOESS) (Cleveland 1979, Cleveland and Devlin 1988) and a
semiparametric partial linear differencing model (PLM) (Yatchew 1997, 1998).
These models estimate more informative continuous relationships between
observable characteristics and outcomes. We are thus able to identify covariate
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ranges that are associated with high conservation and poverty reduction outcomes
(‘win-win’), low conservation and poverty exacerbation outcomes (‘lose-lose’), or
incongruence where one outcome is ‘win’ and the other is ‘lose’ (‘win-lose’).
The rapidly growing conservation planning literature focuses on how to target
conservation investments conditional on observable environmental and economic
characteristics (Margules and Pressey 2000, Naidoo et al. 2006). Planners interested
in achieving both avoided deforestation and poverty reduction need to understand
how these outcomes co-vary with observable characteristics. Such understanding
allows for the development of conditional empirical success rules (see Manski (2005),
p.75) that can be used to target interventions based on expected impacts as
predicted by observable characteristics. We demonstrate how such rules can be
visualized through suitability maps that identify locations associated with ‘win-win’,
‘lose-lose’, or ‘win-lose’ scenarios.
Data
For additional details on data, see Appendix B and Andam et al. (2008, 2010).
Previous studies estimated that protected areas resulted in significant avoided
deforestation and poverty reduction in Costa Rica and Thailand (Andam et al.
2010, Sims 2010, Andam et al. 2008). About 11% of the area protected in Costa
Rica would have been deforested had it not been protected (25). Using similar
methods, we estimate that about 15% of protected forest in Thailand would have
been deforested in the absence of protection (see Appendix B). Protected areas in
Costa Rica accounted for about 10% of the poverty decline around the areas. In
Thailand, protected areas reduced poverty by about 30% (Andam et al. 2010). We
use data from these studies to explore the heterogeneity of protected areas’ impacts.
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Poverty
Poverty measures are based on national census data of household characteristics and
assets (see Appendix B for detail). Costa Rica analyses use 1973 and 2000 census
tract poverty indices (Andam et al. 2010) from a principal components analysis
((Cavatassi et al. 2004); see Appendix B). Thailand analyses use the subdistrict
poverty headcount ratio, which is the share of the population in 2000 with monthly
household consumption below the poverty line and comes from a poverty mapping
analysis (Healy and Jitsuchon 2007, Elbers et al. 2003). The sample comprises
subdistricts in north and northeast Thailand, which is where the majority of
protected forest areas are located. Larger values of both poverty measures imply
greater poverty.
As in Andam et al. (2010), we define a census tract or subdistrict as protected if
at least 10% of its area is protected prior to 1980 (Costa Rica) or 1985 (Thailand)
(249 census tracts and 192 subdistricts).17 With protection assigned 15 or more
years before poverty outcomes are measured, longer-term impacts can be measured.
Unprotected units, from which matched controls are selected, comprise units with
less than 1% protected before 1980 or 1985 (4,164 census tracts and 3,479
subdistricts).18 Protected areas comprise IUCN Categories I, II, IV and VI in Costa
Rica and IUCN Categories I and II in Thailand.
Avoided Deforestation
As a proxy for conservation success, we estimate avoided deforestation from
protected areas (we acknowledge this is not the only possible measure of success).
17Andam et al. (2010) select a 10% threshold because it reflects the call by the fourth World
Congress on National Parks and Protected Areas to protect 10% of each of the world’s major biomes
by 2000, and by the Conference of Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity to conserve 10%
of each of the world’s ecoregions. Andam et al. (2010) show that the estimated impacts are robust
to changes in this threshold.
18Units with one to ten percent of their area protected are dropped from the analysis to avoid
matching protected units to “marginally” protected units.
31
The unit of analysis for the deforestation data is a 3 hectare land parcel (20,000
randomly selected) drawn from forested areas at baseline (Costa Rica, 1960;
Thailand, 1973). Each parcel is classified as deforested or forested by the end year
(Costa Rica, 1997; Thailand, 2000). A parcel is defined as protected if it lies within
a protected area that was established prior to 1980 (Costa Rica) or by 1985
(Thailand). Control parcels were never protected.
Covariates
For each country, multiple spatial layers are used to create covariates for each
census tract, subdistrict or parcel (Tables 1 and 14).
Study Design
To estimate the impact of protection on the protected units, one must establish
what would have happened in the absence of protection. Like the studies from
which we obtain our data (Andam et al. 2010, 2008), we using matching to select
unprotected control units that are similar at baseline to protected units.
Preprocessing the data (Ho et al. 2007) through matching ensures that the
distributions of key covariates believed to affect both outcome and selection into
protection are balanced across protected and unprotected units (see Appendix B).
The goal of matching, like standard regression techniques, is to control for
differences in baseline characteristics that affect the designation of protected areas
and poverty or deforestation (Ho et al. 2007, Imbens and Wooldridge 2009, Angrist
and Pischke 2009). For example, protected areas are often placed on land less suited
for agriculture (MEA 2005, Joppa and Pfaff 2009, Pfaff et al. 2009). The matching
strategy assumes that, after matching, the expected outcomes of protected and
matched control units in the absence of protection are the same. Thus the control
group’s outcome represents the protected group’s counterfactual outcome. Although
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there is no direct way to test this assumption, the previous studies in Costa Rica
and Thailand found the estimates were robust to unobserved heterogeneity using
our matching specifications (Andam et al. 2010, 2008). The Thailand results were
also confirmed using an instrumental variable approach (Sims 2010). For the Costa
Rica poverty sample and both deforestation samples, we use nearest neighbor
Mahalanobis matching with replacement. For the Thailand poverty sample, we use
propensity score matching with exact matching on district to control for baseline
fixed effects. See Appendix B for details on the matching methods used and the
covariates on which units are matched.
Post-matching, we use nonparametric LOESS (Cleveland 1979, Cleveland and
Devlin 1988, Nelson and Chomitz 2009)to estimate impacts as a function of baseline
poverty. LOESS allows us to assess whether or not protected areas contributed to
poverty traps. We use LOESS because we are interested in how poor areas,
including all the factors that make them poor, respond to protection.19 To isolate
the moderating effects on avoided deforestation and poverty from observable
baseline characteristics net of other influences, we use semiparametric PLM
(Cleveland 1979, Cleveland and Devlin 1988, Yatchew 1997, 1998) on the matched
data. This two-stage estimator allows us to linearly control for other influencing
covariates in the first stage and then estimate the outcome as a nonparametric
function of the covariate of interest using LOESS in the second stage (see Appendix
B). The benefit of this approach is that it allows us to conduct inference along a
continuum of covariate values (e.g., distances from cities) while holding constant
potentially complimentary or countervailing covariates (e.g., slope). The results
from the PLMs are then used in the suitability mapping exercise (see Appendix B
for more details).20
19See Appendix B for additional discussion of the choice of methods.
20As done in the studies from which we draw (Andam et al. 2010, 2008), we implement bias-
adjustment techniques within all LOESS iterations (Imbens and Wooldridge 2009, Abadie et al.
2004).
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Figure 2: Heterogeneous responses to protection.
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Results: Heterogeneous Impacts
Figure 2 presents the results. In each panel, the solid and dashed lines represent the
estimated difference between protected and counterfactual units, i.e. the conditional
average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) for avoided deforestation and poverty
reduction, respectively. The green (red) shaded area around the solid (dashed) line
represents the 95% pointwise confidence band for the avoided deforestation (poverty
reduction) ATT estimate.21 The solid green (red) horizontal line represents the zero
line for the avoided deforestation (poverty reduction) estimate, at which there are
no impacts from the establishment of protected areas.
Poverty Traps
We first test whether protected areas reinforced or exacerbated poverty traps in
Costa Rica. If this were the case, we would expect to find that areas that were very
poor at baseline would be negatively affected by protected areas. Based on theory,
we would also expect that negative effects occur only when land-use restrictions are
binding. Thus any exacerbation of poverty should be accompanied by avoided
deforestation.
The results in Figure 2(a) confirm that avoided deforestation (solid line) in Costa
Rica is positive across observed baseline poverty values. In other words, protected
areas did impose binding land-use restrictions. Avoided deforestation is relatively
constant along a majority of the baseline poverty range, although there is a dip
between baseline poverty index values of 15 and 18. Poverty reduction (dashed line),
however, appears to be U-shaped (inverted) as a function of baseline poverty. The
estimates suggest that protected areas achieved significant poverty reduction for
most of the range above the median baseline poverty level (poverty index = 12). At
very high levels of poverty, these effects are not significantly different from zero. The
21See Figures 14 - 16 for more detailed illustration of all the impact heterogeneity results.
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LOESS results therefore do not suggest that protected areas exacerbated poverty in
the poorest populations. In fact, a majority of the poorest areas experienced
poverty reduction compared to their estimated counterfactual poverty levels.22
Moderating Covariates
To better understand the nature of protected areas’ impacts on poverty, we next
consider two covariates that are highly related to poverty and, based on theory, are
expected to moderate the impacts of protection: slope and distance to major cities.
The primary driver of deforestation in Costa Rica and Thailand was agriculture
(de Camino Velozo et al. 2000, Evans 1999, Cropper et al. 1999).23 Slope is highly
correlated with agricultural potential: the steeper the slopes, the less suitable the
land is for agriculture. Steeper slopes are therefore associated with lower
deforestation pressure and, therefore, lower opportunity costs of protection.24 Slope
and baseline poverty are also highly correlated: in Costa Rica the mean slope for
land among the poorest quartile is 16.4 percent, whereas for the richest quartile it is
only 3.8 percent.
Like slope, distance to city is also positively correlated with baseline poverty: in
Costa Rica the mean distance of the poorest quartile is 70 km and of the richest
quartile is 9 km. However, the distance to a major market city has a more
complicated theoretical relationship with deforestation and protection. On one
hand, being far from cities lowers agricultural returns and thus the returns to
deforestation (because of, for example, higher transportation costs and poorer price
22As a robustness check we run a parametric quantile regression. These results are consistent with
the LOESS results (see Appendix B).
23Logging was also an important source of deforestation during this time period and large-scale
logging often cleared the way for conversion of previously forested land to agricultural use. Forest
cover in logged areas tends to regenerate in these nations unless used for agriculture.
24Slope captures other deforestation pressures too, such as ease of logging (Pfaff et al. 2009), but
agriculture is the key deforestation force in our study. In Costa Rica slope has been shown to be
a good proxy for agricultural suitability (Ferraro and Hanauer 2011). Furthermore, the response
functions conditional on slope and baseline labor force in agriculture exhibit similar trends (see
Figure 15).
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information). On the other hand, being far from cities also means one is likely to be
far from the nodes of enforcement of land-use regulations inside and outside
protected areas, thus increasing returns to agriculture. Finally, if one believes that
tourism and associated infrastructure development is a key mechanism through
which protection reduces poverty, then greater distance from cities implies less
potential for poverty reduction. Thus the opportunity costs from protection can
change nonlinearly as distance to cities increases.
Panels (b) and (c) of Figure 2 present the results of the analysis of the two
moderating covariates in Costa Rica. Protection on low-sloped land is associated
with significant tradeoffs in joint outcomes. We observe statistically significant
poverty exacerbation up to an average slope of 10%, whereas the associated impact
on avoided deforestation is relatively high along this range. Between approximately
15% and 40% slope, we observe ‘win-win’ outcomes of avoided deforestation and
poverty reduction statistically different from zero. The results help to explain why
we do not observe an association between protected areas and poverty traps despite
evidence that land-use restrictions were binding. Figure 2(b) also indicates that the
protection of low-sloped land is associated with significantly more avoided
deforestation than the protection of steeply-sloped land.25 As noted by Andam et
al. (25), protected lands are rarely located on lands highly suitable for agriculture,
and thus we can see why Andam et al. (2010, 2008) find a ‘win-win’ outcome, on
average. These results suggest that protected areas are not serving as poverty traps
partly because they tend to be sited in areas with low agricultural potential and
thus low opportunity costs.
Figure 2(c) confirms the conjecture that distance to major cities captures
countervailing forces and thus may generate nonlinear relationships between
protection and the outcomes. The interval at which poverty reduction is greatest is
25This relationship arises largely because the amount of deforestation in the absence of protection
decreases with slope (see Figure 15).
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farther from cities than the interval at which avoided deforestation is greatest.
Nevertheless, there is a substantial overlap of poverty reduction and avoided
deforestation (‘win-win’) at intermediate distances (approximately 40km to 100km).
These results provide indirect evidence that protected areas are not creating poverty
traps partly because they tend to be sited in localities that can respond to
opportunities afforded by tourism and associated infrastructure development. They
also suggest that poor localities far from cities may not respond as well to
protection as poor localities closer to cities.
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Figure 3: Costa Rica protected area suitability map.
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In Thailand, we lack baseline poverty data,26 but we can examine protection’s
impact on deforestation and poverty as a function of slope and distance to major
cities. The shapes of the PLM graphs in Figure 2 panel (d) look remarkably similar
to the shapes of the corresponding graphs for Costa Rica: slope is negatively related
to avoided deforestation and positively related to poverty reduction. While there is
a range over which ‘win-win’ outcomes are observed, the general trend of tradeoffs
(more poverty reduction correlating with less avoided deforestation) is even more
pronounced in Thailand. As in Figure 2(c), we observe in Figure 2(e) a nonlinear
relationship between avoided deforestation and poverty impacts as a function of
distance from major cities. The relationship with avoided deforestation in Thailand
looks different from the relationship observed in Costa Rica (lower avoided
deforestation at intermediate distances), but the relationship between poverty
impact and distance from cities looks strikingly similar in both nations: the largest
reductions in poverty are observed at intermediate distances from major cities.
Results: Suitability Mapping
Figure 2 suggests that the way in which areas respond to protected areas
established in their midst will differ conditional on observable baseline
characteristics. An understanding of these heterogeneous effects offers insights into
how protected areas can be established in the future to manage tradeoffs between
environmental and poverty reduction goals.
Suitability mapping allows one to visualize the joint outcomes spatially. We use
the results from the previous section to create illustrative protected areas suitability
maps for Costa Rica and Thailand. We break the regions into 3 hectare units and,
based on results from PLM models, assign each unit a suitability score according to
26As did Andam et al. (2010), we address this lack of baseline poverty data by matching on a
large number of baseline and time-invariant variables likely correlated with baseline poverty and by
including district fixed effects.
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the predicted impact on deforestation or poverty if the unit were protected (see
Material and Methods and Appendix B). For example, based on historical impacts
of protected areas in Costa Rica, a land parcel located on slopes of approximately
12% is highly suitable for protection in terms avoided deforestation, but only
moderately suitable in terms of poverty reduction (recall that we are controlling for
other parcel characteristics in the PLM estimation). By mapping underlying
covariate relationships jointly with deforestation and poverty outcomes, we are able
to identify areas of ‘win-win’, ‘lose-lose’ and ‘win-lose’. These maps therefore are a
type of graphical illustration of conditional empirical success rules.
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Figure 4: Thailand protected area suitability map.
We classify a land parcel’s suitability for protection based on its slope and its
distance from major cities, which are two time-invariant characteristics that are
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typically available to decision makers (see Methods and Appendix B for details).27
Because protection is assigned mainly to forested areas in the two nations, we limit
our classification to parcels that were forested in the final period of our analyses:
1997 for Costa Rica and 2000 for Thailand.
Figures 3 and 4 display the illustrative suitability maps. The bivariate color grid
represents increasing suitability for protected areas in terms of avoided deforestation
(horizontal axis) and poverty reduction (vertical axis), based on historical impacts.
Boundaries of the protected areas used to estimate the historical impacts of
protection are in blue. In yellow, we highlight areas in the upper five deciles for
both potential avoided deforestation and poverty reduction. These locations might
be considered potential ‘win-win’ locations (see Methods and Appendix B). In
Costa Rica, 324,156 hectares of forest in 1997 are classified as ‘win-win’ locations
(14% of the total) with an average environmental (socioeconomic) suitability score
of 7.25 (6.77). In Thailand, 662,013 hectares of forest in 2000 are classified as
‘win-win’ (5% of the total) with an average environmental (socioeconomic)
suitability score of 6.17 (6.38). In black, we highlight areas that, based on historical
responses, would likely experience poverty exacerbation and thus might be
considered undesirable for establishing a protected area, regardless of environmental
suitability. Because these expected poverty outcomes are driven by low-sloped land,
all these areas are associated with positive avoided deforestation and therefore
expected ‘win-lose’ outcomes. In Costa Rica, 659,730 hectares are classified as likely
exacerbation locations (28% of the total forest area) with an average environmental
suitability score of 5.2. In Thailand, 1,180,041 hectares are classified as likely
exacerbation locations (10% of the total forest area) with an average environmental
suitability score of 6.6 (see Appendix B).
27Slope data are often used in global protected area analyses (Joppa and Pfaff 2009, Nelson and
Chomitz 2009).
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These maps are meant to be illustrative and used in conjunction with other
sources of data and expertise. Other baseline conditions are likely to be important
in determining tradeoffs. In future applications, suitability maps would incorporate
knowledge of other indicators of biological value (e.g., endemic species) and other
forms of expert knowledge about local conditions into a more sophisticated
optimization algorithm (see Naidoo et al. (2006) for examples of algorithms).
Moreover, the maps are based on the assumption that past associations will hold for
future outcomes, which may not be true in rapidly changing societies. Suitability
maps present a static picture of expected relationships and do not capture potential
general equilibrium effects: the protection of an area may fundamentally change the
suitability of the remaining unprotected areas. Finally, future analyses should also
incorporate an understanding of the differential impacts of protected area types
(e.g., wildlife refuges versus national parks) and other characteristics determining
economic opportunities.
Discussion
Debates over the effectiveness of protected areas in achieving conservation results
and in affecting poverty are often based on little empirical evidence. Critics of
protected areas highlight the role that protected areas can play in limiting
agricultural development and exploitation of natural resources. They would thus
predict that observable characteristics associated with high levels of avoided
deforestation from protection would also be associated with poverty exacerbation.
Proponents highlight the role that protected areas can play in supplying ecosystem
services, promoting tourism and improving infrastructure. They would thus predict
that characteristics associated high levels of avoided deforestation from protection
would be associated with high levels of poverty reduction. Our results indicate that
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the realities in Costa Rica and Thailand are more complicated than either of these
two stereotypes.
Our results are not consistent with protected areas creating poverty traps. In
fact, the results suggest that protection in areas associated with high poverty has,
on average, reduced poverty while also reducing deforestation. Such ‘win-win’
outcomes were most commonly associated with locations at intermediate distances
from major cities (40-80 km) and on land of moderate to poor agricultural
potential. These patterns are consistent with a hypothesis that protected areas have
reduced poverty by being placed on lands with little agricultural value that, by their
proximity to major markets, can benefit from tourism and associated infrastructure
development (thus offsetting any losses from foregone agriculture and forest resource
exploitation). To support this hypothesis, more explicit analyses of mechanisms will
be necessary (e.g., Imai et al. (2010)). Although we find no evidence that
protection, on average, created poverty traps, our results do not imply that
protection reduced poverty in all poor communities. poverty may have been
exacerbated in some poor communities.
Despite the lack of evidence for poverty traps from protected areas, the results
do suggest potential tradeoffs: the most avoided deforestation is found on low-sloped
land with high agricultural value, but these lands are where poverty exacerbation is
observed. Thus although protected areas did lead, on average, to moderate levels of
avoided deforestation and poverty reduction in Costa Rica and Thailand, our
analysis points to tradeoffs if decision makers desire higher levels of either outcome.
The potential for tradeoffs underscores the importance of conditional empirical
success rules, especially as practitioners attempt to better target protected area
investments to increase conservation effectiveness and as policymakers look to
protected areas as a means to obtain international financial transfers from reducing
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) programs.
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Costa Rica and Thailand are middle-income countries, have made substantial
investments in their protected area systems, and have relatively successful
eco-tourism sectors. Whether our results would hold for other nations is an open
question. Our approach can, and should be, replicated in other nations through
cooperation between groups collecting spatially explicit data on poverty, protected
areas, and land-use change. A greater understanding of heterogeneous impacts can
improve conservation planning and offer insights into the potential tradeoffs
between environmental and development goals in future efforts to reduce emissions
from deforestation and degradation.
Chapter III
Causal Mechansisms of Protected Areas
Introduction
The proliferation of protected areas in recent decades has led to increased interest in
understanding their economic impacts on surrounding populations. However, there
have been few studies with the requisite data and methodologies to accurately
estimate the socioeconomic impacts of protected areas (Andam et al. 2010, Coad
et al. 2008). The few studies that satisfy the conditions for an impact study of high
quality,28 have found that the establishment of protected areas has been associated
with poverty reductions in surrounding areas (Canavire-Bacarezza and Hanauer
2011, Andam et al. 2010, Sims 2010). Such results run counter to the conventional
wisdom (Coad et al. 2008, Wilkie et al. 2006, Adams et al. 2004) and limited theory
(Robalino 2007). Unfortunately the quasi-experimental methods employed in the
previous protected area impact evaluations are not suitable for addressing the
underlying mechanisms through which protected areas affect poverty. Therefore, the
question of why protected areas have been found to be associated with reductions in
poverty remains. An understanding of these mechanisms would help explain why
impacts occur, rather than simply quantifying the impacts.
The establishment of protected areas has elicited concern from poverty
advocates due to their associated land-use restrictions (Wilkie et al. 2006, Adams
28See Ferraro (2008) for a discussion of the necessary components.
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et al. 2004). Coupled with the facts that, historically, protected areas have been
placed on marginal lands (Joppa and Pfaff 2009),29 and much of the remaining
global biodiversity (land likely to be targeted for protection) lies in areas of high
poverty (Sachs et al. 2009), land-use restrictions are expected to impose economic
hardship on already imperiled populations. This concern is formalized in a Von
Thunen model developed by Robalino (2007) in which the author shows that
land-use restrictions associated with protected areas are predicted to negatively
impact landless workers. Therefore, from a policy standpoint, identification of the
mechanisms through which protected areas affect poverty is of particular interest;
especially if negative channels can be mitigated, or positive channels bolstered,
through social policy.
We use rich biophysical and socioeconomic data from Costa Rica, a developing
country with a renowned protected area network, to identify and quantify the causal
mechanisms through which protected areas established prior to 1980 impacted
poverty between 1973 and 2000. Using recently developed quasi-experimental
approaches to mechanism analysis which allow for both causal interpretation of
mechanism effects and salient comparison to previous studies of Costa Rica (Andam
et al. 2010, Ferraro and Hanauer 2011, Ferraro et al. 2011), we quantify the
proportion of estimated poverty alleviation (Andam et al. 2010) from tourism,
infrastructure development and ecosystem services due to the establishment of
protected areas. By proxying for the respective mechanisms with park entrances,
changes in road networks and changes in forest cover, we find that nearly half of the
poverty alleviation associated with the establishment of protected areas is causally
attributable to tourism. Conversely, infrastructure development accounts for a
relatively small proportion of the estimated poverty alleviation. Finally, because we
proxy for ecosystem services with avoided deforestation (which is associated with
29This is a concern because Andam et al. (2010) show that marginal land is correlated with
poverty.
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potentially negative poverty mechanisms), we argue that our findings of no
mechanism affect due to the prevention of deforestation implies a positive impact on
poverty due to the preservation of ecosystems associated with protected areas. In
addition, we conduct several robustness checks which provide evidence that our
general findings are likely not an artifact of our econometric strategy.
Background
Recent Studies
Only a handful of studies from developing nations have met the necessary data and
methodological requirements for a protected area impact study of high quality. To
properly account for changes in poverty due to the establishment of protected areas,
a study must incorporate pre-protection, baseline measures of poverty. In addition,
the non-random nature in which protected areas are established must be accounted
for in the empirical strategy, which necessitates rich baseline measures of covariates
that jointly determine the establishment of protected areas and poverty outcomes.
Recent studies, that meet the aforementioned requirements, from Bolivia
(Canavire-Bacarezza and Hanauer 2011), Thailand (Sims 2010, Andam et al. 2010),
and Costa Rica (Andam et al. 2010) have found the establishment of protected
areas to be associated with subsequent reductions in poverty. Our study follows
directly from Andam et al. (2010) in which the authors designate census tracts
(segmentos) with 10% or more of their areas protected, as treated. They then use
matching techniques to construct a counterfactual group that is similar along
pretreatment dimensions to the treated census tracts. The authors’ calculation of
average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) provides evidence that census tracts
with protected areas that were established prior to 1980 had differentially greater
levels of poverty reduction between 1973 and 2000 than comparable unprotected
census tracts.
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The only paper to empirically address the potential mechanisms through which
protected areas affect economic outcomes aims to quantify the effects of eco-tourism
on local wages. Robalino and Villalobos-Fiatt (2010) explore how national parks
affect local wages in Costa Rica and how these effects vary within different areas of
a park and among different social groups. They use highly disaggregated geographic
references, and find that parks’ effects on wages vary according to economic activity
and proximity to the entrance of the park. Workers close to entrances receive higher
wages and are employed in higher-paid, non-agricultural activities.
The Argument for the Estimation of Mechanism Effects
The dearth of information regarding the mechanisms through which protected areas
affect economic outcomes serves an archetype of the criticism leveled at experimental
and quasi-experimental reduced form estimation (Deaton 2009, Heckman 2010).30
Studies in which the estimate of interest is the effect of some non-random treatment
have increasingly turned toward quasi-experimental methods. Such methods (e.g.,
matching) seek to mimic the identification mechanism of a randomized experiment
through specific ex post manipulation of the data (e.g., trimming, weighting, etc.).
Although quasi-experimental identification strategies tend to be transparent– if one
can control all other influences on the outcome then all remaining differences are
due to treatment assignment –they generally lack the ability to identify the causal
mechanisms through which treatments work. There are three main limitations to
the estimation of mechanism effects: (1) rich data that include intermediate
observation of mechanism values are necessary; (2) post-treatment mechanisms are,
by definition, affected by treatment (and, therefore, generally subject to selection
bias) so simply controlling for post-treatment mechanisms within a regression
framework will generally lead to biased estimates (Rosenbaum 1984); and (3) within
30Given the methodology used in this study I focus on quasi-experimental methods.
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the quasi-experimental framework, the absence of theoretical models limit the
identification of mechanistic channels (e.g., Heckman (2010)).
Despite these hurdles, an understanding of why protected areas affect poverty is
of paramount importance. Given the recent movements toward increasing the global
coverage of protected areas and the goal that the establishment of protected areas
should at least do no economic harm (Adams et al. 2004), social planners need a
deeper understanding of the interplay between protected areas and economic
outcomes. This is a point that is highlighted by Ferraro and Hanauer (2011) and
Ferraro et al. (2011). These studies provide evidence that protected areas (in Costa
Rica and Thailand) have had heterogeneous economic (and conservation) impacts
according to demographic and biophysical characteristics. They argue (a la Manski
(2005)) that understanding how different subgroups respond to treatment can help
planners optimize the placement of future protected areas. Similarly, understanding
the post-treatment mechanisms through which protected areas affect economic
outcomes will allow planners to optimize social policy concurrent with the
establishment of protected areas. In conjunction, an understanding of both the
heterogeneous impacts and mechanisms of protected areas might greatly improve
the economic outcomes associated with the future establishment of protected areas.
Data
We use data from Andam et al. (2010) to identify and quantify the mechanisms
through which protected areas affected poverty in Costa Rica. The unit of
observation is the census tract. The 1973 census is used as the baseline year and
demographic data are geocoded to their respective census tracts to form a set of
covariates for each observation. In 1973 Costa Rica contained 4,694 census tracts
with an average size of 8.82km2 (range: 0.00466-836 km2). To determine if a census
tract is considered protected for the analyses, a layer containing all protected areas
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established prior to 1980 is overlaid with the census tracts. As in Andam et al.
(2010), a census tract is considered protected if at least 10% of its area is occupied
by protected land.31 Conversely, any census tract that contains less that 1%
protected land is considered unprotected and a binary treatment indicator is
assigned accordingly.32 A poverty index is derived for each tract from census data
following Cavatassi et al. (2004). Higher levels of poverty are associated with
greater poverty index values (negative poverty index values indicate low levels of
poverty). The censuses from which the poverty index is derived were conducted in
1973 and 2000. In the analyses, the poverty index calculation for 2000 is the
outcome of interest. To match tracts on baseline characteristics, we use the
matching covariates used in Andam et al. (2010), which include the 1973 poverty
index and other baseline covariates that affect both protected area location and
economic growth (see Table 3).
Mechanisms
Mechanisms have received the most attention in the epidemiology (surrogate
variables) and psychology (mediating variables) literatures (e.g., Imai et al. (2010),
Rubin (2004), Frangakis and Rubin (2002), Baron and Kenny (1986)). Whereas,
economics has seen relatively little estimation of mechanism effects (Flores and
Flores-Lagunes 2011). Fundamentally a causal mechanism can be viewed as a
variable which, once affected by treatment, impacts the outcome of interest. In
causal Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs) developed by Pearl (2009) and highlighted
31We use the 10% threshold in accordance with Andam et al. (2010). A 10% threshold was chosen
because protecting 10% percent of the worlds’ ecosystems was the goal of the 4th World Congress
on National Parks and Protected Areas (Andam et al. 2010). Andam et al. (2010) show that their
results are robust to changes in this threshold value (alternatively defined as 20% and 50%).
32Of the 4,691 census tracts, 249 are considered protected (treated) prior to 1980 and 4164 are
considered potential counterfactual observations. To avoid bias in the analysis, 278 tracts with
protection between one and ten percent are dropped from the analysis.
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Covariate Description Mean Median Std. Dev. Range
Matching Covariates
Baseline Poverty Poverty index measured in 1973. 14.9 15.8 6.43 -6.4-28.9
Forest Cover Percentage of census tract 0.412 0.383 0.342 0-1
occupied by forest in 1960.
% High Productivity Percent of census tract occupied by Land 0.118 0 0.22 0-1
Land Use Capacity I, II or III land.
%Medium-High Percent of census tract occupied by Land 0.295 0.04 0.377 0-1
Productivity Land Use Capacity IV land.
%Medium-Low Percent of census tract occupied by Land 0.347 0.156 0.387 0-1
Productivity Land Use Capacity VI, VII or VIII land.
Distance to Major City Average distance (km) from each 300m2 land 57.3 49.7 41.28 0.0037-208
plot within a census tract to nearest major
city: Limon, Puntarenas or San Jose.
Roadless Volume The sum of the product of area and 308,000 66,400 699,100 0.28-7,590,000
distance to nearest road (1969) for every
1 ha parcel within the census tract.
Mechanism Variables
Park Entrance Binary indicator equal to 1 if census tract 0.0276 0 0.164 0-1
has at least 10% of its area occupied by a
protected area with a park entrance
∆ Roadless Change in roadless volume between 1969 -8.76e+04 -1.75e+01 605191 -2.65e+07-6.32e+04
Volume and 1991
∆ Forest Percent change in forest cover between 0.0084 0 0.0926 0-0.75
Cover 1960 and 1986 within each census tract
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by Morgan and Winship (2007), a mechanism (S) is drawn as causal pathway (→)
that links treatment (T ) to outcome (Y ), T → S → Y . Therefore, a causal
mechanism is a variable whose quantity is directly effected by treatment, the result
of which causes a direct change in the outcome of interest.
Mechanism variables
The putative mechanism through which protected areas achieve environmental
outcomes (e.g., preventing deforestation, etc.) is land-use restriction. Such
restrictions, which limit access, conversion and the exploitation of natural resources,
would be expected to negatively impact economic conditions in surrounding areas.
If land-use restrictions were the only mechanism (or the dominant mechanism)
through which protected areas impact surrounding populations then we would
expect poverty to have been exacerbated in these areas. In Costa Rica this has not
been the case (Andam et al. 2010). We are, therefore, interested in investigating
potential mechanisms through which protected areas have positively influenced
economic conditions in surrounding populations.
Tourism. Tourism is widely cited (anecdotally, e.g., Wilkie et al. (2006), Adams
et al. (2004) and empirically, e.g., Menkhaus and Lober (1996)) as a likely
mechanism through which protected areas enhance local economies. Costa Rica’s
stable government and rich biodiversity make it a popular destination for so-called
eco-tourists. Conjecture that tourism, catalyzed by the establishment of protected
areas, is likely enhancing the welfare of surrounding communities is supported by
the fact that approximately 54% of international tourists visit a protected area (ICT
2010). Further empirical support is offered from Ferraro et al. (2011). The authors
find that reductions in poverty due to the establishment of protected areas are
greatest at intermediate distances to cities; this range coincides with the location of
a majority of Costa Rica’s national parks (which receive the most tourists). Using
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global positioning system (GPS) data from Robalino and Villalobos-Fiatt (2010) we
proxy for tourism with the establishment of a park entrance. Of Costa Rica’s 39
protected areas that were established prior to 1980, 19 received at least one park
entrance prior to 2000 (total of 23 entrances). A protected census tract (see
definition above) is considered affected by a park entrance if it is occupied by a
protected area in which at least on entrance was established. According to this
assignment rule, 122 census tracts are considered affected by a park entrance.
Infrastructure Development. Access to infrastructure can be expected to
enhance economic outcomes (e.g., reduced production costs). Previous studies from
Costa Rica and Thailand have shown a relationship between access to urban
infrastructure and poverty (Andam et al. 2010). We proxy for infrastructure with
road networks. Access to roads increases access to markets and other resources
(reducing transportation costs, etc.). In addition, roads serve as a good indicator of
the level of infrastructure development and urbanization. We are, therefore,
interested in how differential levels of road development, due to the establishment of
protected areas, has impacted poverty in surrounding communities. We use changes
in roadless volume (Watts et al. 2007) between 1969 and 1991 to capture the impact
of changes in access to infrastructure. Roadless volume is an aggregation of the
euclidean distance to a road for each one-hectare land parcel within a census tract,
adjusted for the size of the land parcel. Roadless volume is calculated by summing
the product of the area of each land parcel (1 ha in this case) and the distance of
that parcel to the nearest road (1969 and 1991). Therefore, higher measurements of
roadless volume indicate fewer road networks within a municipality. Summary
statistics for baseline roadless volume and changes in roadless volume can be found
in Table 3.
Ecosystem Services. Since the seminal paper by Costanza et al. (1997) there
has been great interest in quantifying the economic impacts of the services provided
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by intact ecosystems. One of the arguments from protected area advocates for
potential win-win outcomes is that the establishment of protected areas prevent
ecosystem degradation (win) thereby providing a stream of economic benefits (win)
to surrounding communities (in addition to the global benefits such as carbon
sequestration). We proxy for maintenance of ecosystem services via avoided
deforestation (the difference between observed and counterfactual levels of
deforestation in protected census tracts). We are interested in how the causal
reduction in deforestation (that would have occurred in the absence of protection)
due to the establishment of protected areas has impacted surrounding communities.
We measure the percentage of deforestation within each census tract using GIS and
forest cover boundaries from 1960 and 1986 (see Table 3 for baseline and mechanism
measurements of forest cover).33
Methods
Mechanism Concepts
In the context of a quasi-experimental design, in which one conditions on baseline
characteristics to estimate effects of treatment on subsequent-stage outcomes,
estimating the effect of a mechanism is confounded by the fact that the mechanism
is necessarily observed post-treatment. As such, mechanisms are generally affected
by treatment assignment (or selection) and, therefore, confounded. Thus,
controlling for such concomitant variables generally leads to biased estimates
(Rosenbaum 1984).34. This of course rules out the argument for the inclusion of a
mechanism as a control. Therefore, precluding the estimate of mechanism effects via
the difference between the estimates of a specification (e.g., regression or matching)
33We acknowledge that avoided deforestation is a coarse measure of maintained ecosystem services.
In fact, preventing deforestation likely produces countervailing (to ecosystem services) mechanism
effects. See the Summary of Results Section for a detailed discussion.
34The exception is when the concomitant variable is not effected by the treatment, in which case
it can be considered a baseline covariate (Rosenbaum 1984)
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with and without the mechanism variable. In order to estimate the effects of a
mechanism, it must be treated, and controlled for, like an outcome (hence the
concept of surrogate variables in the epidemiology literature, see e.g., Mealli and
Rubin (2003)). We appeal to the concept of principal strata (see below) developed
by Frangakis and Rubin (2002) to conceptualize and account for mechanisms within
the potential outcomes framework.
Setup
To estimate the causal mechanisms through which protected areas have impacted
economic outcomes we use an augmented potential outcomes framework (we follow
the framework and much of the notation of Flores and Flores-Lagunes (2011). In
the traditional potential outcome framework there are two potential outcomes, Yi(1)
and Yi(0), for each individual i ∈ N under treatment (T = 1) and control (T = 0),
respectively. Intuitively this means that each individual would have one outcome if
they were to receive treatment, and another if they were withheld treatment.
Unfortunately, for any given individual i only one of the two potential outcomes is
observed: Y obsi (1)|T = 1 or Y obsi (0)|T = 0. In practice either individual i’s outcome
under treatment is observed given they were treated or individual i’s outcome in the
absence of treatment is observed given they were in the control group. This is the
fundamental problem for the estimation of causal effects because individual
treatment effects are calculated τi = Yi(1)− Yi(0), for which only one of the rhs
terms is observed. In order to calculate treatment effects in the absence of random
assignment, it is necessary to invoke the conditional independence assumption35
Assumption 1 Yi(1), Yi(0)⊥⊥Ti|Xi,
which states that potential outcomes are independent (⊥⊥) of treatment given a set
of covariates X that jointly determine outcomes and selection into treatment.
35Also known as ignorability, unconfoundedness or selection on observables.
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Random assignment assures independence, without condition, due to the fact that
each individual has and equal probability (or more generally, a probability known to
the experimenter) of assignment to treatment. Therefore, all covariates (X) that
influence outcomes are balanced across treatment and control groups, hence the
independence of treatment and outcome. For conditional independence to hold
under non-random assignment, one must condition on (e.g., matching) or control for
(e.g., regression) all covariates (X), thus rendering any remaining differences in
outcomes between groups a function of treatment.
Principal strata
Further complications arise when post-treatment mechanisms are introduced.
Suppose S is a post-treatment mechanism that is measured at an intermediate
period between administration of treatment and measurement of outcome.36
Because, by definition, S is affected by treatment it is not unconditionally
independent of treatment37 and thus must be handled in a manner similar to the
outcome of interest (Y ). Therefore, as with Y , S has two potential outcomes Si(1)
and Si(0) for each i, depending on assignment to treatment or control, respectively.
This simply states that because mechanisms are affected by treatment, with the
exception of some special cases, the mechanism outcome for each individual is
dependent on the administered treatment. The implications, within the potential
outcomes framework, are that four potential outcomes must now be considered for
each individual: (Yi(1), Yi(0), Si(1), Si(0)).
There are now four compound potential outcomes of interest for i: Yi(1, Si(1)),
the outcome under treatment when the mechanism is affected by treatment;38
36Note that the three mechanisms of interest are denoted formally as Sj , where j = 1, 2, 3. For
ease of exposition throughout a majority of this discussion, the subscript is omitted.
37This is true under random assignment of treatment as well.
38Yi(1, Si(1)) represents the total effect of treatment and is equivalent to Yi(1) in the traditional
potential outcomes framework.
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Yi(1, Si(0)), the outcome under treatment when the mechanism is not affected by
treatment (mechanism is blocked (Flores and Flores-Lagunes 2011)); Yi(0, Si(0)),
the outcome under control and the mechanism is not affected by treatment;39 and
Yi(0, Si(1)), the outcome under control when the mechanism changes as if the
individual was treated.40
To help conceptualize the joint potential outcomes and identify the casual
mechanism effect we use the principal strata framework developed by Frangakis and
Rubin (2002) (see also, Rubin (2004), Mealli and Rubin (2003)). Defining a
principal stratum is similar to the concept of matching individuals (or groups of
individuals) based on similar potential outcomes in a standard quasi-experimental
setting. Two units from different treatment arms share a principal stratum if they
share potential mechanism outcomes (formally a principal stratum is defined where
{S(0) = s0, S(1) = s1} , see below).
To identify units from disparate treatment arms but similar principal strata an
extension to the conditional independence of Assumption 1 is necessary
Assumption 2 Si(1), Si(0)⊥⊥Ti|Xi.
We term Assumption 2 conditional mechanism isolation. Morgan and Winship
(2007) note that in order to estimate the effect of a mechanism on outcomes, the
mechanism must be isolated from (independent of) confounding covariates.
Assumption 2 states that potential mechanism outcomes are independent of
treatment given a set of covariates (X) that jointly determine selection into
treatment and mechanism outcomes, and, therefore, isolated from confounders.
Under Assumption 2 we can identify units within similar principal strata: units
from disparate treatment arms with similar values of X lie within common strata
39Yi(0, Si(0)) represents the outcome in the absence of treatment and is equivalent to Yi(0) in the
traditional potential outcomes framework (implied that post-treatment mechanism is not affected
in absence of treatment).
40Note that, in general, only Yi(1, Si(1)) and Yi(0, Si(0)) are observed in practice, leaving
Yi(1, Si(0)) and Yi(0, Si(1)) as counterfactuals that necessitate estimation.
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and, therefore, share similar potential mechanism outcomes. Assumptions 1 and 2
imply that potential outcomes and potential mechanism values are independent of
treatment given covariates X. Combining Assumptions 1 and 2 we have
Assumption 3 Yi(1, Si(1)), Yi(1, Si(0)), Yi(0, Si(0)), Yi(0, Si(1)), Si(1), Si(0)⊥⊥Ti|Xi.
The necessary condition for Assumption 3 to hold, is that the covariates (X)
must jointly determine selection into treatment, outcomes of interest and
mechanism outcomes. Upon cursory examination Assumption 3 may seem
somewhat untenable. However, when one considers jointly that a primary purpose
of X is to control for the non-random process of selection into treatment and that
treatment directly affects mechanisms, Assumption 3 seems more reasonable.
Formally Assumption 3 allows
E [Si(1)|Xi = x, T = 1] = E [Si(1)|Xi = x, T = 0] (7)
E [Si(0)|Xi = x, T = 1] = E [Si(0)|Xi = x, T = 0] . (8)
Equations (7) and (8) state that the expected mechanism outcomes under
treatment, for individuals that were treated, are equal to those in the control group,
with similar values of X, had they been treated, and vice versa.41 We present (7) and
(2) for completeness, however, note that only (8) is necessary for our analyses.
Estimands
In the study from which we draw (Andam et al. 2010) the estimand of interest is
the average treatment effect on the treated, ATT. Estimation of the ATT is akin to
asking the question, “what would outcomes for treated units have been had they
41These are analogous to E[Y (1)|X,T = 1] = E[(Y (1)|X,T = 0] and E[Y (0)|X,T = 1] =
E[(Y (0)|X,T = 0] which follow from Assumption 1. These equations are commonly used in the
matching literature and demonstrate the equality (in expectation) of potential outcomes conditional
on observable covariates (X) used to estimate average treatment effects.
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not been treated?” Estimating the ATT is appropriate in a protected area impact
evaluation because the supposition that all units have the potential to receive
treatment is inappropriate (e.g., supposing that urban census tracts might contain a
protected area). Therefore, the average treatment effect (ATE), which requires the
estimation of counterfactual outcomes for all control units (had they been treated)
is not the estimand of interest.
Given that the total treatment effect estimand of interest is the ATT, the
mechanism treatment effect of interest is the Mechanism Average Treatment Effect
on the Treated. Our estimands follow directly from the framework for mechanism
average treatment effects (MATE) and net average treatment effects (NATE)
developed by Flores and Flores-Lagunes (2011). Defining a principal strata as
{S(0) = s0, S(1) = s1},42 the MATT can be written
MATT = E {E [Yi(1, Si(1))− Y (1, Si(0))|Si(0) = s0, Si(1) = s1, Xi = x, T = 1]} .
(9)
To estimate the MATT one must ask, “what would outcomes for the treated
have been, had they remained treated but treatment not affected the mechanism?”
Estimation of the MATT answers this question by isolating the only source of
variation in (9) to be the effect on outcomes due to a change in the mechanism (via
blocking the effect of the mechanism on the outcome in the second term of (9)). A
similar estimand of interest is the net average treatment effect on the treated
(NATT) which isolates the effect on outcomes due to a change in treatment
NATT = E {E [Yi(1, Si(0))− Yi(0, Si(0))|Si(0) = s0, Si(1) = s1, Xi = x, T = 1]} ,
(10)
42This states that individuals located within a common principal strata would have similar mech-
anism outcomes s0 had they been in the control group (S(0)), or s1 had they been treated (S(1)),
independent of actual treatment received.
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Figure 5: Causal Directed Acyclic Diagram (DAG) depicting the the concept of Mechanism
Average Treatment Effect on the treated (T → S → Y ) and Net Average Treatment Effect
on the Treated (T → Y ) on outcome.
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Figure 6: Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs) demonstrating the assumptions necessary for
the causal estimation of ATT, MATT and NATT. Each DAG shows how conditioning
on observable covariates (X) breaks the confounding causal relationships (T ← X → Y ,
T ← X → S and S ← X → Y ; represented by the broken single-headed arrows) and allows
for estimation of ATT (a), the causal effect of treatment on mechanism outcomes (b) and
MATT (and NATT)(c).
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holding S at untreated levels. Estimation of NATT is akin to asking, “what would
outcomes for the treated have been, had they not been treated but their mechanism
values remained at levels realized under treatment?” An advantage of MATT and
NATT (under Assumption 1) is that they decompose the ATT such that
ATT=MATT+NATT.43,44 This decomposition states that the average treatment
effect on the treated is equal to the proportion of the of treatment effect that is due
to a change in the mechanism (catalyzed by treatment), the MATT, and the
proportion that is due solely to the effect of treatment (net of the effect of the
mechanism), the NATT (see Figure 5). Therefore, once either MATT or NATT is
estimated the complementary estimate falls out of the difference with ATT.
Estimation Strategy
Estimation of either MATT or NATT is confounded by the fact that Yi(1, Si(0)) is
rarely observed.45 We use matching in the first stage of the estimation to satisfy
Assumption 3 (which encompasses Assumptions 1 and 2), see Figure 6.
Post-matching we follow methods suggested by Flores and Flores-Lagunes (2011),
using mechanism data from the matched control units, and a simple assumption
about the way in which mechanisms affect outcomes within principal strata, to
impute outcomes for treated units had treatment not affect the mechanism
variables: Ŷi(1, Ŝi(0)), the counterfactual of interest.
43Assumption 1 is necessary for this identity to hold. Morgan and Winship (2007) outline condi-
tions under which T → Y can be estimated using a set of mechanisms (e.g., the set of mechanisms
is exhaustive and isolated). However, one can measure the partial effect of T → Y using a non-
exhaustive set of mechanisms, S (i.e., S → Y ), which leads to an estimate of MATT. In conjunction
with Assumption 1, under which unbiased estimates of the ATT can be estimated, the remaining
difference between MATT and ATT can be attributed to the mechanisms not included in S.
44The full decomposition can be written: ATT=E [Y (1, S(1))− Y (1, S(0))] +
E [Y (1, S(0))− Y (0, S(0))], given principal strata {S(0) = s0, S(1) = s1} .
45In the case where a subgroup of treated units for which treatment did not affect mechanism
values can be identified, Flores and Flores-Lagunes (2011) develop an estimand for the local average
treatment effect (LNATE) which requires less restrictive assumptions. See the LNATT Section for
an application of this methodology to our data.
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First stage: matching
We use one-to-one Mahalanobis covariate matching with replacement and
post-match bias-adjustment (Abadie et al. 2004, Abadie and Imbens 2006) to match
control units to treated units. This approach serves two purposes. First, it provides
an estimate of ATT, for comparison to MATT and NATT, which offers
comparability to previous studies from Costa Rica (Andam et al. 2010, Ferraro and
Hanauer 2011, Ferraro et al. 2011). Second, it provides a set of matched controls
that, by Assumption 3 are within the same principal strata as the treated units to
which they are matched. The latter purpose implies that the mechanism outcomes
of the matched controls can be assumed to be the value observed by their treated
counterparts, had treatment not affected the mechanisms. See Table 3 for a
description of the covariates used for matching.
Second stage: estimate the influence of mechanisms
Flores and Flores-Lagunes (2011) suggest using a form of regression adjustment to
impute outcomes for treated units had treatment not affected mechanisms,
Ŷi(1, Ŝi(0)). The necessary assumption for this approach (in addition to Assumption
3) is that the mechanism has a similar effect on potential outcomes Yi(1, Si(1)) and
Yi(1, Si(0)), i.e., their conditional expectation functions share the same functional
form (Flores and Flores-Lagunes 2011).
Assumption 4 Suppose
E [Yi(1, Si(1))|Si(1), Xi = x, T = 1] = a1 + b1Si(1) + c1X, (11)
then,
E [Yi(1, Si(0))|Si(1), Xi = x, T = 1] = a1 + b1Si(0) + c1Xi. (12)
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Assumption 4 implies that the marginal effect of a change in the mechanism
outcome has the same effect on units for whom exposure to treatment affects the
mechanism as it does on units for whom exposure to treatment does not affect the
mechanism.
In (11) and (12) of Assumption 4, b1 represents the effect on outcome due to a
change in the value of the mechanism S. The counterfactual of interest (Ŷ (1, Ŝ(0)))
can be estimated by evaluating (12)), which uses the coefficients from (11), setting
Si(0) = E[Si(0)|T = 1] = [Ŝi(0)|T = 1] which, according to (8), is equal to the
observed control mechanism values within the common principal stratum of each
treated unit.
Empirical estimation of the counterfactual of interest
(
Ŷi(1, Ŝi(0))
)
is conducted
by first running a regression of observed outcomes on covariate and mechanism
values for treated units (as in (11)). Using the coefficients from this regression
(a1, b1, c1), we impute Ŷi(1, Ŝi(0)) using the same treated unit covariates (as in (12))
and the matched control unit mechanism outcomes (where in (12)
Si(0) = E[Si(0)|T = 1] = Sobsi (0) and Sobsi (0) is the observed mechanism outcome of
each treated units respective matched control). Replacing the the second term in
(9), the empirical form for MATT becomes
MATT = E
{
E
[
Y obsi (1)|Sobsi (1) = s1, Xi = x, T = 1
]}− E [f1(Si(0), Xi)] . (13)
Similarly, the empirical form of NATT becomes
NATT = E [f1(Si(0), Xi)]− E
{
E
[
Y obsi (0)|Sobsi (0) = s0, Xi = x, T = 1
]}
, (14)
where in f1(Si(0), Xi) in (13) and (14) is equal to
E [Yi(1, Si(0))|Si(1), Xi = x, T = 1] from (12).
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We again emphasize the intuition behind the counterfactual of interest, which
can be used in the estimation of both MATT and NATT. The regression imputation
methods presented in (11) and (12) allow us to address the question, “what would
the outcomes for treated units have been had their respective covariates(
Xobsi |T = 1
)
and influences of these covariates on outcomes (b1) remained the same,
but their mechanism taken on the values that would have been observed had they
not been treated S(0)|T = 1?” We note that the difference between Sobsi (1)|T = 1
(the observed mechanism value of treated units) and Ŝi(0)|T = 1 (the estimated
counterfactual values of treated units, had they not been treated) represents the
unit-level causal effect of treatment on mechanism outcomes (T → S) .
Bias-adjusted mechanism outcomes
Abadie and Imbens (2006) and Abadie et al. (2004) suggest the use of post-match
regression bias adjustments in the estimation of ATT to control for remaining
imbalance in matched samples. We apply a similar method in the estimation of our
counterfactual mechanism outcomes to control for imbalance in our matched sample.
Post-match bias-adjustment in estimation of ATT is conducted by first running a
regression of outcomes on matching covariates YT=0 = XT=0βC + . This regression
estimates the impact (βC) of the matching covariates on outcomes for the matched
control sample. To impute the ATT counterfactual of interest, βC is combined with
the covariates from the treated units XT=1 to estimate ŶBA = XT=1βC : what
treated unit outcomes would have been had their matching covariates had the same
influence on outcomes as the control units. Note that if matching produces perfect
balance across treated and matched control units then a counterfactual based on the
observed values of the matched control outcomes (Yi:T=0) will be identical to those
estimated from the regression bias adjustment procedure
(
Ŷi:BA
)
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The estimation of our counterfactual of interest in (12) is a function of both b1
from (11) and Ŝi(0)|T = 1. By Assumption 2 we can use the mechanism outcomes of
the matched controls as the counterfactual for treated units. However, if imbalance
in the baseline mechanism covariates remains after matching, we may be concerned
that counterfactual mechanism values will be biased.46 We, therefore, estimate our
counterfactual mechanism values
[
Ŝi(0)|T = 1
]
= Sobsi:T=0 + µ̂0(Xi:T=1)− µ̂0(Xi:T=0) (15)
where µ̂0 represents the predicted values obtained from combining the coefficients
from a control group regression, of mechanism outcomes on covariates, with the
respective treated (µ̂0(Xi:T=1)) or control group (µ̂0(Xi:T=0)) covariates. This
procedure estimates the influence of baseline covariates on mechanism outcomes for
control units and uses these estimated values to impute what the mechanism
outcomes would have been had the control units been treated.
Standard errors
To calculate the precision of our MATT estimates we base our standard error
estimator on the heteroskedasticity robust matching-based estimator suggested by
Abadie and Imbens (2006).47 Our estimator is calculated in two stages to allow for
heteroskedastic variances within and across treatment arms. The variance for
control units (for which comparison to MATT is not meaningful) is calculated using
a within treatment arm matching estimator. The Mahalanobis weighting matrix
from the original matching process (used to create the matched sample) is used to
46If mechanism outcomes are state dependent, then imbalance is a concern. For instance, if, after
matching, unprotected tracts have lower baseline roadless volume, on average, than protected tracts,
change in roadless volume may be less (in absolute terms) in unprotected tracts, simply because
they started with larger road networks.
47A function that estimates the standard errors outlined in this section was programmed in R
2.11.1 and is available from the author upon request.
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find the nearest within treatment arm (unprotected) neighbor to estimate unit-level
variances
σ̂2i:T=0 (Xi) = (Yi − Yl)2 /2, (16)
where Yl represents the outcome of the nearest neighbor to unit i. The treatment
level variance is then calculated
V̂T=0
(
M̂ATT
)
=
∑
NT=0
λ2i · σ̂2i (Xi) , (17)
where λi = #Ci/NT=0, and #Ci is the number of times that control unit i occurs in
the set (was used as a match in the original matching specification).
The individual level variance for protected units is based on unit level deviations
from the estimated MATT
σ̂2i:T=1 (Xi) =
(
Yi − Ŷi(1, Ŝ(0))− M̂ATT
)2
. (18)
These unit level variances are then aggregated to calculate the treatment level
(protected) variance
V̂T=1
(
M̂ATT
)
=
1
N2T=1
∑
NT=1
σ̂2i:T=1 (Xi) . (19)
The final MATT standard error estimate is therefore
σ̂
(
M̂ATT
)
=
√(
V̂T=0 + V̂T=1
)
. (20)
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Results
Empirical Estimation of MATT
We conduct two distinct analyses to estimate the MATT of our mechanisms of
interest. First, the mechanisms are considered separately and the procedure
outlined in the preceding sections is performed for each mechanism. Second, the
mechanisms are considered jointly in the estimation of each MATT via inclusion of
all mechanisms in (11) and (12).
We begin by matching protected and unprotected census tracts using one-to-one
Mahalanobis covariate matching with replacement. The resulting matched set
(identical to the sample used by Andam et al. (2010)) comprises 249 protected and
unprotected tracts, the covariate balance can be seen in Table 4. Using post-match
regression bias-adjustment, the estimated ATT is -1.27, according to the poverty
index. This result indicates that census tracts with at least 10% of their area
occupied by a protected area prior to 1980 had differentially greater levels of
poverty reduction (lower poverty index scores) between 1973 and 2000, on average,
than comparable census tracts that remained unaffected by protected areas (see
Andam et al. (2010) for full details).
Counterfactual mechanism values
The counterfactual of interest necessitates estimation of mechanism outcomes for
treated units, had protection not affected the mechanism. For each mechanism,
estimation of the counterfactual entails a two-step process. First, we estimate a
matched unprotected group regression
Si:T=0 = Xi:T=0β1C +  (21)
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Table 4: Balance Results for Matched Set. Mahalanobis one-to-one covariate matching with
replacement.
Mean Mean Diff. Norm. Mean eQQ %Improve
Covariate Status Prot. Unprot. in Means Diff. Diff. Mean Diff.
Poverty Index Unmatched 15.05 5.376 9.673 0.769 9.687
1973 Matched 15.05 15.240 -0.187 0.013 1.64 98.07%
% Forest 1960 Unmatched 0.523 0.117 0.406 0.734 0.405
Matched 0.523 0.488 0.035 0.054 0.035 91.38%
% Land Use Unmatched 0.093 0.304 -0.211 0.315 0.212
Capacity 1,2,3 Matched 0.093 0.12 -0.028 0.060 0.03 86.84%
% Land Use Unmatched 0.209 0.453 -0.244 0.330 0.245
Capacity 4 Matched 0.209 0.20 0.009 0.016 0.026 96.19%
% Land Use Unmatched 0.233 0.196 0.036 0.056 0.102
Capacity 5,6,7 Matched 0.233 0.243 -0.011 0.019 0.034 70.98%
Distance to Unmatched 58.53 34.87 23.670 0.286 23.62
Major City Matched 58.53 57.56 0.968 0.01 5.282 95.91%
Roadless Unmatched 1113000 66830 1046000 0.321 1035000
Volume 1969 Matched 1113000 681500 431600 0.110 440900 58.75%
where Si:T=0 and Xi:T=0 represent the observed mechanism and baseline covariate
values, respectively, of matched unprotected census tracts. The coefficients from (21)
are then used to impute counterfactual mechanism outcomes for each mechanism
[
Ŝi(0)|T = 1
]
= Xi:T=1β̂1C (22)
where Xi:T=1 are the observed covariate values of the protected census tracts
(empirical analog to equation (15)). Observed and counterfactual mechanism values
for the protected census tracts can be seen in Table 5. The imputed counterfactual
mechanism values from (22) are then used to calculate the counterfactual of
interest: the outcomes for protected units, had protection not affected mechanisms
(Ŷi(1, Si(0))).
Columns (i) and (ii) of Table 5 list the observed and estimated counterfactual
mechanism values for the protected census tracts (see Table 6 for estimates of
counterfactual mechanism values when bias-adjustment is not implemented). The
counterfactual for our proxy for tourism is straight forward. Of the 122 census
tracts that were impacted by a protected area with a park entrance, none would
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have a park entrance in the absence of protection. The estimated counterfactual for
change in forest cover is significantly different from observed values as well. The
average deforestation in protected census tracts between 1960 and 1986 was only
6.7%. We estimate that, had protection not affected deforestation, deforestation
would have been approximately 23% (i.e., avoided deforestation between 1960 and
1986 due to the establishment of protected areas was approximately 16.3%).
Finally, we observe that there was greater infrastructure development (greater
reduction in roadless volume) in protected census tracts between 1969 and 1991.
However, the counterfactual measures of road networks are not significantly
different from observed values.48
Single mechanism estimation
In the single mechanism estimation the following procedure is run on each
mechanism of interest independently. We first estimate the influence of covariates
and mechanism on outcomes using the protected census tracts
Yi:T=1 = Xi:T=1β1T + Si:T=1β2T +  (23)
where Yi:T=1, Xi:T=1 and Si:T=1 are the observed outcomes, matching covariates and
mechanism values for the protected census tracts, respectively. The counterfactual
of interest is then estimated by obtaining the fitted values from
Y˜i:T=1 = Xi:T=1β̂1T + Ŝiβ̂2T (24)
where Ŝi =
[
Ŝi(0)|T = 1
]
are the counterfactual mechanism values from (22), thus
Y˜i:T=1 = Ŷi(1, Si(0)). MATT for each mechanism is calculated by subtracting the
48Differences are significant when counterfactual mechanism values are estimated without bias-
adjustment. See the Without Mechanism Bias-Adjustment Section for results without mechanism
imputation.
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mean of the fitted values (Y˜i:T=1) from mean of the observed protected tract
outcomes (Yi(1, S(1)) = Yi(1)).
Results from the single mechanism estimation strategy can be found in Columns
(iii) and (iv) of Table 5. Column (iii) lists the estimated marginal impact of each
mechanism (β̂2T from (23)) on poverty. Concordant with conjecture that protected
areas have a positive impact on poverty by attracting tourism, we find that
protected census tracts that were impacted by parks with entrances had lower
poverty (by 1.04 according to the poverty index) than similar protected tracts.
Because no protected tract would have been influenced by a park entrance in the
absence of protection, the estimated MATT (column (iv)) is -0.492. In other words,
tourism, as measured by park entrances, accounted for approximately 40% of the
poverty reduction associated with the establishment of protected areas.
The marginal impact of infrastructure development also has the expected sign
(Column (iii)). Our results indicate that as road networks develop (roadless volume
decreases) there is an associated reduction in poverty. We estimate that, had
protection not affected road development in surrounding census tracts, there would
have been less development in the absence of protection. However, the difference
between observed and counterfactual values is relatively small. The slightly greater
road development in protected census tracts accounts for a poverty reduction
(MATT) of only -0.143 (approximately 11% of the total ATT).
The results for change in forest cover reflect the conflicting impacts underlying
deforestation. There is a significant difference in observed and counterfactual
deforestation in protected census tracts. We estimate that, had protection not
affected deforestation, over 22% of the protected census tracts, on average, would
have been deforested between 1960 and 1986 (compared to 6.7% observed
deforestation). Despite this stark difference the MATT of deforestation is quite
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small, 0.099, and indicates that the prevention of deforestation caused by the
establishment of protected areas had essentially no impact on poverty.
Table 5: Mechanism Results Using Mechanism Imputation
Single Mechanism All Mechanisms
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Observed Counterfactual Mechanism Mechanism
Mechanism Mechanism Coefficient MATT Coefficient MATT
Park 122 0 -1.004 -0.492 -1.345 -0.619
Entrance (0.439) (0.448)
∆ Roadless -727,579 -674,147 2.694e-06 -0.143 2.790e-06 -0.148
Volume (0.447) (0.449)
∆ Forest -0.067 -0.23 0.627 0.103 0.124 0.02
Cover (0.439) (0.45)
(Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors)
Joint mechanism estimation
In the single mechanism estimation strategy each mechanism is considered
independently. However, the estimated impact (according to β̂2T ) of a particular
mechanism may be influenced by the inclusion or exclusion of additional
mechanisms in (23). By including all of the mechanism variables in (23) we allow
the coefficients for each mechanism to reflect the presence of the other mechanisms.
For clarity we denote the park entrance, change in roadless volume and
deforestation mechanism variables as E, R and F respectively. The joint mechanism
estimation analog to (23) is
Yi:T=1 = Xi:T=1β1T + Ei:T=1β2T +Ri:T=1β3T + Fi:T=1β4T +  (25)
where all variables represent the observed values from the protected census tracts.
The counterfactual of interest for each mechanism is estimated in a series of three
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imputations
Y˜ Ei:T=1 = Xi:T=1β̂1T + Êiβ̂2T +Riβ̂3T + Fiβ̂4T (26)
Y˜ Ri:T=1 = Xi:T=1β̂1T + Eiβ̂2T + R̂iβ̂3T + Fiβ̂4T labeleq : mech21 (27)
Y˜ Fi:T=1 = Xi:T=1β̂1T + Eiβ̂2T +Riβ̂3T + F̂iβ̂4T (28)
where Êi, R̂i and F̂i represent the imputed mechanism values from (22) (i.e.,[
Ŝi(0)|T = 1
]
for the respective mechanisms). Equations (26) - (28) show that the
counterfactual of interest for each mechanism is estimated by substituting the
imputed mechanism values (from (22) for the mechanism of interest) into the
respective equation, while leaving the covariates and complementary mechanism
values at observed levels.49 For instance, the counterfactual of interest for change in
roadless volume (Y˜ Ri:T=1) is calculated by plugging in the imputed counterfactual
values for change in roadless volume (R̂i) into the coefficients from (25), while
leaving covariates (Xi:T=1) and mechanism values for park entrances (Ei) and
change in forest cover (Fi) at the observed levels of protected census tract.
Results for the joint mechanism estimation strategy can be found in Columns
(v) and (vi) of Table 5. We find that inclusion of all mechanisms in (25) does
change the estimated influence of each mechanism (compare to Column (iii)): the
coefficient on the park entrance mechanism increases in absolute terms from -1.004
to -1.345 (indicating increased poverty reduction attributable to tourism,
comparatively); the coefficient on the roadless volume mechanism increases from
2.694e-06 to 2.790e-06 (indicating increased poverty reduction attributable to
infrastructure development, comparatively), and; the coefficient on the deforestation
mechanism decreases from 0.627 to 0.124 (indicating reduced poverty exacerbation
attributable to deforestation, comparatively).
49A function that performs this iterative process was written in R 2.11.1 and is available from the
author upon request.
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Under the joint mechanism estimation we find that the MATT for the park
entrance mechanism increases, in relative terms, to -0.619. This result implies that
tourism associated with the establishment of protected areas accounts for
approximately 49% of the estimated poverty reduction due to protection. Joint
estimation also affects the MATT for the deforestation mechanism which falls to
0.02. In other words, reductions in deforestation due to the establishment of
protected areas has almost no impact of poverty. Joint mechanism estimation has a
trivial effect on the MATT of roadless volume which increases, in absolute terms, to
-0.148.
Summary of Results
We estimate the MATT for each of our mechanisms using both a single, and joint
estimation strategy. Our results indicate that, while there are some differences, the
choice of strategy is not driving the results or underlying implications. However, a
priori, we prefer the joint estimation strategy because each mechanism coefficient
(and, therefore, each MATT) accounts for the presence of the other mechanisms.
Of the mechanisms we consider, tourism accounts for greatest MATT, in
absolute terms, and the greatest proportion of total poverty reduction due to the
establishment of protected areas (estimated in the ATT). Nearly half of the poverty
reduction associated with the establishment of protected areas is accounted for by
our proxy for tourism, the establishment of a park entrance within a protected area.
These results are concordant with anecdotal evidence, conjecture, and findings from
a previous study (Robalino and Villalobos-Fiatt 2010).
The development of infrastructure in protected census tracts has a strong
poverty reducing influence as well (as measured by β̂3T ). However, because the
establishment of protected areas did not substantially increase the road networks in
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the affected census tracts, compared to our counterfactual estimates, the MATT on
poverty was modest.
We find that the reduction in deforestation associated with the establishment of
protected areas (compared to counterfactual levels) has essentially no impact on
poverty, as measured by the MATT. By measuring the impact of reductions in
deforestation on poverty, due to protection, we were hoping to capture the impact of
preserving ecosystem services. However, as mentioned in the Introduction, there are
likely countervailing mechanism effects of avoided deforestation, which we believe
are highlighted by our results. Figure 7 presents a DAG that depicts two of the
potential underlying impacts that avoided deforestation would likely have on
poverty. The establishment of protected areas reduces deforestation T
(−)→ F . This
causal reduction in deforestation has two impacts. First, we expect an increase in
ecosystem services F
(+)→ ES which would lead to a positive impact on poverty
(poverty reduction), ES
(+)→ Y . Second, we expect the reduction in deforestation to
decrease extraction profits F
(−)→ EP which would lead to a negative impact on
poverty (poverty exacerbation), EP
(−)→ Y .50
Considering the concepts from the DAG in Figure 7, our estimated MATT for
change in forest cover and results from previous studies in Costa Rica (Ferraro and
Hanauer 2011, Ferraro et al. 2011), we believe that ecosystem services can be shown
to exhibit a positive MATT on poverty (reduces poverty). First, assume that the
only causal mechanism relationship between protection, deforestation and poverty is
T→F→EP→Y (i.e., ecosystem services either are not affected by avoided
deforestation or do not impact economic outcomes). Our results show that the
establishment of protected areas is associated with a causal reduction in
50This mechanism channel captures the concern the land-use restrictions associated with the
establishment of protected areas may impose economic hardship by prohibiting extractive activities.
Avoided deforestation provides an indication that land-use laws were binding and, therefore, F
(−)→
EP
(−)→ Y is likely a valid channel.
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deforestation T
(−)→ F . Ferraro and Hanauer (2011) and Ferraro et al. (2011) show
that increases in avoided deforestation, associated with the establishment of
protected areas, generally result in lower levels of poverty reduction or, in some
cases, poverty exacerbation. This association is due to the fact that protected areas
reduce profitable economic activities such as resource extraction. Therefore, by
reducing deforestation we expect the establishment of protected areas to reduce
extractive profits F
(−)→ EP thereby causally reducing poverty outcomes
(exacerbating poverty) EP
(−)→ Y . Taken together, if T (−)→ F (−)→ EP (−)→ Y was the
sole deforestation mechanism process then we would expect the change in forest
cover MATT to be positive (indicating poverty exacerbation to a higher magnitude).
T YF
EP
ES
(-)
(-)
(+)
(-)
(+)
Figure 7: Directed Acyclic Diagram (DAG) depicting two of the potential underlying ef-
fects (and direction) of the change in forest cover mechanism. The the establishment of
protected areas reduces deforestation T
(−)→ F . This causal reduction in deforestation has
two impacts. First, we expect an increase in ecosystem services F
(+)→ ES which would
lead to a positive impact on poverty (poverty reduction), ES
(+)→ Y . Second, we expect the
reduction in deforestation to decrease extraction profits F
(−)→ EP which would lead to a
negative impact on poverty (poverty exacerbation), EP
(−)→ Y . The relative magnitude of
these countervailing effects determine the estimated MATT.
Incorporating the preceding logic into the model established in the DAG in
Figure 7, our posited relationship T
(−)→ F (+)→ ES (+)→ Y must hold. In other words,
because preventing deforestation prevents economically beneficial extractive
activities, the buttressing of ecosystem services associated with the establishment of
protected areas must provide countervailing poverty reducing impacts.
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Robustness
Without mechanism bias-adjustment
In the Counterfactual Mechanism Values Section we motivate and describe the use
of bias-adjustment techniques to impute counterfactual mechanism values. We
argue that, like the use of post-match regression bias-adjustments in the estimation
of average treatment effects, this technique provides a (more) unbiased estimate of
counterfactual mechanism values when imbalance persists (especially in baseline
mechanism covariates) post-matching. We re-estimate all MATTs without using
bias-adjustment, the results can be found in Table 6. As expected, given the
purpose of the bias-adjustment procedure, we find little difference in counterfactual
values for change in forest cover (compare Column (ii) in Tables 5 and 6), for which
a high degree of balance in baseline measures is achieved (see Table 4). In addition,
because of the binary nature of the park entrance mechanism, the counterfactual
values are identical with, and without, bias-adjustment. However, the
counterfactual values for the roadless volume mechanism differ substantially.
Without bias-adjustment the estimated counterfactual change in roadless volume is
only -447,024 (compared to -674,147 with bias-adjustment). In turn, there is a much
larger difference between observed and counterfactual roadless volume mechanism
values which, thus, leads to much larger, in absolute terms, estimate of the MATT
(-0.7827). In other words, by not using bias-adjustment the estimated proportion of
poverty reduction in the ATT attributable to protections causal effect on roadless
volume, changes from approximately 11% to 61%. These results highlight that
infrastructure development has a large influence on poverty reduction (as measured
by β̂3T ). However, the magnitude of the associated MATT is determined by the
counterfactual mechanism value, which we believe is best estimated using the
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bias-adjustment framework that we outline in the Counterfactual Mechanism Values
Section.
Table 6: Mechanism Results Without Mechanism Imputation
Single Mechanism All Mechanisms
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Observed Counterfactual Mechanism Mechanism
Mechanism Mechanism Coefficient MATT Coefficient MATT
Park 122 0 -1.004 -0.492 -1.345 -0.619
Entrance (0.439) (0.546)
∆ Roadless -727,579 -447,024 2.694e-06 -0.756 2.790e-06 -0.7827
Volume (0.54) (0.54)
∆ Forest -0.067 -0.223 0.627 0.099 0.124 0.019
Cover (0.439) (0.55)
(Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors)
LNATT
The estimation of MATT and NATT requires the imputation of counterfactual
mechanism values which are, by definition, unobserved. Our data provide a unique
opportunity to estimate the causal effects of protection net of tourism under less
restrictive assumptions than those used in the main analyses. We exploit the fact
that some protected census tracts are observed in the absence of a park entrance
mechanism. For this subset of the data Si(1) = Si(0) by definition. In other words,
the potential park entrance mechanism value for protected units that did not receive
an entrance is same under protection as it would have been in the absence of
protection (Si(1) = Si(0) = s0). Therefore, we can identify this principal stratum
({Si(1) = Si(0) = s0}) without invoking Assumption 2 or 3. In addition, we observe
Yi(1, Si(0)) for this subset of the data and, therefore, do not need Assumption 4 to
impute the counterfactual of interest.
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The local NATT (LNATT) can be estimated51
LNATT = E{E[Yi(1, Si(0))− Yi(0, Si(0))|Si(1) = Si(0) = s0]} (29)
for the subset of data in the principal stratum {Si(1) = Si(0) = s0} (Flores and
Flores-Lagunes 2011). The fact that we observe protected census tracts that were
not affected by a park entrance means that we can take the simple difference in
these protected tract outcomes (Yi(1, Si(0))) and their matched controls
(Yi(0, Si(0))), both of which are observed in the data. We estimate the LNATT for
this subgroup to be -0.6122. Flores and Flores-Lagunes (2011) note that the
LNATT represents the local ATT (LATT) for this subgroup because there is no
mechanism effect for this group so Yi(1, (Si(0)) = Yi(1). Therefore, under
Assumption 1, LNATT=LATT=E[Yi(1)− Yi(0)|Xi] for this subgroup.
We note that the estimated LNATT for park entrances is very close to the
NATT from the main analysis (-0.6122 and -0.659, respectively). We believe that
the similarity between the two estimates provides evidence that the assumptions
and methods employed in the main analyses are providing unbiased estimates of the
respective mechanism effects. We can make further comparisons to the MATT
estimates using the estimated LNATT and an additional assumption of constant
individual net effects (Flores and Flores-Lagunes 2011)
Assumption 5 Yi(1, Si(0))− Yi(0, Si(0)) = C, for all i.
Under this assumption we can define LNATT=NATT and, therefore, estimate
MATT=ATT-LNATT. Using this framework, the estimate of park entrance MATT
(-0.6658) is very close to the estimate from the main analysis (-0.619).
51This framework follows directly from the framework for the local net average treatment effect
(LNATE) established by Flores and Flores-Lagunes (2011).
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Discussion
Recent impact evaluations from developing countries have found that the
proliferation of protected areas in the past several decades has been associated with
poverty reduction in surrounding communities (Canavire-Bacarezza and Hanauer
2011, Andam et al. 2010, Sims 2010). The findings are contrary to the expectations
that the land-use restrictions, through which protected areas achieve their
environmental goals, restrict economically beneficial activities. While the results
from these studies are important to understanding the policy impacts, in the
context of protected areas, it is arguably more important to understand through
what mechanisms protected areas affect economic outcomes than it is to estimate
the overall effect. Unfortunately, the methodologies employed in previous studies
are not suited to identify or quantify the potential mechanisms through which
protected areas affect economic outcomes.
Using recently developed quasi-experimental methods, and rich biophysical and
demographic data from Andam et al. (2010), we quantify the mechanistic impacts of
tourism, infrastructure development and ecosystem services on poverty due to the
establishment of protected areas in Costa Rica prior to 1980. To capture the causal
effects of our respective mechanisms we use the establishment of park entrances,
changes in road networks and deforestation as proxies. Our results indicate that
approximately 50% of the poverty reduction estimated by Andam et al. (2010) can
be attributed to tourism. Conversely, infrastructure development played a negligible
role in poverty reduction. Finally, although the mechanistic impact of avoided
deforestation is near zero, we argue that, given the negative economic impacts
associated with the prevention of deforestation, enhanced ecosystem services (due to
the establishment of protected areas) likely had a positive effect of poverty
reduction.
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Our results offer insight to potential policy actions that might complement the
establishment of protected areas. For instance, in support of common conjecture,
our results suggest that the promotion of tourism concurrent with the establishment
of protected areas may have beneficial poverty effects. Given that one of the goals
set forth by the 5th World Parks Congress is that the establishment of protected
areas should at least do no economic harm, greater understanding of the
mechanisms through which protected areas affect poverty is needed. Future studies
in Costa Rica should obtain less coarse measures of mechanism variables in order to
more accurately measure the impacts. This will facilitate, for instance, a more
precise measure of the impacts that enhanced ecosystem services, due to the
establishment of protected areas, have on economic outcomes.
There is likely a great deal of heterogeneity in the overall impacts and the
mechanism impacts of protected areas across countries. Therefore, caution should
be taken in the extrapolation of these results to protected area networks elsewhere.
Future studies should apply similar methodologies in other countries. Indeed, to
truly understand the mechanisms through which protected areas affect poverty, the
evidence base will need to built on a country-by-country basis.
Chapter IV
Estimating the Impacts of Protected Areas on Poverty in Bolivia
Introduction
Protected areas are an important tool for the global conservation of ecosystems and
biodiversity (MEA 2005). Presently, approximately 13% of the world’s terrestrial
surface is covered by some form of protected area (WDPA 2009). The sheer scale of
the global coverage of protected areas highlights the importance of understanding
their underlying impacts. Unfortunately, there is little empirical evidence on the
environmental impacts of protected areas and even less on the socioeconomic
impacts of protected areas on surrounding communities (Coad et al. 2008). The
socioeconomic implications of establishing protected areas are of particular interest
given the high degree of overlap between areas of remaining biodiversity (i.e., areas
likely to be targeted for protection) and poverty (Sachs et al. 2009). This raises
concerns from poverty advocates that achieving environmental goals may come at
the expense of the populations impacted by such policy (Coad et al. 2008, Adams
et al. 2004).
The dearth of quality evidence on the impacts of protected areas fuels a general
debate regarding the relationship between areas protected by environmental law and
the socioeconomic outcomes in surrounding areas. Conservationists see the
establishment of protected areas as essential to global environmental stability,
whereas poverty advocates argue that, while the benefits from protecting these
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areas are paid to all, the costs are borne only by those proximal to the areas (Coad
et al. 2008, Wilkie et al. 2006, Adams et al. 2004). This argument concerns the
land-use laws associated with protected areas that restrict economic development by
preventing forms of profitable activities such as the exploitation of natural resources
and agricultural cultivation (Coad et al. 2008, Fleck et al. 2006).
There have been few empirical studies with the proper data and methodologies
to accurately estimate the socioeconomic impacts of protected areas on local
economies, especially in developing nations (exceptions include: Ferraro and
Hanauer (2011), Ferraro et al. (2011), Andam et al. (2010), Sims (2010), Robalino
and Villalobos-Fiatt (2010)).52 Most studies have either been ex ante estimates of
future costs and benefits, or ex post studies of observed states of welfare (Andam
et al. 2010, Wilkie et al. 2006). The ability to empirically measure the
socioeconomic impacts of protected areas is complicated by the non-random nature
in which areas are assigned to protection. The presence of such selection issues
necessitates the use of sophisticated research design and methodologies, absent most
previous studies. Further confounding the process is the fact that most developing
nations do not have sufficiently rich data sets with which to measure pre- and
post-treatment poverty outcomes.53
Bolivia is an apt setting for evaluating the impacts of protected areas on poverty
in surrounding communities. Bolivia is one of the most biodiverse countries in the
world.54 Yet despite having a wealth of natural resources, Bolivia is one of the
52To our knowledge, there is no study that examines the relevance of protected areas on welfare
in Bolivia.
53See Ferraro (2008) for a discussion on the components of a quality socioeconomic impact evalua-
tion which include: 1) An appropriate measure of welfare; 2) observations on outcomes and pertinent
covariates for both pre- and post-treatment; 3) relevant indicators for both treatment and control
units, and; 4) observations of pretreatment covariates that affect both selection into treatment and
socioeconomic outcomes.
54Bolivia is one of the 15 most biologically diverse countries in the world. It is recognized as one
of the 11 nations with the greatest diversity of flora (about 20 thousand species) and one of the
top 10 most abundant in terms of birds (1,400 species) and mammals (356 species). Information
provided by the Protected Areas National Service of Bolivia SERNAP (2009). Moreover, according
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poorest countries in Latin America, with poverty levels upwards of 60% (UDAPE
2006). Bolivia also has an extensive protected area network that was made effective
by an identifiable restructuring of the existing system in 1992, followed by a surge in
proliferation of new protected areas throughout the 90s. Moreover, Bolivia has rich
biophysical and socioeconomic data that predate the effective establishment of
protected areas.
Using rich biophysical and socioeconomic data, and quasi-experimental methods,
we ask, “what would poverty outcomes in Bolivian communities affected by
protected areas have been had protected areas not been established?” We find no
evidence that communities affected by protected areas established between 1992 and
2000 fared any worse, between 1992 and 2001, than similar communities that
remained unaffected by protected areas. In fact, all of our point estimates indicate
that protected communities had differentially greater levels of poverty reduction.
We find that these results are robust to a number of econometric specifications,
sensitivity analyses, spillover analyses and placebo studies. Our results are
concordant with findings of poverty alleviation due to the establishment of
protected areas in Costa Rica (Andam et al. 2010) and Thailand (Andam et al.
2010, Sims 2010). However, unlike previous studies (Andam et al. 2010, Sims 2010)
our results indicate that na¨ıve (uncontrolled) comparisons of protected and
unprotected communities leads to an overestimation of the poverty alleviation
associated with the establishment of protected areas. Accordingly, our results
underscore the fact that protected area impacts are likely not generalizable and,
therefore, the importance of country-level protected area impact evaluations. To
that end, our results add to the scientific body of knowledge on the socioeconomic
impacts of protected areas in developing countries, which is exceedingly sparse.
to an UNESCO report, Bolivia has the largest water reserves in Latin America and ranks 6th in the
world in terms of tropical moist forest resources (the third in the continent after Brazil and Mexico).
83
Background
Protected areas in bolivia
The evolution of the establishment and enforcement of protected areas in Bolivia is
complex but can be defined, coarsely, by two periods: pre- and post-1992. A
non-trivial amount of Bolivia’s area was designated for protection between the late
30’s and early 90’s.55 However, the criteria for establishing these areas were not
uniform, or systematic. Most were established with little technical background and
absent the participation of local actors (SERNAP, 2007). Furthermore, there was a
lack of recognition and requisite enforcement within these areas, a phenomenon
commonly referred to as, “paper parks” (e.g., Bruner et al. (2001)).
The progression of the theme of conservation and the consequent international
commitments undertaken by countries in the early 90’s, after the Rio Conference,
led to the development of policy and institutional foundations related to the then
new paradigm of sustainable development and environmental care. Thus, under the
Environment Law (Law 1333), the National System of Protected Areas in Bolivia
(SNAP) was created in 1992, defined as natural and cultural heritage of the State
and public and social interest.
The Law 1333, defines protected areas in Bolivia as “natural areas with or
without human intervention, declared under state protection by law, in order to
protect and preserve the flora and fauna, genetic resources, natural ecosystems,
watersheds and values of scientific, aesthetic, historical, economic and social interest,
in order to conserve and protect natural and cultural heritage of the country.”56
55The 10 protected areas that were established prior to the 1990’s cover 5,917,638 ha which is
approximately 1/3 of the total protected area.
56One of the most important characteristics of Bolivia’s protected areas is their compatibility
with the existence of traditional indigenous people (Environment Law 1333, Section 60-65). Since
its initiation in 1992, the National System of Protected Areas in Bolivia has been designed with
a participatory approach, recognizing that the areas are occupied and are ancestral territories of
indigenous populations. Therefore, the participation of local people is a fundamental in the main
aspect of the system.
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The consequence of Bolivia’s history of protection and Law 1333 is that, even for
areas designated prior to 1992, the effective establishment date of Bolivia’s protected
area system was 1992 (and thereafter). The identification of this administrative
recognition and enforcement allows us to use 1992 as a baseline, pre-treatment year,
after which the intervention impact of protected areas can be measured.
Related literature
There have been only a handful of studies on the socioeconomic impacts of
protected areas that properly control for their non-random establishment. Further,
there is no formal literature regarding the impacts of protected areas on
socioeconomic outcomes in Bolivia. The closest study to this kind for Bolivia
(Ya´n˜ez 2006) examines the potential effects of three protected areas on poverty in
Bolivia. Based on household surveys carried out near these protected areas, the
author finds a small positive effect of protected areas on poverty. Nevertheless, this
study not only has a small sample of protected areas, but also presents some
methodological drawbacks such as selection bias and sample selection.
The most comparable study to ours is a quasi-experimental analysis of protected
areas in Costa Rica (Andam et al. 2010). The authors designate census tracts
(segmentos) with 10% or more of their areas protected, as treated. They then use
matching techniques to construct a counterfactual group that is similar along
pretreatment dimensions to the treated census tracts. The authors’ calculation of
average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) provides evidence that census tracts
with protected areas that were established prior to 1980 had differentially greater
levels of poverty reduction between 1973 and 2000 than comparable unprotected
census tracts.
In a similar study Sims (2010) uses a continuous measure of the percent of land
area protected within Thailand sub-districts to measure the marginal effect of
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protected areas (IUCN category I & II) on a poverty headcount ratio. The author
compiles an extensive set of pre- and post-treatment biophysical covariates.
However, the outcome variable is only available for the contemporaneous period,
therefore, the baseline levels of poverty are unknown. The results of the study show
that when baseline geographic and development variables are controlled for,
sub-districts with more protected area displayed lower poverty levels than
comparison districts.
Robalino and Villalobos-Fiatt (2010) explore how national parks affect local
wages in Costa Rica and how these effects vary within different areas of a park and
among different social groups. They use highly disaggregated geographic references,
and find that parks’ effects on wages vary according to economic activity and
proximity to the entrance of the park. Workers close to entrances receive higher
wages and are employed in higher-paid, non-agricultural activities.
Several studies from the United States have shown no effect of protected areas
on economic outcomes at the county level. In two studies, (Lewis et al. 2002, 2003)
use a simultaneous equations framework to examine the county level effects of
protected areas (publicly owned land designated for preservation and multiple use)
in the Northern Forest Region of the United States on migration, on employment
and wage composition. A broader study by (Duffy-Deno 1998) uses a cross-section
of intermountain western counties of the United States to determine the effect of
protected areas (Wilderness, Forest Service and BLM land) on population and
employment densities. The author finds no significant effect on either outcome of
interest. However, all of these studies suffer from the lack of a true baseline, given
that all of the protected areas were designated decades prior to the first census
observations.
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Data and Methods
Data
We employ three categories of spatial and demographic data in this study: (1)
temporally distinct boundary mappings of terrestrial protected areas, (2) boundary
mappings of municipalities for the 1992 and 2001 censuses and the underlying
demography, and; (3) key biophysical characteristics believed to jointly affect the
establishment of protected areas and poverty.
The 1992 and 2001 census data were obtained from the Bolivian National
Statistical Office (INE). The census provides information that allows us to estimate
socioeconomic indicators at municipal level, such as structural poverty measures,
education, employment, housing, indigenous populations and health. Information
regarding Bolivia’s protected areas and their boundaries was obtained from
Servicion Nacional de Areas Protegidas (SERNAP) and the World Database on
Protected Areas (WDPA). Further geographic data (e.g., road networks, digital
elevation models, cities, forest cover, etc.) were obtained from NASA, Conservation
International and Bolivian forest regulation office (Superintendencia Forestal).
Unit of analysis
The unit of analysis for our study is the municipality. The municipality is the
penultimate political boundary in terms of disaggregation, second to the
comunidad. Bolivia comprises 326 municipalities with an average area of 325,083 ha
(about the size of Rhode Island; range: 28,928 – 1,298,121 ha). The maps in Figures
reffig:bol1 and reffig:bol2 show that the municipalities in the mountainous and
altiplano regions (southwest) tend to be smaller than those in the lowlands (east
northeast; see Figure reffig:bol3 for the topography of Bolivia).
87Table 7: Baseline Characteristics for Protected and Unprotected Municipalities
Variable Description Status Mean Median Std Min Max
Poverty Index 1992 Asset-based poverty index Unprotected 0.74 1.20 2.08 -5.89 3.97
for 1992 Protected 0.68 1.27 1.96 -5.08 3.56
Poverty Index 2001 Asset-based poverty index Unprotected -0.45 -0.05 2.01 -6.59 2.94
for 2001 Protected -0.94 -0.98 1.90 -5.47 2.35
NBI 1992 % population with unmet Unprotected 91.05 95.73 11.60 44.21 100.00
basic needs 1992 Protected 87.52 93.28 14.07 45.76 99.67
NBI 2001 % population with unmet Unprotected 86.03 93.82 17.00 19.08 100.00
basic needs 2001 Protected 76.70 83.31 21.60 23.83 99.84
Area (m) Municipality area, square Unprotected 2.179E+09 9.313E+08 3.652E+09 1.235E+07 3.511E+10
meters Protected 6.937E+09 2.214E+09 1.270E+10 2.179E+08 7.136E+10
Change in Forest Cover % deforestation in municipality Unprotected -0.01 0.00 0.05 -0.31 0.00
1976-1991 1976-91 Protected -0.02 0.00 0.05 -0.26 0.00
Percent Forest % of municipality under Unprotected 0.19 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.99
Cover 1991 forest cover 1991 Protected 0.48 0.58 0.34 0.00 0.93
Average Distance Avg. dist. to city from each 1ha Unprotected 107999 94104 71562 6828 384000
to a City (m) parcel within each municipality Protected 142790 104553 131397 8400 589100
Average Elevation (m) Average elevation of each 1ha Unprotected 2713 3265 1470 143 4478
parcel within each municipality Protected 1825 1695 1357 149 4589
Average Slope (pct) Average slope of each 1ha parcel Unprotected 18.97 16.58 14.82 0.91 59.35
within each municipality Protected 23.89 27.38 14.31 1.29 55.74
Roadless Volume (m) Sum of the product of area and Unprotected 8.350E+13 9.801E+12 2.604E+14 1.342E+10 2.53E+15
dist. to road, each 1ha parcel Protected 2.979E+14 2.544E+13 8.477E+14 6.059E+11 5.61E+15
Notes: Sample includes 56 protected and 252 unprotected units. 21 “marginally” protected units (those with between [0.01,0.1)
of their area occupied by a protected area) are removed from the sample.
*The municipalities are segmented into square parcels with sides of 100m. Measurements are made for each parcel then
averaged within municipalities.
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Protected areas and treatment assignment
Bolivia has 23 protected areas that cover a total area of 17,131,507.48 ha or ˜16
percent of Bolivia’s terrestrial area (GIS calculations). The average size of a
protected area is 475,875 ha (range: 221 – 2,919,143 ha). To determine the
socioeconomic impacts of protected areas we must identify the municipalities that
are spatially influenced by protected areas. We use GIS to determine the proportion
(percentage) of each municipality that is occupied by a protected area established
between 1992 and 2000. Of the 87 municipalities that intersect with one or more
protected area, the average area designated as protected is 29.3% (range: 0.00007 –
100%). In order to assign municipalities a binary indicator of treatment we must
establish a threshold (percentage), above which municipalities are considered
protected. Our initial threshold is established at 10%.57 In order to reduce potential
bias to our estimates we need to ensure that we are not comparing protected
municipalities with marginally protected municipalities (doing so would likely serve
to weaken estimates of treatment effect). We, therefore, drop municipalities with
percentage overlap along the interval [0.1, 10). According to our assignment rule,
there are 56 municipalities that are considered protected. The percentage of overlap
within these protected municipalities ranges from 10.26 – 100% (mean = 43.9%,
median = 39.14%). We are left with 256 municipalities that are considered
unprotected.
57We use the 10% threshold in accordance with previous studies (Andam et al. 2010, Ferraro and
Hanauer 2011, Ferraro et al. 2011). A 10% threshold was chosen because one the goals of set forth
by 4th World Congress on National Parks and Protected Areas was to protect 10% of the worlds
ecosystems (Andam et al. 2010). We test the robustness of our results to this protection threshold
by defining alternative thresholds at 5, 20, 30 and 50%. We find that our results are robust to these
alternative thresholds (see Appendix C for full threshold results).
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Figure 8: Map of protected areas, major cities and quintiles of poverty in 1992 according
to poverty index.
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Covariates of interest
To isolate the causal effect of protected areas on poverty, we compile a set of
observable covariates that jointly affect the establishment of protected areas and
poverty outcomes (and assume that all unobservables do not exhibit joint influence).
These covariates are used in our analyses to control for the observable differences
between protected and unprotected municipalities, therefore, isolating the impact of
protection.
Distance to major city. Cities tend to be the nodes of major markets,
economic activity and opportunity. Protected areas are often located distant from
major cities, where the opportunity cost of land is lower (Sims 2010, Joppa and
Pfaff 2009). We calculate the average distance from each municipality to the nearest
city (each municipality is broken into 1 ha parcels and the average euclidean
distance from the set of parcels within each municipality to the nearest city is
calculated using GIS). Cities included in the measurement are the state capitals: La
Paz, Sucre, Cochabamba, Cobija, Trinidad, Oruro, Potosi and Santa Cruz. Table 7
shows that protected municipalities are significantly farther from cities, on average,
than unprotected municipalities. This is consistent with previous findings (e.g.,
Andam et al. 2010, Sims 2010, Joppa and Pfaff 2009).
Roadless volume. Access to roads increases access to markets and other
resources (reducing transportation costs, etc.). In addition, roads serve as a good
indicator of the level of infrastructure development and urbanization. Previous
country-level studies have found that protected areas tend to be located in areas
with sparse road networks (Andam et al. 2010, 2008). To control for baseline
measures of these influences we calculate roadless volume (Watts et al. 2007).
Roadless volume is an aggregation of the euclidean distance to a road for each land
parcel within a municipality, adjusted for the size of the land parcel. Roadless
volume is calculated by summing the product of the area of each land parcel (1 ha
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Figure 9: Map of protected areas, major cities and quintiles of poverty in 1992 according
to NBI.
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in this case) and the distance of that parcel to the nearest road (1992). Therefore,
higher measurements of roadless volume indicate fewer road networks within a
municipality. Table 7 shows that roadless volume is greater within protected
municipalities, which is consistent with previous studies (e.g., Andam et al. 2010).58
Elevation and slope. Productivity of land, especially related to agricultural
productivity, plays a large role in economic development. Low slope, low elevation
land tends to be more suitable for agriculture and general development (lower
production, extraction and development costs). Previous studies, both globally
(Joppa and Pfaff 2009) and at the country-level (Sims 2010), have found that
protected areas tend to be placed on land that is relatively steep and high elevation.
It is, therefore, important to control for the average slope and elevation of
municipalities. Bolivia presents somewhat of a unique case, however. Bolivia is
characterized by a dichotomous landscape in that the country is defined (in general)
by the highlands and lowlands. Table 7 shows that the slope in protected
municipalities is greater in unprotected municipalities (expected), however the
average elevation is lower (on average) within these protected municipalities
(unexpected).
Forest cover. Protected areas tend to be placed on forested lands (Andam
et al. 2010, Sims 2010). In addition, forests represent potential for economic
opportunities (timber, fuelwood, etc.). We therefore calculate the percentage of each
municipality covered by forest in 1991. Table 7 shows that protected municipalities
contained significantly more forested areas at baseline.
58One may be concerned that disparate municipality areas across protected and unprotected units
might confound the estimates of protected area impacts (e.g., may be correlated with urbanization
or other unobservable). However, roadless volume is nearly perfectly correlated with the area of
respective municipalities (Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.905), mitigating such concerns.
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N
Figure 10: Digital elevation model of Bolivia, with protected areas draped (green). While
a majority of the designated protected areas lie in relatively mountainous regions, there
is a large area protected in the east that accounts for the relatively low average slope of
protected municipalities. The red points represent the location of major cities listed in
Figures 8 and 9.
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Poverty
In order to estimate the impact of protected areas on poverty, an outcome that
objectively measures levels of socioeconomic welfare is necessary. In the absence of a
universal metric such as income, we are tasked with developing metrics that
adequately capture socioeconomic outcomes. We employ two measures of poverty in
our analyses: an asset based poverty index (PI) and Necesidades Basicas
Insatisfechas (NBI). Both poverty indicators are measured during the 1992 and 2001
census years and serve two purposes. First, the PI and NBI in 2001 serve as the
outcome of interest to measure differences in poverty between protected and
unprotected municipalities. Second, the PI and NBI in 1992 serve as controls for
baseline states of poverty. By ensuring that we compare protected and unprotected
municipalities with similar baseline poverty characteristics, we improve the
probability that these units share similar poverty trajectories prior to the
establishment of protected areas.
Table 8: Eigenvectors from principal component analysis
Eigenvectors, Pooled
Variable EigenV
Adult men in population* -0.02836
Households without bathroom* 0.34984
Households that use fuelwood for cooking* 0.39719
Households with dirt floors* 0.39399
Low-quality houses* 0.33074
Households without electricity* 0.46972
Illiterate population* 0.17906
Population employed with salary* -0.06499
Average persons per bedroom 0.00384
Households without access to public water* 0.39091
Households without sewer or septic* 0.20994
Average years of education -0.02452
Notes: Census data from 1992 and 2001 are pooled to measure
average influence of assets across time.
* Indicates that variable is measured as a percentage.
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Table 9: Mean Asset Values by Deciles of 1992 Poverty Index
Richer Deciles of PI 1992 Poorer
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
pct.men.92 57.77 55.96 55.78 54.74 54.45 56.5 55.1 54.56 54.3 57.9
pct.wo.bath.92 43.96 66.88 61.13 68.52 77.72 86.13 82.14 85.15 92.49 99.26
pct.fuelwood.92 25.59 46.61 70.06 69.85 65.79 74.67 82.98 89.47 91.4 99.2
pct.dirt.floor.92 28.77 49.74 63.72 72.77 76.89 79.72 80.52 81.61 92.19 91.7
pct.low.qual.house.92 15.23 23.07 37.02 41.09 49.08 47.7 57.57 58.63 68.46 82.57
pct.wo.elct.92 26.35 45.1 63.42 73.31 82.13 86.89 94.17 94.65 97.19 99.87
illit.92 12.5 19.32 23.11 27.04 24.7 33.12 30.24 37.22 47.19 67.91
emp.92 95.8 91.28 90.17 88.66 89.6 88.09 85.62 84.93 81.45 61.62
avg.person.room.92 3.28 3.26 3.48 3.52 3.42 3.34 3.53 3.57 3.77 4.09
pct.nowater.92 27.13 46.12 59.33 69.38 75.83 75.63 77.57 83.98 90.18 97.56
pct.nosewer.92 65.05 87.19 90.97 93.19 96.16 96.98 97.34 98.5 99.03 99.87
avg.edu.92 6.77 5.1 4.66 4.2 4.42 3.68 3.77 3.36 2.72 1.45
We use two separate measures of poverty to buttress the robustness of our
analyses. Although the PI and NBI are both designed as measures of poverty, they
capture different aspects that contribute to poverty. Given that we do not have a
more direct metric for poverty, such as income, we feel that it is important not to
limit our analyses to a single proxy.
Poverty Index (PI).59 Our PI is an asset based poverty index founded on
household responses to the 1992 and 2001 censuses. The index is constructed using
a principal component analysis (PCA). The primary purpose of the PCA is to
measure the influence of a vector of variables on a latent outcome, poverty. The
relative influence of each component variable is measured by the eigenvectors (factor
loading) calculated from the variance/covariance matrix underlying the component
variables. The eigenvectors are combined with the relative municipal-level variation
in assets to calculate a municipal-level PI.
Table 8 lists the variables used in the construction of the poverty index, and the
eigenvectors associated with each asset.60 These eigenvectors (from the first
59A similar asset based poverty index was developed for Costa Rica (Andam et al. 2010, Cavatassi
et al. 2004) and used by the Mexican government in the analyses of the PROGRESA program (cited
by Cavatassi et al. (2004).
60Our analyses are designed to measure changes in poverty over time. To ensure that our poverty
indexes are comparable across time we pool the asset data from the 1992 and 2001 census data
similar to Cavatassi et al. (2004) (see also (Filmer and Pritchett 2001)). By pooling the data for
the PCA we estimate the mean influence of each asset across time, allowing the variation in assets
between time periods to drive the estimated changes in poverty.
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component) account for over 60% of the variation in the asset variables and provide
the factor scores Fj for asset j ∈ {1, 2, ..., J} which indicate the weight and direction
of the influence each asset aj exerts on the PI. These factor scores are combined
with observed asset levels to formulate the PI for municipality i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N} ,
P Ii =
J∑
1
Fj
[
aij − aj
sj
]
, (30)
where aij is the observed level of asset j in municipality i, aj is the mean of asset j
across all municipalities, and sj is the standard deviation of asset j across
municipalities. The intuition underlying our PI is that there are a number of
household assets and characteristics that explain variation in unobserved poverty
outcomes. By understanding of how these assets co-vary (and by how much), we
can infer, from the composition of these assets across municipalities, how relative
poverty levels vary across municipalities.
We confirm the validity of our PI both internally and externally. The factor
scores from the eigenvectors in Table 8 provide evidence that our PI is internally
coherent. A positive factor score indicates that the asset variable contributes (adds)
to poverty, and vice versa. The factor score of each asset variable carries the
expected sign.61 We provide further evidence of the internal validity of our PI in
Table 9, in which we list the mean values of each asset within the deciles of the 1992
PI. The trends in asset levels as the PI increases (increasing deciles) are similar to
what we would expect to see as wealth decreases, indicating that the PI is likely
capturing poverty. As an external (to the PI) measure of our poverty index’s
validity we measure the correlation between the PI and NBI. Although the PI and
NBI capture different aspects of poverty, the two measures should be correlated. We
61According to the manner in which the poverty index was constructed, poverty is decreasing in
the negative orthant.
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find that this is the case, for instance, the correlation between NBI and PI in 2001 is
over 0.88.62
NBI. The NBI measures the percentage of the population within a municipality
with unsatisfied basic human needs. It captures poverty by measuring the goods or
services that a household possesses that are associated with well-being and then
comparing these municipality-level values to a norm (or ideal). The Bolivian NBI
was estimated by the INE in coordination with UDAPE. It comprises a set of
factors such as housing, basic services, education and health.63 The housing
component aims to isolate the household environment, in terms of providing
protection from the outdoors and other external factors such as animals and insects
that transmit diseases. It also includes living spaces inside the household in order to
consider social environment, privacy and comfort. The basic services component
considers basic sanitation in terms of the need for good quality water for food and
hygiene, and the availability of health services that allow privacy, sanitation and
hygiene. In addition, NBI considers energy availability and cooking sources. The
education portion includes the years of schooling, school attainment and literacy.
Finally, the health component relates to the capabilities of people, and good health
that allows the proper development within the social environment.
The individual household components are compared to a norm which is used to
determine if the household’s basic needs are met. The compilation of each equally
weighted component allows for the identification of the poverty condition of each
62This correlation can be observed spatially in the maps in Figures 8 and 9.
63The health component of the Bolivian NBI is not fully comparable between censuses as the
questions have changed. The full methodology can be found at http://www.ine.gob.bo/pdf/
Metodologias2004/NBI.doc
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household.64 Accordingly, a higher measure of the NBI indicates greater poverty
within the associated municipality.
Baseline covariate distributions
Previous studies at the global and country level have found significant differences in
the biophysical (Andam et al. 2010, Sims 2010, Joppa and Pfaff 2009, Pfaff et al.
2009) and socioeconomic (Andam et al. 2010) characteristics underlying protected
and unprotected areas. The differences underscore the non-random nature in which
protected areas are allocated. Globally it has been shown that protected areas tend
to be located distant from cities (markets) and on agriculturally unsuitable land
(high slope, high elevation), so-called “high and far” or “rocks and ice” bias (Joppa
and Pfaff 2009). In addition, a similar study in Costa Rica demonstrated that
communities affected by protected areas had significantly higher levels of baseline
poverty than unaffected communities (Andam et al. 2010).
Table 7 shows that Bolivia shares many of the characteristics associated with
protected areas that are observed globally. The geographic characteristics associated
with access to markets, infrastructure and urbanization differ significantly between
protected and unprotected areas. The average distance to a major city, roadless
volume and percent baseline forest cover are greater in protected municipalities,
indicating that protected areas tend to be established in more rural areas. In
addition, it can be seen that one of the primary indicators of agricultural suitability,
slope, is greater (indicating lower suitability) in protected municipalities. However,
contrary to global trends, we observe that the average elevation in protected
64The methods used to formulate the NBI present some limitations related to the weight of the
components that are included in the index. All the factors included have the same weight, in
addition, the method require some norms to which indicators are compared. These norms are, to
some extent, arbitrary. Also, a household is considered poor if at least one of the NBI components
are not satisfied. Moreover, NBI does not consider explicitly the demographic structure of the
household and prioritizes the housing indicators. There is one final, practical, limitation: there are
13 municipalities (four of which are considered protected) for which NBI was not calculated in 1992.
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municipalities is lower than in unprotected municipalities (see Figure 10). Most
interesting is the fact that, according to both poverty measures, baseline poverty is
slightly lower in protected municipalities. This finding is contrary to findings from
Costa Rica (Andam et al. 2010) and common wisdom.
Methods
The underlying differences in covariate values between protected and unprotected
municipalities indicates the importance of controlling for such differences in the
estimation of the impacts of protected areas. The selection issue that we must
address is that protected areas are not established randomly across the landscape.
Non-random allocation leads to the observed imbalance across these key covariates,
that jointly determine selection into protection and socioeconomic outcomes (see
Table 7), which may lead to biased estimates of the impacts of protected areas
under na¨ıve comparisons of protected and unprotected municipalities. To reduce the
bias associated with our estimates of the socioeconomic impacts of protected areas,
we use matching as our primary strategy to control for this confounding imbalance.
Matching
To measure the impact of protected areas on poverty in surrounding municipalities
we use matching to estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT).
Estimation of the ATT is implied in our research question, “what would poverty
outcomes in protected municipalities have been had they not been protected?”
Answering such a question implies the estimation of a counterfactual, and because
there are municipalities for which it is implausible to suppose the establishment of a
protected area, the estimation of an ATT is most appropriate.65
65Estimation of average treatment effects (ATE), for instance, entails the estimation of an addi-
tional counterfactual: outcomes for all unprotected units had they been protected. We argue that
it is implausible for many of Bolivia’s municipalities to have been protected and, therefore, the
estimation of ATT is more appropriate that ATE.
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The key to matching as an identification strategy to estimate ATT is the
balancing of covariate distributions across treatment arms (protected and
unprotected) thus mimicking the identification strategy of a randomized
experiment. This covariate balance is achieved in expectation through
randomization. Covariate balance is implicit under randomization because each unit
of the experimental sample has an equal probability (or more generally, a
probability that is known to the experimenter) of being assigned to treatment or
control. Therefore, treatment is assigned independent of potential outcomes Y (1)
and Y (0) under treatment (T = 1) and control (T = 0), respectively. In the absence
of a treatment, one would expect similar average outcomes from both groups.
Similarly, if both groups were to receive (the same) treatment, one would expect
similar average outcomes from both groups. In the statistics, epidemiology and
social science literature this assumption is termed ignorability of treatment,
independence of treatment or unconfoundedness. Stated formally,
E[Y (1)|T = 1)] = E[Y (1)|T = 0)] = E[Y (1)] (31)
E[Y (0)|T = 1)] = E[Y (0)|T = 0)] = E[Y (0)] . (32)
In words, (2) simply states that average potential outcome for the treatment
group under treatment, E[Y (1)|T = 1)], is equal to the average potential outcome of
the control group had they been treated, E[Y (1)|T = 0)]. Similarly, (3) states that
the average potential outcome for the treated group had they not been treated,
E[Y (0)|T = 1)], is equal to the average potential outcome of the control group in
the absence of treatment, E[Y (0)|T = 0)]. In (2) and (3), the terms E[Y (1)|T = 0)]
and E[Y (0)|T = 1)] are termed counterfactual outcomes. The fundamental problem
for causal inference (Holland 1986) is the fact that counterfactual outcomes are not
observed. However, with treatment assigned at random (and thus independent of
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potential outcomes), the average outcome for control units can act as the
counterfactual for treatment units, and vice versa.
Protected areas in Bolivia were not established randomly. Matching seeks to
mimic the identification of randomization by balancing key covariates that jointly
determine selection into treatment and outcomes. Balance, conditional on key
covariates, leads to conditional ignorability or conditional independence. However,
because our primary estimand of interest is the ATT we only need to estimate one
counterfactual. Therefore, it is only necessary for us to invoke the conditional
independence assumption (CIA) for (2). This more restrictive assumption can be
stated formally as the analog to (2),
E[Y (0)|T = 1, X] = E[Y (0)|T = 0, X)] = E[Y (0)|X] . (33)
Equation (4) states that, conditional on similar covariate distributions across
treatment arms, the average outcomes for the matched control units,
E[Y (0)|X,T = 0)], can be used as the counterfactual for treatment units. In other
words, by ensuring that the distributions of key covariates are balanced across
treatment and control groups, similar methods to those used in randomized
experiments can be used to estimate ATT on matched datasets.66 By ensuring that
units are comparable across treatment and control groups, we make the CIA, which
is necessary for causal inference, more defensible (Angrist and Pischke 2009).
Primary estimator
There are many matching metrics from which to choose. Our final specification is
determined by the metric that provides the best balance across our covariates of
66Similarly, by additionally invoking CIA for equation (3) (i.e.,
E[Y(1)—T=1,X]=E[Y(1)—T=0,X)]= E[Y(1)—X]), average treatment effects can be measured.
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interest.67 We find that, given our relatively small sample size, genetic matching
provides the best balance and, therefore, is most likely to satisfy the CIA. Genetic
matching (Sekhon 2007) conducts an algorithmic search across potential weighting
matrices in order to optimize the weighting matrix to best satisfy covariate balance.
We conduct a series of robustness checks on the estimates stemming from the
genetic matching, including adding calipers, calculating the Rosenbaum bounds
(Rosenbaum 2002), and various regression based estimators (see the Robustness
Section below).
Our primary genetic matching specification uses the single nearest neighbor (in
terms of covariate distribution) to each treated unit to act as the counterfactual for
each treated unit. We allow for replacement (which generally reduces bias but can
increase the variance (Imbens and Wooldridge 2009, Dehejia and Wahba 2002))
during matching, use a post-match regression bias adjustment (Imbens and
Wooldridge 2009, Abadie and Imbens 2006, Abadie et al. 2004),68 and calculate
so-called Abadie and Imbens (2006) heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. Our
matching specification seeks to find an unprotected municipality that is observably
similar to each protected municipality, isolating the only remaining variation
between treatment arms to be the establishment of protected areas, thereby
allowing the unbiased estimation of ATT.
67During the process of selecting a matching metric we tested the balancing properties of many
different metrics (e.g., Mahalanobis, propensity score and inverse covariance). Outcomes and ATT
estimates were omitted while inspecting balance across different specifications to prevent the esti-
mates from potentially affecting the selection of a metric.
68Because our matched samples are relatively balanced, the post-match regression bias adjustment
has relatively little effect on the point estimates.
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Results
Primary Results
Figure 11 and Table 10 present the results from our primary, and ancillary
robustness, analyses (Tables 11 and 12 provide balancing results from our primary
matching specifications). In this subsection we focus on the second column of the
respective right, and left, hand bar charts and the respective row in Table 10, which
present the ATT estimates stemming from the genetic matching algorithm.
For both our PI and NBI poverty indicators we find no evidence to suggest that
the establishment of protected areas in Bolivia had deleterious effects on poverty.
To the contrary, all of our point estimates indicate that protected areas were likely
associated with poverty alleviation. In other words, after controlling for covariates
that jointly influence the establishment of protected areas and poverty, we find that
there was differentially greater poverty reduction between 1992 and 2001 in
municipalities that had at least 10% of their area occupied by a protected area. The
point estimates from the primary specification are statistically significant (at any
standard level) when the PI is used as the outcome of interest, but is insignificant
when NBI is used as the outcome of interest (though the point estimates are
concurrent with those of the PI).
An attractive feature of our matching-based estimator is its transparency in
terms of allowing for the identification of mean poverty outcomes across treatment
arms of the matched sample, which represent the components of the ATT. Table 10
highlights the underlying difference between the na¨ıve and genetic matching
estimates, which stem from the formulation of the counterfactual sample. When the
counterfactual comprises all unprotected municipalities other than those marginally
protected, the counterfactual poverty outcome (the poverty level that would have
been observed in protected municipalities, had they not been protected) is -0.451
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(85.61) according to the PI (NBI). Under our genetic matching specification we are
left with 56 and 53 counterfactual unprotected municipalities for the PI and NBI
analyses, respectively (41 and 38 of which are unique in the respective analyses).
Because the counterfactual unprotected units under the genetic matching
specification are observably similar (at least more so than the na¨ıve counterfactual,
see Tables 11 and 12), the counterfactual outcome estimates are more similar to the
treated sample (-0.805 for the PI and 84.16 for NBI), resulting in a more modest
estimate of the poverty reduction associated with the establishment of protected
areas for both poverty metrics.
Our results are concordant with previous studies from Costa Rica (Andam et al.
2010) and Thailand (Andam et al. 2010, Sims 2010): protected areas are associated
with poverty reduction. However, our results differ fundamentally from these
previous studies. Andam et al. (2010) and Sims (2010) find that na¨ıve estimates of
protected area impacts indicate that protected areas exacerbated poverty. When
key covariates are controlled for, however, their results reverse. In contrast, our
results indicate that a failure to control for key covariates leads to the over
estimation of the impacts of protected areas on poverty reduction.
Robustness
We test the robustness of our primary estimates in several ways. First, we test the
sensitivity of our matching estimator to unobserved heterogeneity between
protected and unprotected units. The purpose is to identify by how much the
groups would have to differ (unobservably) in order to nullify our results of
statistically significant poverty reduction. Second, we test the robustness of our
matching specifications by comparing our primary specification to a number of
matching- and regression-based econometric specifications.
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Figure 11: Primary estimates of the impacts of protected areas on poverty in Bolivia.
The left hand (right hand) group of bars represent the impact according to poverty index
(NBI) across a number of econometric specifications. The results from the primary genetic
matching specification described in Methods can be found in the second bar of the respective
bar groups. The whiskers represent the 95% confidence interval for the corresponding point
estimates underlying each bar.
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Internal robustness of matching specification
In any observational study it must be acknowledged that the ability to eliminate
bias associated with non-random selection is limited by one’s understanding of the
underlying selection process (Meyer 1995), moreover, from a practical standpoint,
by the pertinent characteristics of selection that one can actually observe and
obtain. If the selection process and outcomes are systematically determined only by
observable characteristics (for which one controls) then a treatment effect estimate
derived from a matching algorithm that provides balance will be unbiased and
consistent. However, if there are unobservable characteristics that also contribute to
determining selection and outcomes, then treatment effect estimates, even for a well
balanced matched sample, may be biased. We believe our data are rich enough to
provide sufficient covariates with which to control, therefore mitigating unobserved
heterogeneity. However, we test the sensitivity of our ATT estimates to unobserved
heterogeneity/bias using Rosenbaum bounds (Rosenbaum 2002).
The Rosenbaum bounds sensitivity analysis measures the amount of unobserved
heterogeneity necessary to undermine the statistical results from our matching
process. If a great (small) amount of unobserved heterogeneity is necessary to
weaken the significance of our results then the results are relatively robust
(sensitive).69 Table 13 indicates the level of unobserved heterogeneity (unaccounted
for in our matching process) that would be necessary to nullify our findings of
statistically significant poverty reduction according to the PI. Our results are robust
(at the 5% level) to unobserved heterogeneity that affects the odds of selection into
protection by a factor of 2.3. In other words, these results are highly robust to
potential unobserved bias.
69See Appendix C for full details on Rosenbaum bounds.
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Robustness of matching specification to alternative econometric specifications
To ensure that our results are not sensitive to the choice of econometric
specification, we conduct a series of ancillary matching and regression based
analyses. The results of these analyses can be found in Figure 11 and Table 10.
Genetic matching with calipers. We use one-to-one nearest neighbor
matching based on the genetic matching algorithm in our primary econometric
specification. Although we achieve a high level of balance in expectation across
treatment arms, there are invariably a number of treated units that do not obtain a
well-matched control/counterfactual unit. To ensure that a few poorly matched
units are not biasing or driving the results, we impose calipers equal to one
standard deviation on our primary matching specification. In other words, we use
the identical genetic weighting matrix, however, we remove from the sample any
matched pair that differ by more than one standard deviation across covariate
values.70
Figure 11 and Table 10 show that the results for the PI are relatively robust to
the introduction of calipers, i.e., there is only a marginal absolute increase in the
point estimate of ATT. Seven protected municipalities are dropped from the
analysis, resulting in a bilateral increase in PI outcomes across matched protected
and unprotected municipalities (from -1.33 to -1.07 and -0.805 to -0.511,
respectively). The variance of the resulting ATT changes little and the point
estimate is significant at any conventional level.
Results for NBI are not as robust. Six protected municipalities are dropped from
the sample resulting in an absolute reduction in the ATT from -4.99 to -2.47. Table
10 indicates that this change is due to opposite movements in average poverty
70The variance is measured according to the scalar value assigned to each unit after taking the
product of the covariate values of each unit and the genetic weighting matrix. This scalar, like a
propensity score, mitigates the so-called curse of dimensionality associated with multivariate match-
ing.
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Table 10: Results from Primary and Ancillary Analyses
Poverty Index NBI
Method Y(T=1) Y(T=0) Treatment Y(T=1) Y(T=0) Treatment
Nave Difference -1.33 -0.451 -0.838 76.7 85.61 -8.92
in Means [56] [268] {0.014} [53] [242] {0.005}
Regression on Raw NA NA -0.502 NA NA -5.52
Data [56] [268] (0.98) [53] [258] (1.17)
Regression Dropping NA NA -0.535 NA NA -5.62
Marginal [56] [252] (0.099) [53] [242] (1.2)
Post-Match Frequency NA NA -0.494 NA NA -2.63
Weighted Regression [56] [41] (0.106) [53] [45] (1.7)
Genetic Matching -1.33 -0.805 -0.525 76.18 81.16 -4.99
[56] [56] (0.142) [53] [53] (3.67)
Genetic Matching, -1.07 -0.511 -0.56 79.04 81.51 -2.47
Calipers=1sd [49] [49] (0.147) [47] [47] (1.55)
[Number of observations]
(Standard errors)
{P-value}
across the protected and unprotected samples. Average NBI in protected
municipalities increased from 76.18 to 79.04 while average NBI in unprotected
municipalities decreased from 84.16 to 81.51. Although the variance in ATT
decreases after calipers are imposed, the resulting ATT estimate remains
insignificant at conventional levels.
Regression-based specifications. We run several regression-based
econometric specifications to ensure that our results are not driven by the use of a
matching-based estimator. The results of these specifications are found in Table 10
(see Appendix C Table 34 for full regression results) and we highlight these
specifications in last two columns of each bar group of Figure 11. Although there is
slightly greater heterogeneity in the specifications for which NBI is the outcome, the
central results from these specifications are that: (1) protected areas are associated
with significant poverty reductions according to both the PI and NBI, and; (2) the
results do not differ significantly from the primary matching-based estimates.
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Table 11: Balance Results for Primary GenMatch Specification- PI
Mean Mean Diff. Norm. Mean eQQ %Improve
Covariate Status Prot. Unprot. in Means Diff. Diff. Mean Diff.
Poverty Index Unmatched 0.267 0.744 -0.477 0.141 0.436
1992 Matched 0.267 0.319 -0.052 0.015 0.164 89.12%
% Forest 1991 Unmatched 0.485 0.194 0.291 0.476 0.292
Matched 0.485 0.466 0.019 0.029 0.037 93.40%
Distance to Unmatched 142800 108000 34790 0.173 35950
Major City Matched 142800 136600 6151 0.029 32940 82.32%
Average Unmatched 1825 2713 -888 0.307 884
Elevation Matched 1825 1794 30.94 0.011 118.9 96.52%
Average Slope Unmatched 23.89 18.97 4.922 0.162 5.34
Matched 23.89 23.89 0.004 0.000 1.628 99.92%
Roadless Unmatched 2.98E+14 8.35E+13 2.14E+14 0.194 1.96E+14
Volume 1992 Matched 2.98E+14 2.53E+14 4.53E+13 0.030 1.27E+14 78.89%
Table 12: Balance Results for Primary GenMatch Specification- NBI
Mean Mean Diff. Norm. Mean eQQ %Improve
Covariate Status Prot. Unprot. in Means Diff. Diff. Mean Diff.
NBI 1992 Unmatched 87.52 91.05 -3.527 0.078 3.15
Matched 87.52 87.56 -0.044 0.001 0.97 98.74%
% Forest 1991 Unmatched 0.464 0.187 0.277 0.453 0.277
Matched 0.464 0.459 0.005 0.007 0.03 98.22%
Distance to Unmatched 136400 108600 27790 0.140 29580
Major City Matched 136400 132600 3730 0.017 25160 86.58%
Average Unmatched 1888 2751 -863.1 0.299 862.8
Elevation Matched 1888 1884 4.489 0.002 106.7 99.48%
Average Slope Unmatched 24.01 19.45 4.555 0.149 5.055
Matched 24.01 23.67 0.334 0.010 3.979 92.66%
Roadless Unmatched 3.06E+14 8.53E+13 2.20E+14 0.195 1.99E+14
Volume 1992 Matched 3.06E+14 2.58E+14 4.80E+13 0.033 1.06E+14 78.22%
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Bar columns 4 and 5 of each bar group in Figure 11 present the results of a
standard regression (marginally protected units are dropped from the sample and all
covariates are included as controls), and a post-match frequency weighted
regression,71 respectively.
Both the regression-based analyses for which the PI is the outcome of interest
(bars 4 and 5 on the left hand side of Figure 11) return estimates that are strikingly
similar to one another, and to the primary matching specification. The confidence
intervals are slightly tighter than those from the matching based estimators
(expected given the efficiency properties of OLS and the fact that the standard
specification contains a larger sample of unprotected units). There is more
heterogeneity in the impact estimates in which NBI is the outcome of interest.
However, one of the more interesting results from the NBI regression specifications
is that, although the estimated impacts of protected areas on poverty do not differ
significantly from the primary matching specification, the impacts of protected areas
on NBI are all significantly different from zero.
Results Summary
The central finding in our results is that it does not appear as if protected areas
have had any negative effect on poverty in surrounding communities. Rather, our
results indicate that protected areas were likely associated with reductions in
poverty. Though these results are relatively robust across specifications, a couple of
questions linger.
71The post-match frequency weight regression is conducted on the resulting matched sample from
the primary genetic matching specification. To correct for potential overstatement in the precision
of coefficient estimates (due to repeat unprotected matched observations) we drop all duplicate
observations from the unprotected sample and then weight each unprotected unit by the number of
times it was used as a match for a protected unit, to ensure unbiased coefficient estimates. This
so-called “double robust” estimation strategy is promoted by Ho et al. (2007) because the second
stage regression helps to eliminate any residual differences across treatment arms that remain after
matching.
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PI or NBI?
Although the point estimates in all the primary and ancillary analyses indicate
poverty reductions associated with protected areas, the results from analyses in
which the PI is the outcome of interest are more consistent, and remain statistically
significant. This begs the question, in which poverty measure we should place more
stock? From a policy standpoint we argue that it matters little. There is no evidence
that protected areas exacerbated poverty, by any measure. From a technical
standpoint, however, we believe that the PI is more appropriate in our study.
The NBI has some technical and practical shortcomings, mentioned previously.
First, the NBI weights all socioeconomic components equally, unlike the PI in which
weights are determined empirically via the PCA. Second, the NBI measure the
percentage of households that lie below a norm which is (somewhat) arbitrarily
established. The PI, on the other hand, is based on deviations from
municipality-level means (in either direction). Finally, and from a practical
standpoint, analyses in which the NBI is used are limited by the fact that we do not
have baseline NBI measurement for 14 municipalities (four of which are considered
protected).
Why are the matching-based and regression-based estimates so similar?
The goals of matching and regression in causal analysis are the same: achieve
plausible conditional independence of the treatment. However, the two methods go
about doing so in different manners. Regression isolates the causal effect of a
treatment by establishing a functional relationship between treatment, covariates
and outcome, then isolates the causal effect of treatment by partialing out the
effects of the covariates of interest. Instead of controlling for the differences across
treatment arms via the imposition of a functional form, matching uses a weighting
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scheme72 to create balance in expectation across the covariates, thereby
“controlling” for their influence.
Typically in an analysis in which the ATT is the estimand of interest we would
expect greater differences in matching- and regression-based results. The reason
relates to the idea of propensity for treatment. In a study like ours, where there are
control units that would never plausibly be treated, the overlap in propensity for
treatment is generally sparse (or completely lacking) at the tails of the distributions
(of propensity scores and the underlying covariates) between protected and
unprotected units. This scenario can lead to bias in regression results because the
coefficient estimates can be heavily (and inappropriately) influenced by outlying
control units (e.g., Ho et al. (2007)).
The reason that our results across matching- and regression-based estimates are
so similar can be seen in Figure 22. We plot the distributions of propensity scores
across treatment arms for pre- and post-matched samples. It can be seen that there
is a high degree of overlap across the range of propensity scores even prior to
matching (left panel of Figure 22). Therefore, it makes sense that the matching-
and regression-based results are comparable because, even within the full sample,
the regression results are not plagued by “out of sample” predictions.
Discussion
Protected areas have played an increasingly important role in the global
conservation of biodiversity and ecosystem services over the past several decades.
However, there is little empirical evidence of the environmental impacts of protected
areas and even less evidence of their socioeconomic impacts on surrounding
communities. Given the high degree of overlap between remaining global
72For example, with one-to-one matching without replacement, control units are excluded from
the sample by receiving an effective weight of 0 whereas remaining units receive a weight of 1.
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Table 13: Rosenbaum Upper Bound on P-Value at Given Levels of Γ for Primary Matching
Analysis- PI
Upper Bound
Γ P-value
1 0
1.1 0.0001
1.2 0.0003
1.3 0.0007
1.4 0.0015
1.5 0.0029
1.6 0.005
1.7 0.0081
1.8 0.0124
1.9 0.018
2 0.0253
2.1 0.0342
2.2 0.0448
2.3 0.0572
biodiversity and poverty, it is of paramount importance to understand how the
establishment of protected areas impacts poverty.
We use rich biophysical and socioeconomic data, and a myriad of econometric
specifications to estimate the impact of protected areas established in Bolivia
between 1992 and 2000 on poverty between 1992 and 2001. Contrary to the
concerns of poverty advocates, that the land-use restrictions associated with
protected areas impart economic hardship on surrounding communities, our results
do not indicate that protected municipalities were adversely affected by the
establishment of protected areas. In fact, we find evidence that municipalities with
at least 10% of their areas occupied by a protected area had differentially greater
poverty reduction than those unaffected by protected areas. We employ two
separate measures of poverty in our analyses and find that the point estimates of
poverty reduction are robust across our econometric specification.
Although our overarching results that Bolivia’s protected areas were associated
with poverty reduction are similar to previous studies from Costa Rica (Andam
et al. 2010) and Thailand (Andam et al. 2010, Sims 2010), our underlying results
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are subtly, but significantly, different. In those studies the authors found that
controlling for key observable covariates lead to fundamentally antithetical results
compared to na¨ıve estimates. Conversely, our results indicate that na¨ıve estimates
lead to an over estimation of the poverty reducing impacts of protected areas.
The implications of our results are twofold. First, our results add to a growing
body of literature on the impacts of protected ares on poverty. More importantly
our findings add support to this literature that environmental conservation policies
do not necessarily run in opposition to development goals. On the contrary, our
results indicate that environmental goals can be complementary to social poverty
goals. Second, our results underscore the importance of country-level analyses of the
socioeconomic impacts of protected areas. Protected areas in Bolivia exhibit many
of the characteristics observed globally (i.e., located relatively distant from major
cities, roads and on steeper slopes), however, some of the key drivers of poverty
differ in important ways from global and previous country-level observations.
Importantly, we key find differences from previous country-level and global studies
which indicate that evidence from single country or global studies are likely not
generalizable across countries.
The fact that our results exhibit subtle differences to previous results implies
that the external validity of our, and other studies of this ilk, is likely limited.
Indeed, we believe that comprehensive understanding of the socioeconomic impacts
for protected areas requires that the scientific body of knowledge be built on a
country-by-country basis.
Further studies in Bolivia and elsewhere should strive to identify and quantify
the mechanisms through which protected areas affect poverty (e.g., Hanauer (2011),
Robalino and Villalobos-Fiatt (2010)). Although studies such as ours are important
for building an understanding of the global impacts of protected areas, only by
understanding how protected areas affect poverty (especially in terms of alleviating
115
poverty) can social policies be designed to enhance (mitigate) the positive
(negative) impacts of protected areas. In addition, because the theme of protection
in Bolivia has been toward integrated management and recognition of indigenous
populations, future studies should account for differences in protected area
management practices and baseline populations.
Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter I
A.1 Areal Interpolation
Costa Rica’s census tract boundaries are not spatially consistent across time. The
number of census tracts increases from 4,694 in 1973 to 17,625 in 2000. Furthermore,
the addition of census tracts over time did not follow any discernible pattern, the
newer subdivided census tracts do not necessarily fall within the boundaries of the
old census tracts. This poses a problem for the comparability of the demographic
data over time. In order to make the 2000 data comparable to the 1973 data, the
geographic method of Areal Interpolation (Reibel 2007) is implemented.
Areal interpolation is a GIS method by which demographic variables are made
comparable across time given changes in political boundaries. For our analyses the
1973 census tracts are used as baselines. Therefore, areal interpolation assigns
weights (assuming a uniform population distribution) based upon the amount that
the 2000 census tracts overlap with the 1973 census tracts. These weights are used
to interpolate the 2000 populations that reside within the 1973 census tract
boundaries. The resulting data set contains the original 1973 demographic data
according to its native boundaries and the 2000 demographic data distributed as if
the census tract boundaries had not changed since 1973.
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A.2 Poverty Index
Costa Rica does not have properly disaggregated income data that date back to
1973 (Gindling and Terrell 2004). To measure the socioeconomic impacts of
protected areas an alternative metric is necessary. Cavatassi et al. (2004) suggest
the use of principal components analysis to form a poverty index. The method uses
indicators from the respective censuses that are believed to affect poverty to create
a measure that is spatially and temporally comparable. The variables included in
the poverty index are: (* indicates a percentage): men in total population*, families
who cook with coal or wood*, families without washing machine*, families without
refrigerator*, people who are employed and get a salary as job remuneration*,
illiterate population aged 12 or more*, household dwellings without connection to
private or public water system*, household dwellings without sewers*, household
dwellings without electricity*, household dwellings without telephone*, dwellings with
earth floor*, dwellings in bad condition*, dwellings without bathroom*, dwellings
without access to hot water*, dependency ratio, average number of occupants per
bedroom, average years of education per adult. A similar measure was employed by
the Mexican government in the analysis of the PROGRESA program (Cavatassi
et al. 2004).
Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter II
B.1 Data
B.1.1 Costa Rica
For full details on data, see Andam et al. (2008, 2010). Digital layers of protected
areas (source: National System of Conservation Area Office, Ministry of
Environment and Energy, 2006) were provided by the Earth Observation Systems
Laboratory, University of Alberta. Other GIS layers are land use capacity (source:
Ministry of Agriculture) and roads digitized from hard copy maps for 1969 (source:
Instituto Geogra´fico Nacional, Ministerio Obras Publicas y Transporte). Summary
statistics of the data are presented in Table 1.
For the deforestation analyses, digital forest cover layers are created from either
aerial photographs (baseline, 1960) or Landsat Thematic Mapper satellite images.73
The units of analysis are land parcel pixels that measure three hectares, the
minimum mappable area. We use Andam et al. (2008) data set, which comprises
20,000 randomly selected land parcels that were forested (80% or more canopy
cover) in 1960. Forested parcels in a given year receive a value of 1; deforested
parcels receive a value of 0. The outcome of interest is change in forest cover
between 1960 and 1997. Given all sample parcels were forested in 1960, the outcome
measure equals 0 if the parcel is still forested in 1997 and 1 if it is deforested.
73Earth Observation Systems Laboratory, University of Alberta, Edmonton, AB.
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Spatial layers of protected status (IUCN categories Ia, I, II, IV and VI are used
in the analyses) and other geographic characteristics are used to create a set of
covariates for each land parcel (Table 14). For various reasons (e.g., cloud cover),
4,737 land parcels are dropped prior to analysis, leaving 15,283 land parcels, of
which, 2,809 were protected prior to 1980. We remove parcels that were protected
after 1980 (2,183), leaving 10,291 unprotected land parcels from which matches can
be drawn.
For the poverty analyses, data come from the population and housing censuses
conducted by the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Censos (INEC) in 1973 and
2000. Digitized GIS census segment boundaries for 1973 and 2000 were provided by
the Cartography Department at INEC. The unit of analysis is the census tract
(segmento). In 1973 Costa Rica contained 4,694 census tracts with an average size
of 8.82km (range: 0.00466-836 km). The 1973 census is used as the baseline year
and all census data are geocoded to their respective census tracts. Between 1973
and 2000 there was a great deal of segmentation of census tracts, with few of the
segmented tracts being proper subsets (or sharing major borders) with the original
1973 census tracts. Through the method of areal interpolation ((Andam et al. 2010,
Reibel 2007)); see below), the 2000 census data are aggregated to fit to the 1973
census tract boundaries so that the data are spatially and temporally comparable.
The poverty measure (poverty index) builds on recent efforts to develop a
census-based poverty index for Costa Rica (Cavatassi et al. 2004), which uses
principal components analysis to formulate a temporally comparable index based on
variables believed to influence poverty.
B.1.2 Thailand
For full details on data see Andam et al. (2010) and Sims (2010). Digital layers of
protected area boundaries are from the IUCN World Database on Protected Areas
120
(accessed 3/2007; IUCN categories I and II were used in the analyses). Other GIS
data and the source layers from which they are derived are slope and elevation
(NIMA’s Digital Terrain Elevation Data- USGS Global GIS database, 1999);
distance to major cities (ESRI World Cities, 2000); distance to roads in 1962
(digitized East Asia Road Map, U.S. Map Service 1964, data from 1962); distance
to rail lines, distance to major rivers, proximity to watershed boundaries, distance
to mineral deposits, distance to Thai border, and ecoregions (USGS Global GIS
database, 1999), average monthly temperature and rainfall (Marc Souris, IRD).
The deforestation analysis is based on two classified layers from 1973 and 2000.
The 1973 data are based on Landsat MSS images interpreted by the Tropical Rain
Forest Information Center (Michigan State University) and the 2000 data on
Landsat TM images interpreted by the Thai Royal Forestry Department (courtesy
of Marc Souris). The units of analysis are points which are spaced so as to represent
the centroid of a three hectare parcel. The data set is created in a similar manner to
the Costa Rica deforestation data set and comprises 20,000 randomly selected
points which were forested in 1973. Forested points in a given year receive a value of
1; deforested points receive a value of 0. The outcome of interest is change in forest
cover between 1973 and 2000. Given all sample points were forested in 1973, the
outcome measure equals 0 if the point is still forested in 2000 and 1 if it is
deforested. Spatial layers of protected status and other geographic characteristics
are used to create a set of covariates corresponding to each sample point (Table 14).
For the poverty analysis the unit of analysis is a subdistrict (tambon). In
descending order of size, Thailand has administrative units of “province,” “district,”
“subdistrict,” and “village.” The sample consists of subdistricts in the North and
Northeast regions, where the majority of protected forest areas are located. We
exclude subdistricts that are less than 10 km away from a major city (population
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100,000; all of these cities had been established by the 1960’s). The average size of a
subdistrict in the sample is 74 sq km; the average population is 5043.
The poverty measure for Thailand (poverty headcount ratio) is the share of the
population with consumption below the poverty line. This outcome is derived from
a poverty mapping analysis by Healy and Jitsuchon (2007), applying the poverty
mapping methodology developed by Elbers et al. (2003).
B.2 Preprocessing
We preprocess the data (Ho et al. 2007, Imbens and Wooldridge 2009) using
matching techniques prior to performing any of the LOESS or PLM analyses. Our
primary motivation for matching is not the estimation of an overall average
treatment effect on the treated. With the exception of an analysis of Thailand
deforestation at the scale used in our study, these impacts have already been
estimated (Andam et al. 2008, 2010). We use matching to preprocess the data so
that we can estimate conditional average treatment effects on the treated. To ensure
that our analyses are as comparable as possible to the studies from which we draw
(Andam et al. 2008, 2010), we use the same matching methods to create the same
matched data sets as those studies. These methods were chosen in these studies
because they generated the best covariate balance.
The key to matching as an identification strategy to estimate average treatment
effects on the treated is the balancing of key covariate distributions across treatment
arms (protected and unprotected). This covariate balance is achieved in expectation
through randomization. Covariate balance is implicit under randomization because
each unit of the experimental sample has an equal probability (or more generally, a
probability that is known to the experimenter) of being assigned to treatment or
control. Therefore, treatment is assigned independent of potential outcomes Y (1)
and Y (0) under treatment (T = 1) and control (T = 0), respectively. In the absence
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of a treatment, one would expect similar average outcomes from both groups.
Similarly, if both groups were to receive (the same) treatment, one would expect
similar average outcomes from both groups. In the statistics, epidemiology and
social science literature this assumption is termed ignorability of treatment,
independence of treatment or unconfoundedness. Stated formally,
E[Y (1)|T = 1)] = E[Y (1)|T = 0)] = E[Y (1)] (34)
E[Y (0)|T = 1)] = E[Y (0)|T = 0)] = E[Y (0)] . (35)
In words, (34) simply states that average potential outcome for the treatment
group under treatment, E[Y (1)|T = 1)], is equal to the average potential outcome of
the control group had they been treated, E[Y (1)|T = 0)]. Similarly, (35) states that
the average potential outcome for the treated group had they not been treated,
E[Y (0)|T = 1)], is equal to the average potential outcome of the control group in
the absence of treatment, E[Y (0)|T = 0)]. In (34) and (35), the terms
E[Y (1)|T = 0)] and E[Y (0)|T = 1)] are termed counterfactual outcomes. The
fundamental problem for causal inference (Holland 1986) is the fact that
counterfactual outcomes are not observed. However, with treatment assigned at
random (and thus independent of potential outcomes), the average outcome for
control units can act as the counterfactual for treatment units, and vice versa.
Protected areas in Costa Rica and Thailand were not established randomly.
Matching seeks to mimic the identification of randomization by balancing key
covariates that jointly determine selection into treatment and outcomes. Balance,
conditional on key covariates, leads to conditional ignorability or conditional
independence. These more restrictive assumptions can be stated formally as the
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analogs to (34) and (35),
E[Y (1)|T = 1, X] = E[Y (1)|T = 0, X)] = E[Y (1)|X] (36)
E[Y (0)|T = 1, X] = E[Y (0)|T = 0, X)] = E[Y (0)|X]. (37)
Equations (36) and (37) state that, conditional on similar covariate distributions
across treatment arms, the average outcomes for the matched control units,
E[Y (0)|X,T = 0)], can be used as the counterfactual for treatment units, and vice
versa. In other words, by ensuring that the distributions of key covariates are
balanced across treatment and control groups, similar methods to those used in
randomized experiments can be used to estimate average treatment effects on
matched datasets. We present (34)-(37) for completeness; however, we focus on the
estimation of conditional average treatment effects on the treated, for which only
(35) and (37) are necessary.
By ensuring that units are comparable across treatment and control groups, we
make the conditional independence assumption (CIA), which is necessary for causal
inference, more defensible (Angrist and Pischke 2009). We extend the CIA by
assuming that if average treatment effect on the treated estimates are unbiased,
conditional on balance across key covariates, comparisons of subgroups within these
balanced sets are also unbiased. This allows for causal inference to be drawn from
the LOESS and PLM analyses.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, matching can only account for heterogeneity in
observable covariates. If the selection process and outcomes are systematically
determined only by observable characteristics (for which one controls) then a
treatment effect estimate derived from a matching algorithm that provides balance
will be unbiased and consistent. However, if there are unobservable characteristics
that also contribute to determining selection and outcomes, then treatment effect
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estimates, even for a well balanced matched sample, may be biased. There is no way
to formally test the conditional independence assumption, however Andam et al.
(2008, 2010) test the robustness of their estimates (which are derived from the same
matched sets used in our study) to unobserved heterogeneity.
B.2.1 Matched Datasets
For the Costa Rica data, we use nearest neighbor Mahalanobis covariate matching
with replacement to preprocess the socioeconomic and deforestation data. We use
the same algorithm and covariates (Table 1) as Andam et al. (2008, 2010), and thus
our resulting matched datasets are nearly identical to those used in their analyses.74
The resulting socioeconomic matched set comprises 249 protected (prior to 1980)
and unprotected census tracts. The resulting deforestation matched set comprises
2,809 protected (prior to 1980) and unprotected land parcels. See Table 1 for
description and summary statistics of the covariates used in each Costa Rica
matching specification.
For the Thailand socioeconomic data we use propensity score matching with
exact matching on district in order to control for baseline fixed effects associated
with poverty. This is the same specification and matched set used in (Andam et al.
2010) which comprises 197 protected (prior to 1985) and unprotected subdistricts.
For the Thailand deforestation data we use Mahalanobis covariate matching, with
exact matching on district, to create a dataset that is similar to the Costa Rica
deforestation analysis (see Tables 16 and 17 for estimates of ATT and balancing
results). The resulting matched set comprises 2,808 protected (prior to 1985) and
74The socioeconomic matched set is identical to the final data set in Andam et al. (2010). The
deforestation matched sets would be exact, but we use a slightly updated protected areas database
resulting in slightly more protected observations. The average treatment effect on the treated es-
timates, however, are not different between the two datasets. We present the balancing results in
Table 15.
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unprotected land parcels. See Table 14 for description and summary statistics of the
covariates used in each Thailand matching specification.
B.2.2 Thailand Deforestation Analysis
To ensure methodological comparability across countries, we perform a similar
deforestation analysis to that of (Andam et al. 2008) for Thailand. Our primary
interest was to create a dataset, comparable to the Costa Rica deforestation
dataset, with which to perform the heterogeneity analyses. As a point of departure,
however, we perform sample average treatment effect on the treated calculations
similar to those done in (Andam et al. 2008). There are two benefits to this
approach. First it offers a comparison to the original Costa Rica deforestation
analysis (Andam et al. 2008). Second, it provides an average treatment effect on the
treated (ATT) estimate to which we can contrast our heterogeneity analyses.
In creating our deforestation dataset for Thailand we follow the methodology of
(Andam et al. 2008); see their SI Text), all geoprocessing is done in ArcGIS 9.x. We
begin by selecting 20,000 random points, spaced so as to represent 3 ha land parcels,
from the areas of Thailand that were forested in 1973, our baseline year. Using
spatial overlays, we create indicators for parcels that were protected by 1985 (2,808)
and parcels that were protected after 1985 (3,423). The analysis is designed to
estimate the impact of protected areas that were established prior to 1985 on
deforestation outcomes between 1973 and 2000. Therefore, we remove from the pool
of potential controls, any parcel that was protected after 1985. As a result, our
potential pool of controls comprises 13,609 parcels that were never protected prior
to 2000.75 We run a series of overlay analyses on the remaining parcels to assign a
value for each of the covariates listed in upper panel of Table 14.
75Due to incongruence in spatial layers, 160 parcels are dropped prior to analysis.
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Using these data, we implement regression bias-adjusted nearest neighbor
Mahalanobis matching with replacement (Imbens and Wooldridge 2009, Abadie
et al. 2004) to estimate the ATT. Point estimates and balancing results can be
found in Tables 15and 16, respectively.76 Similar to (Andam et al. 2008), we find
that the naive difference in means overestimates the amount of avoided deforestation
attributable to the establishment of protected areas. As noted in Chapter 2, this is
a finding that is consistent with the general observation that protected areas tend to
be placed on land that is less desirable for agriculture, and therefore less likely to be
deforested in the absence of protection. The resulting matched dataset is used for
the Thailand deforestation heterogeneity analyses described in Chapter 2.
B.3 LOESS
Three LOESS estimators (Cleveland 1979, Cleveland and Devlin 1988) are
performed for each of the covariates in the heterogeneous response to protection
analyses: (1) on the protected units only; (2) on the imputed counterfactual control
units only, and; (3) on the difference between protected and counterfactual
unprotected units, the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT).
In LOESS the data of interest are the doubles (Yi, Xi) representing the outcome
and covariate values for observation i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, where N is the number of
observations in the dataset. The data are first ordered according to X such that
X1 ≤ ... ≤ XN . Beginning with the first observation (i∗ = 1) in this ordered set,
fitted values
(
Ŷ
)
are predicted via a local quadratic regression
Ŷi∈s = β̂0 + β̂1Xi∈s + β̂2X2i∈s, (38)
76In addition to the covariates listed in Tables 14 and 16, matching is required to be performed
within districts (i.e., exact matching on district ID) to control for regional heterogeneity.
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where the vector β̂ is estimated from
Yi∈s = β0 + β1Xi∈s + β2X2i∈s + i, (39)
and only observations that lie within span (s) are used. The total number of
observations used for each imputation is therefore j = sN . Moving stepwise through
the ordered data set, N local regressions are estimated.
For each of these local regressions all of the j observations are assigned a weight
(wd) using the tricubic function
wd =

(
1− |di|3
)3
for 0 ≤ |di| < 1
0 otherwise
, (40)
where di is a cardinal distance ratio
di =
|Xi∗ −Xi|
max (|Xi∗ −Xi|) . (41)
Here Xi∗ represents the covariate value of the observation for which we are
imputing Ŷ . The weight wd reduces the influence of observations according to their
disparity in covariate value as compared to the observation being evaluated. The
LOESS estimation moves stepwise repeating (38)-(41) for each (ith) observation,
“re-centering” the span s to include an equal number j observations about the ith
observation. The result of these N local regressions is N local fit values
(
Ŷi
)
and
their corresponding standard errors of the fit which can be used to form confidence
intervals about each fit value. This standard LOESS process is run on the protected
units for each analysis (dash-dot line in Figures 14 - 19.
We extend the LOESS methodology in order to offer comparability to the studies
from which we draw (Andam et al. 2008, 2010, Ferraro and Hanauer 2011) by
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including local bias-adjusted imputation of counterfactual (unprotected) outcomes.
This type of method is used in the matching literature (e.g., Imbens and Wooldridge
(2009), Abadie et al. (2004)) to impute counterfactual values by plugging the values
of treated unit covariates into the coefficients estimated from a regression of control
unit covariates on control unit outcomes. The purpose of this imputation is to
reduce post-match bias, in finite samples, due to remaining covariate imbalance.
This process is like asking the question, “what would the outcomes of protected
units have been in the absence of protection had their covariates influenced their
outcomes in the same manner as the units that were not protected?”
Our methodology requires us to modify the LOESS procedure. In order to
impute counterfactual outcome values for each treated unit, both protected and
unprotected units must be used as inputs for the LOESS. Prior to the ith local
estimation outlined in equations (38)-(41), a counterfactual value for each protected
unit outcome in the span (s) is imputed according to
Y˜i∈s = Yi∈s:T=0 + µ̂0 (Xi∈s:T=1)− µ̂0 (Xi∈s:T=0) , (42)
where T is an indicator of treatment (0 and 1 indicating the unit is unprotected or
protected, respectively) and µ̂0(·) represents the predicted values obtained from
combining the coefficients from a control group regression, of outcome on covariates,
with the respective treated or control covariates (see Tables 1 and 14 for a list of the
covariates).77 In addition to estimating a LOESS curve based on these
counterfactual outcomes (dotted line in Figures 14 - 19), the counterfactual value
Y˜i∈s from (42) of the observation being evaluated (i∗) is stored in a vector for use in
evaluating a LOESS for ATT.78
77The imputations are calculated by plugging the covariates Xi∈s:T=1 and Xi∈s:T=0 into the
vector of coefficients from the regression Yi∈s:T=0 = Xi∈s:T=0β0 + ε to obtain µ̂0 (Xi∈s:T=1) and
µ̂0 (Xi∈s:T=0), respectively.
78Imputations within the LOESS were programmed in R v2.10.1. Code is available from authors
upon request.
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The LOESS curve for ATT is estimated using the difference between actual
protected unit outcomes (Yi) and their respective counterfactual outcomes
(
Y˜i
)
from (42), (
Yi∈s − Y˜i∈s
)
= β0 + β1Xi∈s + β2X2i∈s + i, (43)
where the corresponding fits are estimated in a similar manner to (36). The
standard error of the fit is used to form the confidence band (red/green shaded
area) about the ATT LOESS curve (solid line in Figures 2 and 14 - 19).
The span for any LOESS estimator must be chosen so as to balance the
bias/variance tradeoff. A relatively small span includes fewer data points and is
considered to be more localized and therefore less biased. However, there will be
greater variation, ceteris paribus, within a small span. Conversely, a relatively large
span uses more data and produces smoother curves (less variation) that are
considered to be more biased. For each of the LOESS estimators that we
implement, we set the span (s) equal to 0.75. We choose this span for all analyses
because: (1) after experimenting with many specifications we felt that it captured
the important underlying variability with relatively little noise; and (2) we wanted
to remain consistent across analyses.
B.4 PLM
B.4.1 Model
For all (moderating) covariates introduced in the Study Design Section we use a
two-stage semiparametric partial differencing linear model (Yatchew 1997, 1998).
The PLM is advantageous in that it allows us to control, linearly, for a vector of
covariates that influence the outcome of interest and then map the outcome as a
nonparametric function of the covariate of interest.
130
The data used in the PLM are the triples (Yi, Xi, Zi) where Y is the scalar
outcome of interest, X is the scalar covariate for which the nonparametric function
will be estimated and Z is a vector of covariates for which we wish to control in our
estimation. Our first-stage equation is thus
Yi = Ziβ + f(Xi) + i, (44)
where β is a vector of coefficients and f(·) is an unknown real function. Our
intention is to estimate f(·) net of the effects of Z. In order to achieve the final goal
of removing the influence of Z on Y we must first remove the influence of X on Y.
In the first stage we begin by ordering the data according to X such that
X1 ≤ ... ≤ XN where i ∈ {1, ..., N}. Yatchew (1997, 1998) shows that the influence
of X on Y can be removed be taking the (first) difference (in (44)) according to X
Yi − Yi−1 = (Zi − Zi−1)β + (f (Xi)− f (Xi−1)) + (45)
+i − i−1, i = 2, ..., N.
Under the assumption that ∂Y/∂X is bounded by a constant, (f (Xi)− f (Xi−1))
goes to zero as N increases. Intuitively this assumption implies that, when the data
are ordered according to X, the marginal influence of X on Y is zero, so that term
can be dropped from the equation. OLS can then be run on (45) to return an
estimate of β̂diff . Yatchew (1997, 1998) shows that because β̂diff converges
sufficiently quickly to β, Ziβ̂diff can be subtracted from both sides of (44) to obtain
Yi − Ziβ̂diff = Zi
(
β − β̂diff
)
+ f(Xi) + i (46)
∼= f(Xi) + i. (47)
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Denoting Yi − Ziβ̂diff = Yi − Ŷi,diff = Y˜ , the combination of the LHS of (46) and
RHS of (46) is equivalent to
Y˜i = f(Xi) + i. (48)
We are now able to estimate f(·), which is the nonparametric relationship
between X and Y, net of the effects of Z. We do so for treatment, control and ATT
estimates using the same LOESS estimator described above. Lokshin (2006)
suggests using LOESS in the second stage and wrote a Stata ado file which performs
the estimate. We wrote a similar function for R. The code is available from the
authors upon request.
Yatchew (1997, 1998) noted that although β̂diff is an unbiased estimate of β,
due to the differencing, β̂diff is relatively inefficient. However, he provides analytical
higher order differencing weights that can be applied to a high order difference
generalization of (45) to greatly improve the efficiency of estimates. We incorporate
these weights into our estimation using the 10th order difference (the highest order
for which weights are provided).79 See (Yatchew 1997) for detailed description of
the efficiency issues and a table of the analytical weights.
B.4.2 Empirical Specifications
For each of our PLM analyses we include in Z covariates that we believe affect the
outcome of interest. This means that we control for the covariates used in each
matching specification and the complementary moderating covariates. There are
some notable exceptions, however, in which we exclude or add covariates as controls.
For each of the analyses in which distance to major city is the moderating covariate
of interest, we exclude distance to road from the controls due to high correlation
(multicollinearity). For each of the Thailand socioeconomic analyses, we add
79The PLM estimates were programmed in R v. 2.11.1. The code is available from the authors
upon request.
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province level fixed effects to the vector of covariates. For a detailed account of the
controls used in each specification see Table 18. Complete first stage results are
available from the authors upon request.
B.4.3 Use of PLM and LOESS
We use LOESS to estimate the relationship between baseline poverty and the
outcomes of interest in Costa Rica (Figure 2(a)) because we are interested in what
actually happened to the poor over time rather than simply the effect of being poor.
To identify the potential for protected areas to act as a mechanism for poverty
traps, we do not want to partial out any of the variables that are correlated with
being poor. We simply want to observe how areas with differing levels of baseline
poverty fared over time.
We view the other covariates (slope, distance to city and percent agricultural
workers) as moderating variables through which protection affects outcomes. For
this reason we are interested in identifying the specific effect of these covariates, net
of other influences, on our outcomes. Thus we use PLM. In addition, the use of
PLM to isolate the specific effects of variables allows us to overlay these effects on
the suitability maps with fewer concerns of confounding effects
B.5 Suitability Mapping
B.5.1 Motivation
The illustrative suitability maps presented in Chapter 2 characterize the suitability
of end-period forested land for protection, based on past observed relationships
between covariates and the environmental and socioeconomic outcomes. We
characterize suitability along these two outcome dimensions because, while the
targeting of protected areas is likely to be based on expected environmental
outcomes, the opportunity costs of protection are socioeconomic in nature.
133
Therefore, it would be beneficial to a planner to understand the expected joint
outcomes of the establishment of protected areas.
We choose to formulate our suitability maps based on slope and distance to
major city for two reasons. First, these are measurements that are globally available
and have been used in past studies of protected areas. Second, these covariates
capture the notion of deforestation pressure (see main text) and are therefore likely
to be considered in the establishment of protected areas.
B.5.2 Formulation
To map expected suitability for protection in Costa Rica and Thailand we begin by
rasterizing the end-period forest cover shapefiles so that each raster cell is 3 ha in
size. We then create a distance to city and slope raster based on these end-period
forest cover rasters for each analysis.80 The values of the rasters’ cells are populated
with measurements of distance to major city and slope, respectively.
The results from the PLM heterogeneity analyses act as the basis for our
designation of expected suitability. The PLM results are appropriate for the
creation of these maps because they map the continuous nonparametric effect of the
covariates on the outcome of interest, net the effect of other influencing covariates.
To allow for aggregation of suitability across covariates, we rescale the estimated
covariate effects on avoided deforestation and poverty to fall within a range of 1 to
10.81 For example, the maximum estimated effect of slope on avoided deforestation
in Costa Rica is 0.139 at a slope of 14%, so it is rescaled to 10. Conversely, the
minimum estimated effect is 0.00087 at a slope of 50%, so it is rescaled to 0.
Similarly, all estimated effect between the min and max are rescaled and rounded.
The rescaled values are then assigned to the distance to city and slope rasters for
80This leaves us with four initial rasters for each country: a distance to major city and slope raster
for the deforestation analysis, and a distance to major city and slope raster for the poverty analysis.
81Mathematica has a Rescale command which we rewrote for R.
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each analysis.82 For example, all of the cells (of the slope raster) with slope values
of 14 in the Costa Rica deforestation analysis are assigned a suitability score of 10.
Comparable value assignments are made for each covariate in each analysis.
As a result of these assignments each parcel (in each country) has two rescaled
environmental suitability scores and two rescaled socioeconomic suitability scores
(one based on distance to city and the other based on slope). We use these values to
calculate the average suitability (separately for environmental and socioeconomic
outcomes) scores for each land parcel. Figure 12 and 13 show the aggregated
environmental and socioeconomic suitability on separate maps for Costa Rica and
Thailand, respectively. The final compound suitability maps (Figures 3 and 4 in
Chapter 2) are created by overlaying the aggregate environmental and
socioeconomic suitability maps.
On the final suitability maps, we highlight two types of land parcels: those with
expected ‘win-win’ outcomes (yellow), and those with expected poverty
exacerbation (black). A parcel is designated as ‘win-win’ if its average
environmental and socioeconomic suitability scores are jointly greater than or equal
to 6 (this corresponds to the top five deciles). Conversely, if the underlying
covariate value of a parcel is associated with negative socioeconomic impacts then
the parcels is designated as unsuitable for protection due to potential poverty
exacerbation from protection. For instance, due to the relationship between
agricultural suitability and slope, flat parcels in Costa Rica and Thailand are
designated as unsuitable for protection.
82In the rescaling of the socioeconomic effects of the covariates, only positive expected outcomes
are rescaled between 0 and 10. Any covariate value that is associated with socioeconomic effects
deemed unsuitable for protection (see below).
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B.5.3 Note on Thailand Results
In the final Thailand suitability map there are distinct concentric circles of
predicted ‘win-win’ outcomes. It can be seen from the underlying suitability maps
(Figure 13) and PLM results (Figure 2(d&e)) that these expected outcomes are
driven by the nonparametric relationship between the outcomes of interest and
distance to a major city. Figure 2(e) indicates that the greatest poverty reduction is
expected between approximately 50km and 90km. Expected avoided deforestation is
also positive along this range. The range 55-75km, where both expected outcomes
are relatively high, is where a majority of the ‘win-win’ areas lie.
While distance to major city drives the concentric circles observed in Figures
4and 13, it is but a one facet in the determination of the joint suitability. In order
for a parcel to be designated as ‘win-win’ there must be congruence in expected
outcomes across distance to city and slope. Much of the land that lies within the
50-75km range is also relatively steeply sloped. Close examination of Figures 4 and
13 show that this is not the case throughout. In fact, there are many parcels within
this range that are not designated as expected ‘win-win’ due to the underlying low
slope.
B.6 Ancillary Analyses
B.6.1 Quantile Regression
In the Results Section of Chapter 2, we use the LOESS estimates to assert that the
establishment of protected areas has not acted as a mechanism for poverty traps in
Costa Rica. Our assertion stems from the fact that, in the mapping of the LOESS,
there is a general trend of greater poverty alleviation in areas with higher baseline
poverty. To corroborate these results from the nonparametric LOESS estimator, we
use a parametric quantile regression (see Koenker and Hallock (2001) for a nice
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overview). Quantile regressions estimate covariate effects at defined quantiles of the
outcome. In our case, we use deciles of the poverty index in 2000. We are interested
in the response to protection according to baseline poverty. To interpret the results
of a quantile regression as a treatment effect on the distribution of outcomes, we
must invoke a rank preservation assumption. This assumption implies that the
poverty rank among census tracts remains stable over time. Given that the
correlation coefficient between baseline and outcome poverty index is nearly 0.7, this
assumption seems plausible.
We run a quantile regression (using deciles) of 2000 poverty index on an
intercept and indicator of protection using the same matched set as is used in the
LOESS analysis (described above). We do not include any additional controls in the
regression because: (1) the LOESS estimator is (essentially) a univariate regression
method, and thus our intention is to use similar specifications to that analysis; and
(2) the quantile regression is run using the preprocessed matched set which is
designed to be balanced across key confounding covariates. Figure 20 presents the
results of the quantile regression in which the solid line represents the point
estimates at each decile with the corresponding pointwise 95% confidence band in
green. The point estimates can be interpreted as the effect on poverty of “moving”
from unprotected to protected at each level of poverty. The results display a similar
trend to that seen in the LOESS results (Figure 2(a) of the main text): namely that
protection has had greater poverty alleviating effects on the poorer census tracts.
B.6.2 Agricultural Workers
In Chapter 2, we use slope as a proxy for agricultural suitability. Slope has been
used in a similar manner in previous studies (Ferraro and Hanauer 2011) as well as
a proxy for other deforestation pressures (e.g., logging access; (19)). To support the
conjecture that the slope analysis is indeed highlighting the impact of opportunity
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costs from agriculture, we run a PLM analysis to study the heterogeneity of
protection’s impact conditional on baseline percentage of the workforce employed in
agriculture in Costa Rica (where we have data on this measure). An opportunity
cost argument would predict that avoided deforestation would be higher in areas
with a high percentage of the workforce in agriculture and poverty impacts would be
lower in these same areas. We observe this relationship in Figure 15 (bottom panel).
B.6.3 Standard Errors
All of our analyses are preceded by matching to improve balance across protected
and unprotected units. Because the matching is performed with replacement there
are repeated control observations in the final matched samples. The concern with
repeat control observations is that precision of the standard error estimates in
post-match analyses (e.g., regression) may be overstated. In response to this
concern, we first note that our results are driven by the relationships presented in
the ATT estimates, rather than the precision of these estimates. For example, we
are more interested in the overall relationship between avoided deforestation and
slope than knowing whether or not avoided deforestation was significantly different
from zero at 45 percent slope.
Second, we note that the standard errors of the fit presented in the main text are
not likely to be understated. The final estimate in each of our analyses (both LOESS
and PLM) is designed to be interpreted in a manner similar to a post-matching,
bias-adjusted difference in means. This design allows us to compare our results to
the studies from which we draw. Thus we are performing the final stage LOESS
using the independent variable of interest and the individual ATT, which is simply
the difference between actual outcome and imputed counterfactual outcome for each
protected unit (see LOESS section above). Therefore the degrees of freedom in the
estimation of the standard error of the fit is based only on the number of
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observations in the protected sample, rather the entire sample of protected and
unprotected units (as would be the case in a typical regression context). The fact
that unprotected units do not add to the degrees of freedom serves to mitigate the
effect of repeated observations, which lie only in the unprotected units.
Third, to offer the reader more confidence that the standard errors used in
Figure 2 are not substantially understated, we calculate standard errors via
bootstrapping. The 95% pointwise confidence band is determined by the 2.5 and
97.5 percentile bootstrapped outcome at each point of interest along the range of
the independent variable. In each analysis, the final stage LOESS estimate is
bootstrapped 1000 times.83 The bootstrapped standard errors are overlaid on the
standard errors of the fit in Figures 17 - 19 in which it can be seen that the two
standard error estimates coincide closely. One of the key insights that can be taken
from Figures 17 - 19 is that our main results are robust to alternative methods of
estimating the standard errors.
83The bootstrapping function was written in R v. 2.11.1. Code is available from authors upon
request.
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Figure S1b. Costa Rica Socioeconomic Suitability MapProtected Prior to 1980
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Figure S1a. Costa Rica Environmental Suitability Map
Protected Prior to 1980
Figure 12: Costa Rica protected area suitability maps by environmental and socioeconomic
suitability.
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Figure S2a. Thailand Environmental Suitability MapProtected Prior to 1985
Socioeconomic Suitability
0 10
Unforested area
Figure S2b. Thailand Socioeconomic Suitability MapProtected Prior to 1985
Figure 13: Thailand protected area suitability maps by environmental and socioeconomic
suitability.
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Figure 14: Costa Rica: Full LOESS results.
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Costa Rica: Avoided Deforestation by Agricultural Workers
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Figure 15: Costa Rica: full heterogeneous response to protection results.
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Thailand: Poverty by Distance to Major City
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Figure 16: Thailand: full heterogeneous response to protection results.
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Costa Rica: Avoided Deforestation by Baseline Poverty
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Figure 17: Costa Rica: Comparison of bootstrapped standard errors to standard errors of
the fit.
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Costa Rica: Avoided Deforestation by Slope
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Figure 18: Costa Rica: Comparison of bootstrapped standard errors to standard errors of
the fit.
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Thailand: Poverty by Distance to Major City
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Figure 19: Thailand: Comparison of bootstrapped standard errors to standard errors of the
fit.
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Costa Rica: Quantile Regression
Deciles
 Poverty Index 2000
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Figure 20: Costa Rica: Quantile regression estimating impact of protection according to
deciles of 2000 poverty index.
148Table 14: Thailand- Summary statistics and description of covariates used as controls to form counterfactual samples.
Standard
Variable Description Mean Median Deviation Range
Deforestation Covariates
Slope Slope of parcel (degrees) 5.905 5 5.48 0-43
Distance to Major Distance (km) to major river 30.598 27.62 19.552 0.004-109.3
rivers (flow accumulation greater than 5000)
Elevation Elevation (m) of parcel 555.535 497 316.942 0-2183
Distance to Forest Edge Distance (km) to the edge of the 2.747 1.884 2.775 0.0001-19.58
forest in 1973
Distance to Road Distance (km) to nearest road in 1962 21.08 116.4 17.682 0.00076-93.8
Distance to Major City Distance (km) to nearest major city 113.573 113.5 42.621 7.26-254.3
(pop greater than 100,000)
Socioeconomic Covariates
Average Slope Average slope of subdistrict (degrees) 1.018 0.0504 2.042 0-14.33
Maximum Slope Maximum slope of subdistrict (degrees) 4.05 0.9882 6.99 0-46.99
Distance to Major River Distance (km) to major river 21.61 0 16.61 0.01-97.82
(flow accumulation greater than 5000)
Forest Cover 1973 Percent of subdistrict covered by forest, 1973 0.194 0.00423 0.315 0-1
Distance to Major City Distance (km) to nearest major city 85.59 81.03 44.51 10.05-222.6
(pop greater than 100,000)
Distance to Major Road Distance (km) to major road in 1962 5.26 7.615 6.22 0.002-76.16
Distance to Any Road Distance (km) to minor road in 1962 10.42 3.448 0.002 88.08
Distance to Thai Border Distance (km) to Thailand border 91.62 91.33 52.36 0.062-218.9
Near Watershed Within 1 km of major watershed boundary 0.461 0 0.499 0-1
Distance to Rail Line Distance (km) to rail line 55.05 42.95 45.76 0.015-222.1
Dist. to Mineral Deposit Distance (km) to nearest mineral deposit 119.46 102.7 84.73 1.371-376.4
Temperature Average temperature (C) for subdistrict 25.37 25.89 1.448 18.07-27.85
Rainfall Average monthly rainfall (mm) 1064 1021 225.3 375.8-2308
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Table 15: Costa Rica - Covariate balance for baseline avoided deforestation analysis.
Mean Mean Diff. Norm. Mean eQQ %Improve
Covariate Status Prot. Unprot. in Means Diff. Diff. Mean Diff.
High Land Use Unmatched 0.008 0.205 -0.197 0.307 0.197
Capacity Matched 0.008 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 100.0%
Medium-High Unmatched 0.029 0.198 -0.170 0.259 0.170
Land Use Capacity Matched 0.029 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.000 100.0%
Median-Low Unmatched 0.080 0.507 -0.427 0.563 0.427
Land Use Capacity Matched 0.080 0.080 0.000 0.000 0.000 100.0%
Distance to Unmatched 2.857 2.045 0.812 0.162 0.886
Forest Edge Matched 2.857 2.713 0.143 0.031 0.148 82.3%
Distance to Unmatched 17.354 15.336 2.017 0.078 2.099
Road Matched 17.354 16.709 0.645 0.026 0.975 68.0%
Distance to Unmatched 76.980 80.515 -3.535 0.037 15.894
Major City Matched 76.980 77.912 -0.933 0.008 2.295 73.6%
Table 16: Thailand- Baseline avoided deforestation analysis.
Difference Mahalanobis
in Means Matching†
Avoided Deforestation -0.2595*** -0.14738***
(YT=1 − YT=0) {0.0062} (0.0175)
N Protected 2,808 2,808
N Available Controls NA 13,609
*** Indicates significance at the 1% level
† ATT is post-match difference in means using regression
bias-adjustment to control for bias in finite samples
(Abadie-Imbens heteroskedasticity robust standard errors)
{Standard errors}
Table 17: Thailand - Covariate balance for baseline avoided deforestation analysis.
Mean Mean Diff. Norm. Mean eQQ %Improve
Covariate Status Prot. Unprot. in Means Diff. Diff. Mean Diff.
Distance to Unmatched 109.67 114.06 -4.395 0.040 8.498
Major City Matched 109.67 110.42 -0.756 0.008 4.958 82.8%
Distance Unmatched 31.16 17.16 13.999 0.401 14.001
to Road Matched 31.16 29.42 1.741 0.039 2.054 87.6%
Distance to Unmatched 3.62 2.26 1.359 0.242 1.358
Forest Edge Matched 3.62 3.30 0.316 0.051 0.317 76.7%
Slope Unmatched 7.96 4.99 2.970 0.254 2.972
Matched 7.96 7.81 0.152 0.012 0.437 94.9%
Distance to Unmatched 35.93 27.24 8.691 0.217 8.689
Major River Matched 35.93 34.89 1.043 0.024 2.464 88.0%
Elevation Unmatched 697.13 486.61 210.519 0.307 210.448
Matched 697.13 635.13 62.004 0.093 62.061 70.6%
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Table 18: Exclusions and Inclusions, with respect to the baseline set of controls, in PLM
analyses.
Covariate Exclusions Inclusions Justification
Costa Rica
Slope Land Use Cap.†‡ NA LUC is a function of slope
D. MCity Dist.e to Road†‡ NA Colinearity with distance to city
% AgWorkers NA NA NA
Thailand
Slope NA Province Fixed Effects‡ Control for baseline poverty
D. MCity Dist. to Road†‡ – Colinearity with distance to city
Dist. to Railroad‡ – Colinearity with distance to city
– Province Fixed Effects‡ Control for baseline poverty
Baseline set of controls for each analysis include all matching covariates (Table 1)
and other mediating covariates
† Indicates inclussion/exclussion from the deforestation analysis
‡ Indicates inclussion/exclussion from the socioeconomic analysis
Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter IV
C.1 Threshold Analyses
In our primary specifications we designate a municipality as protected if at least
10% of its area is occupied by a protected area. A 10% protection threshold is in
line with the goals set forth at the 4th World Congress on National Parks and
Protected areas (Andam et al. 2010)84 and previous studies (Andam et al. 2010,
Ferraro and Hanauer 2011, Ferraro et al. 2011). However, it could be argued that
this threshold is somewhat arbitrary. We, therefore, test the robustness of our
results to changes in this threshold assignment.
Table 19 provides comparisons of ATT for the primary genetic matching
specification at the 5%, 10% (primary specification in main analysis), 20%, 30% and
50% protection thresholds for both PI and NBI (Tables 20-23 provide full results for
all protection thresholds). Table 19 shows that as the protection threshold increases,
i.e., as we increase the protected area land coverage required for a municipality to
be considered protected, the number of protected municipalities drops (as
expected). In the final 50% threshold specification, only 18 (17) treated units
remain in the PI (NBI) analyses.
In the PI analyses we find that the ATT remains relatively stable, and
statistically significant, across the range of protection thresholds. The mean
84As mentioned in the main text, one of the goals set forth by the 4th World Congress on National
Parks and Protected areas was to protect 10% of the earth’s ecosystems by the year 2000.
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outcomes for treated and control groups jumps up (in absolute terms) at the 50%
threshold providing indication that there is somewhat lower poverty within
municipalities with greater area protected (note that their matched counterparts
have relatively low average poverty levels as well). We see a similar phenomenon in
the NBI analyses in Table 19. The lowest average poverty outcomes (for protected
and matched unprotected units) are observed at the highest levels of protection.
The ATT according to NBI is increasing monotonically (in absolute terms) with
percent protection, however none of the estimates are significant at the 5% level
(the 50% threshold specification is significant at the 10% level).
The results in Tables 19 - 23 provide evidence that our primary results are not
driven by the choice of threshold. Rather, our results are robust and consistent
across protection threshold specifications.
C.2 Placebo Analysis
In our main and ancillary analyses we show that the estimated poverty alleviation
associated with the establishment of protected areas is robust to a number of
econometric specifications and ancillary analyses. However, there is always the
concern that the difference in outcomes between protected and unprotected
municipalities stems from our inability to select a control group that closely enough
resembles the protected group.85 To address this potential confounding issue we
perform a placebo analysis.
The goal is to see if our covariates of interest perform well in the construction of
a counterfactual for municipalities that are observably similar (on average) to
protected municipalities, but were never protected. In other words, to see if the gap
in poverty outcomes between protected and unprotected groups was due to
something other than protection. If protection was the only remaining source of
85This concern is unlikely true given the high degree of balance across treatment arms in Tables
11 and 12.
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variation across treatment arms (to which the treatment effect can be attributed) in
our main analyses, then we should observe no difference in expected outcomes
between the placebo group and its matched controls (i.e., our covariates are creating
a quality counterfactual).
We proceed by selecting a placebo group that is observably similar to the
original protected group. We then run the same genetic matching specification,
assigning the placebo group as the “treated” group, as in the primary matching
analysis. The placebo group in this analysis comprises the 56 matched controls from
the primary genetic matching analysis in the main text.86 This group is observably
similar to the original protected group (on average; see Table 11) with the exception
that the placebo group was not affected by protected areas. Therefore, if our
covariates are capturing underlying poverty trajectories well, then by selecting
unprotected municipalities that are observably similar to our placebo group, we
should observe no difference in outcomes because there is no longer protection as a
source of variation between the two groups.
The results in Table 24, for both the full and unique placebo groups, indicate
that there is no placebo effect. In other words, our covariates of interest appear to
be predicting poverty trajectories well (see Tables 25 and 26 for balance results).
These results buttress our claims that the treatment effects present in our main
analyses are due to the establishment of protected areas rather than an inability to
estimate quality counterfactuals.
C.3 Spillover Analysis
The central result from our main analyses is that municipalities that were affected
by protected areas had differentially greater poverty reduction than comparable
86Recall that matching was performed with replacement so the placebo group has 15 repeat
observations. We choose this for our primary placebo group because it most closely resembles our
original protected group in expectation . We perform an additional analysis assigning only unique
matched controls, from the original analysis, to the placebo group (see Table 25).
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municipalities that were unaffected by protected areas. An often voiced concern is
that protected areas, rather than having a positive impact of proximal populations,
caused those most negatively impacted to emigrate from the impacted communities.
If such emigration was undertaken by relatively poor populations (a supposition
supported by Robalino 2007) it would have two effects. First, the departure of a
relatively poor population would result in a decrease in the measured average
poverty level within protected municipalities. Second, immigration of these
relatively poor populations would have negative impacts on measured average
poverty in surrounding municipalities. The former affect is a concern because it
implies that there were no truly positive mechanisms through which protected areas
affected poverty (e.g., tourism, infrastructure development, ecosystem services, etc.).
Instead, the former implies that protected areas didn’t make surrounding
populations better-off, it just compelled those that they made the worst-off, to
emigrate. The latter effect is one that we attempt to test. To do so we first assume
that if the poor are negatively affected by protected areas, they will migrate to the
nearest unaffected communities.
Our analysis to test local migration effects is thus framed as a spillover analysis.
Using GIS we select all the municipalities that neighbor (congruent to)
municipalities with at least 10% of their area occupied by a protected area (see
Figure 21). If protected areas caused poor populations to migrate to surrounding
communities, then we would expect an increase in poverty between 1992 and 2001
in these neighboring municipalities, compared to observably similar (unprotected)
municipalities. To test this hypothesis we treat the 99 neighboring municipalities87
as “treated” units and match them to observably similar unprotected municipalities
(according to our covariates of interest). Under the null hypothesis of no spillover,
there should be no treatment effect in the resulting matched sample. In other
87There are 116 municipalities that are congruent to a protected municipality. 17 are dropped
from the sample because they are considered marginally protected.
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words, there should be no difference in poverty outcomes between congruent (to
protected municipalities) and matched unprotected municipalities.
We run our primary genetic matching and regression specifications on the
spillover data, the results of which can be found in Table 27 (see Tables 28 and A11
for balance results). We find no evidence of negative spillover effects from protected
municipalities into congruent communities. For both specifications in which we
designate the PI as the outcome, the estimated impacts are quite small and
statistically insignificant. In the specifications using NBI, we find estimates of
poverty alleviation in congruent municipalities (compared to similar unprotected
municipalities). These results are statistically significant (insignificant) in the
regression (genetic matching) specification.
The results from our spillover analysis indicate that municipalities congruent to
protected municipalities fared no worse (and by most indications, better) than
similar unprotected municipalities. We, therefore, propose that the positive poverty
impacts associated with the establishment of protected areas are unlikely due to the
emigration of poor populations to surrounding communities. While this proposition
may hold for our regional spillover analysis, it is difficult to test for broader general
equilibrium migration effects.
One potential scenario is that the emigrants move to urban areas. If this were
the case then we would expect to see less poverty reduction in urban areas as
compared to protected municipalities, ceteris paribus. We attempt to capture this
potential migration effect by limiting our control sample to municipalities that lie
within 50km of a major city.88 Our resulting sample comprises the original 56
protected municipalities and 53 unprotected municipalities. The regression results
from this sample can seen found in Table 30. We find that, compared to relatively
88Unprotected municipalities remain in the sample if their average euclidean distance from each
1ha parcel is within 50km from a major city. We choose 50km to balance the tradeoff between
capturing urban areas and sample size.
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urban areas, protected areas still had differentially greater level of poverty reduction
between 1992 and 2001. Though coarse, this provides evidence that our results are
not consistent with poor populations being driven to urban areas.
One final piece of evidence that indicates our results are unlikely driven by
complex migration patterns comes from the preceding placebo analysis. Aside from
localized (congruent) or urban migration, it is not illogical to presume that
adversely affected poor populations might migrate to municipalities that are
observably similar to the protected municipalities from which they originate. Under
this scenario we might reasonably assume that poor populations would migrate to
the unprotected municipalities found in the matched control group from the
primary genetic matching specification. However, these are the municipalities that
compose our “treated” placebo group, for which we found no difference in poverty
outcomes (compared to similar unprotected municipalities) in the placebo analysis.
If our more complex migration scenario were occurring, we would expect to find a
negative (poverty exacerbation) treatment effect in the placebo analysis.
Unfortunately it is not possible to fully capture all the potential general
equilibrium poverty effects of protected areas. However, given the limited mobility
of poor populations and migration scenarios explored, we believe that our analyses
provide strong evidence that the positive impacts of protected areas are not driven
by the emigration of poor populations.
C.4 Areas Formally Protected in the 1990s
Fundamental to our identification of the impacts of protected areas in our study
period was Law 1333 and the associated restructuring and enforcement or protected
areas subsequent to 1992. Despite the evidence of that protected areas were
so-called “paper parks” (e.g., (Bruner et al. 2001)), if the 10 protected areas that
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were established prior to our study period were in fact effective, this may be biasing
our results.
There are a number of plausible impacts to our results that stem from including
protected areas established (and maintained effectively) prior to our study period.
However, our primary concern is that such inclusion would significantly increase the
probability of inferring poverty alleviation associated with the establishment of
protected areas. To address this potential bias, we drop the 10 protected areas that
were originally established prior to our study period. We are left with 32 (30)
protected municipalities when the PI (NBI) is used as the outcome of interest. We
run our primary specifications on this sample and find the results to be strikingly
similar to those from the original sample (see Table 31 for results and Tables 32 and
34 for balance results).
C.5 Rosenbaum Bounds
The ATT estimates from the primary genetic matching specifications represent
unbiased estimates of the impact of protected areas on poverty under the
assumption that we have sufficiently controlled for all covariates that jointly
determine the spatial establishment of protection and poverty (conditional
independence assumption). However, if there exists an unobserved covariate or
group of covariates, that is highly correlated with protection and poverty, and
uncorrelated with the covariates for which we do control, then we may be concerned
that this confounder might be biasing our results. The fundamental concern is that
the poverty alleviation observed in protected municipalities is due to systematic
differences between protected and unprotected municipalities, other than protection.
One of the desirable properties of matching is that under CIA we can invoke
many of the methods of inference used in a randomized experiment. Under pure
randomization each selected unit has an equal probability of being assigned to the
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treatment or control group. Therefore, under the null hypothesis of no treatment
effect there is a Pr = 0.5 that any unit within a pair chosen across treatment arms
has a greater outcome than the other unit within the pair (outcomes are
“exchangeable” within pairs). In other words, under randomization, if treatment
has no effect, we should observe treated units within pairs exhibiting greater
outcomes approximately 50% of the time, and control units exhibiting greater
outcomes approximately 50% of the time.89 If matching satisfies CIA then similar
logic, and inference, can be applied to matched pairs.
Suppose that matching perfectly accounts for all covariates that affect outcome
and selection. Similar to randomization, under the null hypothesis of no treatment
effect, we should observe treated units exhibiting greater outcome values within
matched pairs approximately 50%, and vice versa. This type of inference is valid
within matched pairs because, conditional on covariates X, the probability of
treatment within these pairs in equal and, therefore, outcomes within matched pairs
are considered exchangeable.90 Now suppose that there is some unobserved
covariate, u, that is uncorrelated with X, but correlated with outcomes Y and
treatment T . There are two ways of looking at the impact of u on inference. (1) u
affects the probability of treatment such that exchangeability is no longer satisfied,
therefore, invalidating permutation-based inference using a null of no treatment
effect. (2) The differences in u, which are systematically related to T, are driving
the observed differences in Y, otherwise attributed to T.
Rosenbaum (2002) proposes measures by which we can test the sensitivity of our
matching results to the presence of u. Rosenbaum bounds allow us to measure how
strong a confounder, u, would need to be to the invalidate our statistical findings.91
89Under randomization, there are a number of permutation-based inference tests by which to
estimate exact p-values based on this logic (e.g., Rosenbaum 2002).
90Another way of expressing this is that, conditional of X, there remains no other source of
variation between treated and control groups that affects Y , other than T .
91It should be noted prior to exposition that any measurement of sensitivity to unobserved bias,
or varying degrees therein, does not imply the presences of unobserved bias.
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In Rosenbaum’s model the probability of assignment to treatment pij for unit j can
be expressed in terms of odds as
pij
(1−pij) . Under randomization pij = pik for j 6= k.
Similarly, in an observational setting and in absence of u, pij = pik when xj = xk. In
other words, conditional of similar values of X within matched pairs, the probability
of treatment is equal for treated and control units. The departure from
randomization (or the influence of u), can be expressed by Γ in the odds ratio
between matched pairs
1
Γ
≤ pij (1− pik)
pik (1− pij) ≤ Γ, for all j, k with xj = xk,
where Γ = 1 under randomization. Conversely, if xj = xk but pij 6= pik this implies
the presence of u, the degree of which is captured by Γ 6= 1. For instance, if Γ = 2
(but xj = xk) this implies that the presence of u is causing the odds of treatment
between j and k to differ by a factor of 2. In Rosenbaum’s sensitivity test we ask
how large Γ would need to be (i.e., how strong a confounder u would need to be) in
order to alter matching-based inference.
To frame Γ explicitly in terms of the unobserved bias, u, Rosenbaum (2002)
shows that the log odds ratio for j is equivalent to
log
(
pij
(1− pij)
)
= k(xj) + γuj, with 0 ≤ uj ≤ 1,
which states that the odds of treatment are an unknown function of x plus an
unknown parametrization of u.92 The odds ratio can therefore be rewritten as
pij (1− pik)
pik (1− pij) = exp{γ(uj − uk)},
92See Rosenbaum (2002) for a discussion of the restriction on u.
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where k(·) cancels when xj = xk. By stating the odds ratio in terms of u it can be
seen that in the absence of u, i.e., when u does not influence pi (or when uj = uk),
eγ = Γ = 1. Conversely, as the influence of u increases (or as uj and uk diverge) Γ
and the absolute difference in probability of treatment between treated and
untreated units increases.
In observational studies we cannot observe the presence of u or its potential
influence as measured by Γ = eγ. In Rosenbaum’s sensitivity test we impose
increasing levels of Γ to measure at what influence of unobserved bias our inference
would be invalidated (shown to be insignificant). If inference is altered by a level of
Γ close to 1 this implies that a study is sensitive to unobserved bias. However, we
reiterate that estimated sensitivity to unobserved bias in no way implies the
presence of unobserved bias.
161
Brazil
Bolivia
Peru
Chile
Paraguay
Argentina
Legend
Protected Areas
Protected Municipalities
Congruent to Protected Municipality
No Dataµ
200 0 200 400 600100
Kilometers
Figure 21: Map of municipalities congruent (orange) to a municipality with at least 10%
area occupied by a protected area (yellow).
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Figure 22: Histogram of propensity score distributions according to PI for full and matched
datasets. Red bars indicate frequency of unprotected units and blue bars indicate frequency
of protected units (purple represent areas where bars overlap).
Table 19: ATT Estimates from Primary GenMatch Specification by Protection Threshold
Poverty Index NBI
Threshold Y(T=1) Y(T=0) Treatment Y(T=1) Y(T=0) Treatment
5% -1.23 -0.761 -0.465 77.12 81.78 -4.66
[63] [63] (0.136) [60] [60] (3.394)
10% -1.33 -0.805 -0.525 76.18 84.16 -4.99
(Primary Specification) [56] [56] (0.142) [53] [53] (3.67)
20% -1.214 -0.725 -0.489 76.21 82.3 -6.075
[42] [42] (0.149) [39] [39] (4.75)
30% -1.162 -0.731 -0.431 76.64 82.92 -6.282
[38] [38] (0.154) [36] [36] (5.1)
50% -1.67 -1.223 -0.454 70.14 76.49 -6.35
[18] [18] (0.272) [17] [17] (3.52)
(Abadie-Imbens Heteroskedasticity Robust Standard Errors)
[Observation]
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Table 20: Results from Primary and Ancillary Analyses, Treatment Threshold=5%
Poverty Index NBI
Method Y(T=1) Y(T=0) Treatment Y(T=1) Y(T=0) Treatment
Nave Difference -1.23 -0.4946 -0.731 77.12 85.89 -8.77
in Means [63] [261] {0.0215} [60] [251] {0.004}
Regression Dropping NA NA -0.42 NA NA -2.04
Marginal [63] [46] (0.103) [60] [42] (1.55)
Post-Match Frequency -1.23 -0.761 -0.465 77.12 81.78 -4.66
Weighted Regression [63] [63] (0.136) [60] [60] (3.394)
Genetic Matching -0.986 -0.516 -0.471 79.72 82.73 -3.01
[56] [56] (0.14) [54] [54] (2.09)
Genetic Matching, -1.07 -0.511 -0.56 79.04 81.51 -2.47
Calipers=1sd [49] [49] (0.147) [47] [47] (1.55)
[Number of observations]
(Standard errors)
{P-value}
Table 21: Results from Primary and Ancillary Analyses, Treatment Threshold=20%
Poverty Index NBI
Method Y(T=1) Y(T=0) Treatment Y(T=1) Y(T=0) Treatment
Nave Difference -1.21 -0.551 -0.663 76.2 85.3 -9.13
in Means [42] [282] {0.018} [39] [272] {0.013}
Regression Dropping NA NA -0.527 NA NA -7.23
Marginal [42] [252] (0.113) [39] [242] (1.39)
Post-Match Frequency NA NA -0.47 NA NA -2.83
Weighted Regression [42] [31] (0.116) [39] [29] (1.95)
Genetic Matching -0.996 -0.475 -0.52 78.95 82.48 -3.53
[36] [36] (0.155) [35] [35] (3.1)
Genetic Matching, -1.07 -0.511 -0.56 79.04 81.51 -2.47
Calipers=1sd [49] [49] (0.147) [47] [47] (1.55)
[Number of observations]
(Standard errors)
{P-value}
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Table 22: Results from Primary and Ancillary Analyses, Treatment Threshold=30%
Poverty Index NBI
Method Y(T=1) Y(T=0) Treatment Y(T=1) Y(T=0) Treatment
Nave Difference -1.16 -0.567 -0.595 76.6 85.2 -8.551
in Means [42] [282] {0.108} [36] [275] {0.029}
Regression Dropping NA NA -0.523 NA NA -7.42
Marginal [38] [252] (0.119) [36] [242] (1.44)
Post-Match Frequency NA NA -0.45 NA NA -2.91
Weighted Regression [38] [30] (0.124) [36] [28] (2.08)
Genetic Matching -1.162 -0.731 -0.431 76.64 82.92 -6.282
[38] [38] (0.154) [36] [36] (5.1)
Genetic Matching, -0.908 -0.506 -0.402 79.71 83.59 -3.872
Calipers=1sd [32] [32] (0.157) [31] [31] (3.1)
[Number of observations]
(Standard errors)
{P-value}
Table 23: Results from Primary and Ancillary Analyses, Treatment Threshold=50%
Poverty Index NBI
Method Y(T=1) Y(T=0) Treatment Y(T=1) Y(T=0) Treatment
Nave Difference -1.67 -0.577 -1.1 70.14 85.01 -14.87
in Means [18] [306] {0.09} [17] [294] {0.04}
Regression Dropping NA NA -0.684 NA NA -11.3
Marginal [18] [252] (0.162) [17] [242] (1.95)
Post-Match Frequency NA NA -0.627 NA NA -8.52
Weighted Regression [18] [15] (0.218) [17] [15] (3.3)
Genetic Matching -1.67 -1.223 -0.454 70.14 76.49 -6.35
[18] [18] (0.272) [17] [17] (3.52)
Genetic Matching, -1.23 -0.451 -0.782 75.9 82.22 -6.33
Calipers=1sd [15] [15] (0.245) [14] [14] (6.95)
[Number of observations]
(Standard errors)
{P-value}
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Table 24: Results from Placebo Matching Test
Poverty Index
Method Y(T=1) Y(T=0) Treatment
Genetic Matching -0.797 -0.84 0.044
Full Matched Sample [56] [56] (0.17)
Genetic Matching -0.915 -0.7189 -0.196
Dropped Repeat [41] [41] (0.156)
[Number of observations]
(Standard errors)
Table 25: Balance Results for Placebo Matching Analysis- Full Sample
Mean Mean Diff. Norm. Mean eQQ %Improve
Covariate Status Prot. Unprot. in Means Diff. Diff. Mean Diff.
Poverty Index Unmatched 0.319 0.834 -0.515 0.157 0.502
1992 Matched 0.319 0.264 0.054 0.016 0.216 89.48%
% Forest 1991 Unmatched 0.466 0.148 0.317 0.531 0.315
Matched 0.466 0.458 0.008 0.012 0.035 97.51%
Distance to Unmatched 136600 102500 34100 0.205 33260
Major City Matched 136600 137500 -868.1 0.004 13100 97.45%
Average Unmatched 1794 2860 -1066 0.375 1052
Elevation Matched 1794 1936 -142 0.051 204.9 86.68%
Average Slope Unmatched 23.89 18.06 5.822 0.191 5.989
Matched 23.89 24.17 -0.287 0.008 4.508 95.07%
Roadless Unmatched 2.526E+14 6.101E+13 1.916E+14 0.259 1.860E+14
Volume 1992 Matched 2.526E+14 1.269E+14 1.257E+14 0.162 1.547E+14 34.38%
Table 26: Balance Results for Placebo Matching Analysis- Unique Sample
Mean Mean Diff. Norm. Mean eQQ %Improve
Covariate Status Prot. Unprot. in Means Diff. Diff. Mean Diff.
Poverty Index Unmatched 0.282 0.834 -0.551 0.170 0.537
1992 Matched 0.282 0.283 -0.001 0.000 0.188 99.89%
% Forest 1991 Unmatched 0.427 0.148 0.279 0.458 0.274
Matched 0.427 0.426 0.002 0.002 0.024 99.41%
Distance to Unmatched 136100 102500 33560 0.201 32230
Major City Matched 136100 132900 3230 0.017 10430 90.38%
Average Unmatched 1956 2860 -904.1 0.313 887.6
Elevation Matched 1956 2000 -44.070 0.015 147.3 95.13%
Average Slope Unmatched 23.62 18.06 5.556 0.181 5.591
Matched 23.62 23.03 0.594 0.017 3.361 89.30%
Roadless Unmatched 1.992E+14 6.101E+13 1.382E+14 0.212 1.265E+14
Volume 1992 Matched 1.992E+14 1.415E+14 5.764E+13 0.080 1.097E+14 58.28%
166
Table 27: Spillover Analyses, Municipalities Congruent to Protected Municipalities Consid-
ered Treated
Poverty Index NBI
Method Y(T=1) Y(T=0) Treatment Y(T=1) Y(T=0) Treatment
Regression Dropping NA NA -0.14 NA NA -3.12
Marginal [99] [153] (0.09) [95] [147] (0.98)
Genetic Matching -0.629 -0.726 0.097 81.7 83.88 -2.187
[99] [99] (0.185) [95] [95] (2.29)
[Number of observations]
(Standard errors)
Table 28: Balance Results for Congruent Spillover Analysis- PI
Mean Mean Diff. Norm. Mean eQQ %Improve
Covariate Status Prot. Unprot. in Means Diff. Diff. Mean Diff.
Poverty Index Unmatched 0.678 0.787 -0.109 0.034 0.323
1992 Matched 0.678 0.616 0.062 0.019 0.331 43.27%
% Forest 1991 Unmatched 0.319 0.113 0.206 0.355 0.208
Matched 0.319 0.311 0.008 0.012 0.020 96.30%
Distance to Unmatched 109000 107400 1569 0.009 10650
Major City Matched 109000 110500 -1567 0.009 9140 0.06%
Average Unmatched 2124 3095 -970.3 0.342 959.5
Elevation Matched 2124 2109 15.45 0.005 195.9 98.41%
Average Slope Unmatched 21.66 17.23 4.43 0.145 4.688
Matched 21.66 20.70 0.96 0.029 3.121 78.28%
Roadless Unmatched 7.926E+13 8.624E+13 -6.976E+12 0.009 3.20E+13
Volume 1992 Matched 7.926E+13 7.774E+13 1.524E+12 0.002 1.95E+13 78.15%
Table 29: Balance Results for Congruent Spillover Analysis- NBI
Mean Mean Diff. Norm. Mean eQQ %Improve
Covariate Status Prot. Unprot. in Means Diff. Diff. Mean Diff.
NBI 1992 Unmatched 89.760 91.880 -2.114 0.049 1.957
Matched 89.760 90.560 -0.797 0.018 1.936 62.32%
% Forest 1991 Unmatched 0.309 0.108 0.201 0.346 0.203
Matched 0.309 0.304 0.005 0.007 0.023 97.56%
Distance to Unmatched 109200 108200 1048 0.006 10110
Major City Matched 109200 107300 1894 0.011 7354 -80.79%
Average Unmatched 2158 3135 -977 0.348 965.8
Elevation Matched 2158 2137 20.97 0.008 167.7 97.85%
Average Slope Unmatched 22.08 17.75 4.332 0.141 4.579
Matched 22.08 22.72 -0.643 0.019 2.743 85.15%
Roadless Unmatched 8.04E+13 8.84E+13 -8.04E+12 0.010 3.26E+13
Volume 1992 Matched 8.04E+13 7.70E+13 3.43E+12 0.004 2.08E+13 57.36%
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Table 30: Spillover Regression Results, Controls Within 50km of Major City
Standard
Covariate/Outcome PI NBI
(Intercept) -2.16*** -48.9***
(0.266) (6.09)
Protected -0.469** –4.88*
(0.161) (2.58)
Baseline Poverty 0.918*** 1.26***
(0.025) (0.0648)
Percent Forest 1991 0.643* 16.48**
(0.349) (5.70)
Distance to Major City 2.44E-06*** 1.87E-06***
(6.87E-07) (1.17E-05)
Average Elevation 2.15E-04** -0.0049***
(8.18E-05) (0.00135)
Average Slope -9.99E-04 0.071
(0.0052) (0.082)
Roadless Volume 7.83E-17 4.01E-15*
(1.11E-16) (1.77E-15)
R2=0.944 R2=0.836
DF=101 DF=96
F=242 F=69.7
Notes: Outcomes are indicated at column heads
and represent 2001 poverty index and NBI.
***, **, * Indicate significance at the
(0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level, respectively.)
(Standard Errors)
Table 31: Results from Primary and Ancillary Analyses, Protected Areas Established in
1990s
Poverty Index NBI
Method Y(T=1) Y(T=0) Treatment Y(T=1) Y(T=0) Treatment
Regression Dropping NA NA -0.599 NA NA -4.23
Marginal [32] [252] (0.128) [30] [242] (1.48)
Post-Match Frequency NA NA -0.54 NA NA -1.87
Weighted Regression [32] [24] (0.151) [30] [24] (2.09)
Genetic Matching -0.79 -0.313 -0.485 79.95 85.85 -5.89
[32] [32] (0.205) [30] [30] (5.38)
[Number of observations]
(Standard errors)
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Table 32: Balance Results for Analysis Using Protected Areas Established in 1990s- PI
Mean Mean Diff. Norm. Mean eQQ %Improve
Covariate Status Prot. Unprot. in Means Diff. Diff. Mean Diff.
Poverty Index Unmatched 0.552 0.744 -0.192 0.056 0.329
1992 Matched 0.552 0.563 -0.010 0.003 0.199 94.54%
% Forest 1991 Unmatched 0.510 0.194 0.316 0.534 0.316
Matched 0.510 0.501 0.009 0.014 0.048 97.28%
Distance to Unmatched 175400 108000 67370 0.314 65140
Major City Matched 175400 145900 29480 0.123 41660 56.24%
Average Unmatched 1649 2713 -1065.000 0.373 1057
Elevation Matched 1649 1584 65.060 0.027 130.400 93.89%
Average Slope Unmatched 24.970 18.970 6.006 0.193 6.080
Matched 24.970 24.890 0.087 0.003 2.305 98.56%
Roadless Unmatched 3.825E+14 8.350E+13 2.990E+14 0.234 2.558E+14
Volume 1992 Matched 3.825E+14 2.808E+14 1.017E+14 0.061 1.632E+14 65.98%
Table 33: Balance Results for Analysis Using Protected Areas Established in 1990s- NBI
Mean Mean Diff. Norm. Mean eQQ %Improve
Covariate Status Prot. Unprot. in Means Diff. Diff. Mean Diff.
NBI 1992 Unmatched 89.11 91.050 -1.934 0.043 1.821
Matched 89.11 89.130 -0.017 0.000 1.069 0.991%
% Forest 1991 Unmatched 0.488 0.187 0.301 0.510 0.298
Matched 0.488 0.483 0.006 0.009 0.036 0.982%
Distance to Unmatched 165600 108600 57030 0.271 54590
Major City Matched 165600 139400 26230 0.108 34620 0.540%
Average Unmatched 1731 2751 -1021 0.360 1013
Elevation Matched 1731 1746 -14.74 0.006 112.6 0.986%
Average Slope Unmatched 25.83 19.45 6.376 0.204 6.4
Matched 25.83 27.43 -1.602 0.045 3.239 0.749%
Roadless Unmatched 3.924E+14 8.528E+13 3.071E+14 0.234 2.600E+14
Volume 1992 Matched 3.924E+14 3.027E+14 8.969E+13 0.052 1.691E+14 0.708%
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Table 34: Regression Results from Primary Specifications
Standard Post-Match Weighted
Covariate/Outcome PI NBI PI NBI
(Intercept) -2.01*** -42.3*** -1.42*** -39.4
(0.157) (3.41) (0.288) (6.37)
Protected -0.535*** -5.62*** -0.494*** -2.63
(0.099) (1.2) (0.106) (1.7)
Baseline Poverty 0.896*** 1.26*** 0.927*** 1.31***
(0.017) (0.0361) (0.0235) (0.066)
Percent Forest 1991 0.574** 6.22*** -0.0298 -2.73
(0.192) (2.34) (0.302) (4.75)
Distance to Major City 2.77E-06*** -2.47E-05*** 2.22E-06*** 1.12E-05
(4.88E-08) (5.98E-06) (6.33E-07) (9.69E-06)
Average Elevation 1.95E-04*** -0.0035*** -4.51E-05 6.70E-04
(4.39E-05) (0.00054) (9.09E-05) (0.0014)
Average Slope -0.003 0.027 0.006 0.071
(0.0027) (0.032) (0.005) (0.074)
Roadless Volume 2.67E-17 1.96E-15* -7.78E-17 1.58E-15
(9.26E-17) (1.11E-15) (8.29E-17 (1.41E-15)
R2=0.918 R2=0.848 R2=0.951 R2=0.845
DF=300 DF=287 DF=89 DF=83
F=481 F=229 F=245 F=64.8
Notes: Outcomes are indicated at column heads and represent 2001 poverty index and NBI.
***, **, * Indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level, respectively.
(Standard Errors)
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